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1、一课经济学中英文对照此一课经济学中英文对照版是在德赛公园开放式校译本v20090305基础上编辑而成的。主要参照此前出版的5个中译本。网友寻正对前六章做了新的校译。希望有一天Henry Hazlitt这本一课经济学，跟物理、化学并列科学教材，作为中学生的必修课。在此利用blog作一个开放的平台，欢迎有兴趣的朋友都来添砖加瓦。德赛公园主站http:/www.de-sci.org/blogs/dingdong/category/economics-in-one-lesson/Mises.org博客存档http:/mises.org/Community/blogs/dp/default.aspx“一
2、课”说来很简单，也就是经济学的首要教训。教训是一句话就说完了。对于不守教训的政府干预经济的政策，要一条条批下去，这样才能让人醒豁。Preface to the New Edition4新版序4Preface to the First Edition5第一版序5PART ONE: THE LESSON9The Lesson9第一编 主旨 第1章 关于这堂课9The Lesson Applied The Broken Window15第二编 课程的应用15第2章 破橱窗15The Blessings of Destruction 第3章 战祸之福17Public Works Mean Taxes2
3、4第4章 公共工程意味着增税24Taxes Discourage Production32第5章 税负抑制生产32Credit Diverts Production35第6章 政府信贷扭曲生产35The Curse of Machinery46第7章 诅咒机器46Spread-the-Work Schemes62第8章 分散工作机会的方案62Disbanding Troops and Bureaucrats68第9章 遣散军队和裁减公务员68The Fetish of Full Employment72第10章 盲目崇拜充分就业72Whos “Protected” by Tariffs?75第
4、11章 关税“保护”了哪些人？75The Drive for Exports88第12章 拉动出口88“Parity” Prices95第13章 “平准价格”95Saving the X Industry104第14章 救救X产业104How the Price System Works111第15章 价格体系如何运作？111“Stabilizing” Commodities119第16章 “稳定”物价119Government Price-Fixing128第17章 政府管制价格12818. What Rent Control Does140第18章 房租管制的后果140Minimum Wa
5、ge Laws148第19章 最低工资法令148Do Unions Really Raise Wages156第20章 工会真正提高了工资吗？156“Enough to Buy Back the Product” 第21章 “足以买回产品”171The Function of Profits 第22章 利润的功能180The Mirage of Inflation 第23章 通货膨胀的幻景185The Assault on Saving 第24章 抨击储蓄202The Lesson Restated 第25章 课后温习218The Lesson after Thirty Years230第三篇
6、 三十年后的这堂课 第26章 三十年后的这堂课230A Note on Books 后记与参考书目243Preface to the New Edition新版序The first edition of this book appeared in 1946. Eight translations were made of it, and there were numerous paperback editions. In a paperback of 1961, a new chapter was added on rent control, which had not been specif
7、ically considered in the first edition apart from government price-fixing in general. A few statistics and illustrative references were brought up to date.本书第一版于1946年面市，该版曾被译成八种文字，并出过好些平装版本。在1961年版的平装本中，我加写了新的一章，探讨租金管制的问题，这个课题在第一版中并没有从一般的政府定价中拿出来单独讨论。1961年版还更新了部分统计数据和用作说明例证的参考资料。Otherwise no changes
8、 were made until now. The chief reason was that they were not thought necessary. My book was written to emphasize general economic principles, and the penalties of ignoring them-not the harm done by any specific piece of legislation. While my illustrations were based mainly on American experience, t
9、he kind of government interventions I deplored had become so internationalized that I seemed to many foreign readers to be particularly describing the economic policies of their own countries.此外，本书内容在此新版前再无其他改动，主要是我认为没有大改的必要。本书是为了强调一般性的经济科学原理，强调忽视这些原理会受到的惩罚，而不是去探讨特定政策法规对经济可能造成的危害。书中的例证虽然主要取材于美国经验，但作
10、者所责难的政府干预行为在各个国家是如此普遍，以至于在许多外国读者看来，作者就像特地在描述他们自己国家的经济政策。Nevertheless, the passage of thirty-two years now seems to me to call for extensive revision. In addition to bringing all illustrations and statistics up to date, I have written an entirely new chapter on rent control; the 1961 discussion now s
11、eems inadequate. And I have added a new final chapter, “The Lesson After Thirty Years,” to show why that lesson is today more desperately needed than ever.H.H.Wilton, Conn.June 1978时隔32年，该对此书作一个全面修订了。我对例证资料和统计资料做了全面更新，并彻底重写了租金管制那一章，因为1961年版的讨论现在看来还不够充分。另外，我加写了最后一章“三十年后的这堂课”，以说明今天我们上这堂课比以往更为迫切的原因。亨利黑
12、兹利特于康涅狄格州，威尔顿镇1978年6月Preface to the First Edition第一版序This book is an analysis of economic fallacies that are at last so prevalent that they have almost become a new orthodoxy. The one thing that has prevented this has been their own self-contradictions, which have scattered those who accept the same
13、 premises into a hundred different “schools,” for the simple reason that it is impossible in matters touching practical life to be consistently wrong. But the difference between one new school and another is merely that one group wakes up earlier than another to the absurdities to which its false pr
14、emises are driving it, and becomes at that moment inconsistent by either unwittingly abandoning its false premises or accepting conclusions from them less disturbing or fantastic than those that logic would demand.本书在于分析那些盛行到几乎成为新的正统学说的经济学谬误。阻碍它们成为正统学说的一个因素，在于这些谬误本身自相矛盾，让接受同样前提的学者各执一端形成百家争鸣的“学派”。道理很
15、简单，跟现实相联系的问题，是不可能一直错下去的。一个新兴学派与另一个的区别无非就是一群人比另一群人更早地认识到基于错误前提所进行的推导多么荒谬，那一刻，由于是无意间放弃了错误的前提，或是由于接受了相对于其内在逻辑所推导出的不那么诡异与令人难以接受的结论，那种区别又会化为矛盾。There is not a major government in the world at this moment, however, whose economic policies are not influenced if they are not almost wholly determined by accep
16、tance of some of these fallacies. Perhaps the shortest and surest way to an understanding of economics is through a dissection of such errors, and particularly of the central error from which they stem. That is the assumption of this volume and of its somewhat ambitious and belligerent title.然而，当今主要
17、国家的政府所采取的经济政策，即便不是全部被那些盛行的经济学谬误所左右，也必然都受到了那些经济谬误的深刻影响。所以，剖析这些谬误，尤其是衍生出这些谬误的核心谬误，也许是了解经济学的最简捷且最可靠的方法。本书的构思，以及看上去多少有些雄心勃勃与挑战意味的书名，正是来源于这个信念。The volume is therefore primarily one of exposition. It makes no claim to originality with regard to any of the chief ideas that it expounds. Rather its effort is
18、 to show that many of the ideas which now pass for brilliant innovations and advances are in fact mere revivals of ancient errors, and a further proof of the dictum that those who are ignorant of the past are condemned to repeat it.本书属于阐释性质。本书所阐述的主要观点，皆非原创。相反，本书将致力于揭示，当今许多被看作是卓越的创新和发展的观点只不过是换了新马甲的古老
19、谬误，进而印证“忘记历史，就意味着重蹈覆辙”这句格言。The present essay itself is, I suppose, unblushingly “classical,” “traditional” and “orthodox”; at least these are the epithets with which those whose sophisms are here subjected to analysis will no doubt attempt to dismiss it. But the student whose aim is to attain as muc
20、h truth as possible will not be frightened by such adjectives. He will not be forever seeking a revolution, a “fresh start,” in economic thought. His mind will, of course, be as receptive to new ideas as to old ones; but he will be content to put aside merely restless or exhibitionistic straining fo
21、r novelty and originality. As Morris R. Cohen has remarked *: “The notion that we can dismiss the views of all previous thinkers surely leaves no basis for the hope that our own work will prove of any value to others.”本书的内容，我觉得，应当算是“古典的”、“传统的”或“正统的”吧，起码，抱持那些谬误的人会用这些名义来否定我的分析。但是那些努力探求真理的学生，则不应该被几个形容词
22、吓住。学生们不应该总想着寻找革命性的、“全新”的经济学思想，他们应该是既接纳老观念，又欢迎新观念，应该摒弃浮躁而不是好炫求酷，一味地追寻新奇和原创。莫里斯科恩（Morris R. Cohen）说过：“如果说我们能够推翻以前所有思想家的理论，那么我也不敢奢望自己的作品对别人会有任何价值。”footnotes:理性与本质（Reason and Nature), 1931Because this is a work of exposition I have availed myself freely and without detailed acknowledgment (except for ra
23、re footnotes and quotations) of the ideas of others. This is inevitable when one writes in a field in which many of the worlds finest minds have labored. But my indebtedness to at least three writers is of so specific a nature that I cannot allow it to pass unmentioned. My greatest debt, with respec
24、t to the kind of expository framework on which the present argument is hung, is to Frederic Bastiats essay Ce qu on voit et ce quon ne voit pas, now nearly a century old. The present work may, in fact, be regarded as a modernization, extension and generalization of the approach found in Bastiats pam
25、phlet. My second debt is to Philip Wicksteed: in particular the chapters on wages and the final summary chapter owe much to his Common-sense of Political Economy. My third debt is to Ludwig von Mises. Passing over everything that this elementary treatise may owe to his writings in general, my most s
26、pecific debt is to his exposition of the manner in which the process of monetary inflation is spread.由于这是一部阐释性著作，我会自由地利用他人的观点而不必作具体说明（除了少数脚注和引文外）。在经济学这个诸多先贤辛勤耕耘过的领域写作，这样做在所难免。不过，有三位作者对我有特别的帮助，我不能不提及。首先要感谢弗雷德里克巴斯夏（Frederic Bastiat），本书中的阐释所采用的框架得益于巴斯夏一百年前发表的文章（Ce quon voit et ce quon ne voit pas）。事实上，
27、本书可视为巴斯夏原文所用的分析方法的现代版，是其延伸和扩展。其次，要感谢菲利普威克斯第德（Philip Wicksteed），特别是关于工资的章节和课后温习那一章，多得益于他所著的政治经济常识（The Common Sense of Political Economy）。最后要感谢路德维希米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises），除了他对我这本粗浅的入门著作在写作上的指点，特别地要感谢他对通货膨胀过程散播方式的说明。When analyzing fallacies, I have thought it still less advisable to mention particular na
28、mes than in giving credit. To do so would have required special justice to each writer criticized, with exact quotations, account taken of the particular emphasis he places on this point or that, the qualifications he makes, his personal ambiguities, inconsistencies, and so on. I hope, therefore, th
29、at no one will be too disappointed at the absence of such names as Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Major Douglas, Lord Keynes, Professor Alvin Hansen and others in these pages. The object of this book is not to expose the special errors of particular writers, but economic errors in their most frequent,
30、 widespread or influential form. Fallacies, when they have reached the popular stage, become anonymous anyway. The subtleties or obscurities to be found in the authors most responsible for propagating them are washed off. A doctrine becomes simplified; the sophism that may have been buried in a netw
31、ork of qualifications, ambiguities or mathematical equations stands clear. I hope I shall not be accused of injustice on the ground, therefore, that a fashionable doctrine in the form in which I have presented it is not precisely the doctrine as it has been formulated by Lord Keynes or some other sp
32、ecial author. It is the beliefs which politically influential groups hold and which governments act upon that we are interested in here, not the historical origins of those beliefs.我认为在分析谬误时，不同于对贡献的评价，要避免指名道姓。若要指名道姓，就得公允地对待每一位被批评的学者，引录其著述原文，叙述其对某个问题的特殊见解，列明其所给定的限定条件，指出其表达暧昧或前后矛盾之处等。因此，书内并没有具体提及卡尔马克思
33、（Karl Marx）、索尔斯坦凡勃伦（Thorstein Veblen）、大道格拉斯（Major Douglas）、凯恩斯爵士（Lord John M. Keynes）、阿尔文汉森（Alvin Hansen）和其他人，但愿读者不会太失望。本书的目的并不在于揭露某某学者所犯下的某个错误，而是在于分析经济生活中那些最常见的、流传最广的、影响力最大的经济学谬误。谬论一旦流行开来，便责怪不到谁的头上,散布谬误负有主要责任的作者的细节与隐晦之处会在流传中消失。当用于包装谬误的理论被简化成泛泛的教条，那些可能隐藏在一堆限定条件、含混表达或数学方程式中的诡辩就会显现出来。本书所讨论的流行教条跟凯恩斯或其他
34、某位学者所陈述的学说不完全相同，希望大家不要因为这些不同就责怪我处理不公。我们在这里所感兴趣的，是那些有强大政治影响力的集团抱持的信条，以及政府的政策行动所依据的信条，而不是这些信条的历史渊源。I hope, finally, that I shall be forgiven for making such rare reference to statistics in the following pages. To have tried to present statistical confirmation, in referring to the effects of tariffs, p
35、rice-fixing, inflation, and the controls over such commodities as coal, rubber and cotton, would have swollen this book much beyond the dimensions contemplated. As a working newspaper man, moreover, I am acutely aware of how quickly statistics become out of date and are superseded by later figures.
36、Those who are interested in specific economic problems are advised to read current “realistic discussions of them, with statistical documentation: they will not find it difficult to interpret the statistics correctly in the light of the basic principles they have learned.书中极少引用统计资料，望读者见谅。倘若要引述统计资料作论
37、据，去论证关税、政府限价、通货膨胀，去论证政府对于煤炭、橡胶、棉花等商品的进行管制所产生的影响，那么本书的篇幅势必远远超出预先的设想。还有，作为一个报界从业人士，我非常清楚统计数字更新的频率有多快。我建议那些对特定的经济问题感兴趣的读者，结合统计资料，去翻阅即时的“现实”问题讨论：相信大多数读者会发现，用学到的基本原理去正确解读统计数字并非难事。I have tried to write this book as simply and with as much freedom from technicalities as is consistent with reasonable accura
38、cy, so that it can be fully understood by a reader with no previous acquaintance with economics.本书中的文字力求通俗易懂，力求在不丧失合理的准确性的前提下，尽量避免过分专业化，以便还不了解经济学的读者同样能充分理解。While this book was composed as a unit, three chapters have already appeared as separate articles, and I wish to thank the New York Times, the A
39、merican Scholar and the New Leader for permission to reprint material originally published in their pages. I am grateful to Professor von Mises for reading the manuscript and for helpful suggestions. Responsibility for the opinions expressed is, of course, entirely my own.Henry HazlittNew YorkMarch
40、25, 1946当本书编为单行本时，先已有三个章节分别独立发表于纽约时报（New York Times）、美国学人（American Scholar）、新领袖杂志（New Leader），感谢三家允许我将这些篇章收集于本书中。米塞斯教授校阅了本书手稿，并且提出了许多有益的建议，这里表示感谢。当然，对于书中所表述的各种观点，言论责任完全由作者本人承担。亨利黑兹利特于纽约1946年3月25日PART ONE: THE LESSON第一编 主旨The Lesson第1章 关于这堂课Economics is haunted by more fallacies than any other study
41、known to man. This is no accident. The inherent difficulties of the subject would be great enough in any case, but they are multiplied a thousandfold by a factor that is insignificant in, say, physics, mathematics or medicine-the special pleading of selfish interests. While every group has certain e
42、conomic interests identical with those of all groups, every group has also, as we shall see, interests antagonistic to those of all other groups. While certain public policies would in the long run benefit everybody, other policies would benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The
43、 group that would benefit by such policies, having such a direct interest in them, will argue for them plausibly and persistently. It will hire the best buyable minds to devote their whole time to presenting its case. And it will finally either convince the general public that its case is sound, or
44、so befuddle it that clear thinking on the subject becomes next to impossible.在人类所知领域中，经济学总是被更多的谬误所困扰。这决非出于偶然。这门学科内在的难度原本就高，再加上人类好为追求私利掩饰辩护，对于物理学、数学、医学等其他学科而言，这种倾向无关紧要，但在经济学就把问题无数倍地复杂化了。我们将在本书中看到，尽管每个群体都有某些经济利益和所有群体的完全一致，但各自又都存在着与其他不同群体的利益相抵触的利益关系。尽管有一些公共政策从长远来看对所有人都有利，但其它的政策却是以牺牲其他群体的利益为代价来维护某些群体的利益
45、。能够从那些政策直接获利的群体，会在利益的驱使下不遗余力地主张积极实施相关政策。他们会雇来花钱所能雇到的最好的专家来全力宣扬有利于他们的学说。这样做的结果，要不会让大众信以为真，也会让大众稀里糊涂，以至于接下来对经济科学几乎再也无法做清晰地思考。In addition to these endless pleadings of self-interest, there is a second main factor that spawns new economic fallacies every day. This is the persistent tendency of men to se
46、e only the immediate effects of a given policy, or its effects only on a special group, and to neglect to inquire what the long-run effects of that policy will be not only on that special group but on all groups. It is the fallacy of overlooking secondary consequences.除去这些无休无止对私人利益的辩护，还有另一个重要因素导致新的经
47、济学谬误每天都在产生。那就是：人们有着天生短视的倾向，总是只关注某项政策的即时影响，或者只关注政策对某个特殊群体产生的影响，而不去探究那项政策对所有群体造成的长远影响。这本身就是忽略种种续发后果的谬误。In this lies the whole difference between good economics and bad. The bad economist sees only what immediately strikes the eye; the good economist also looks beyond. The bad economist sees only the d
48、irect consequences of a proposed course; the good economist looks also at the longer and indirect consequences. The bad economist sees only what the effect of a given policy has been or will be on one particular group; the good economist inquires also what the effect of the policy will be on all groups.好经济学与坏经济学之间的全部区别就在于此。坏经济学家只顾及眼前所见的利弊得失，而好经济学家则看得更远；坏经济学家只观察经济政策提案中的行动产生的直接结果，好经济学家还会考察更长远的间接结果；坏经济学家只关注某项政策对某个特殊群体已经产生或者即将产生的影响，好经济学家还会去探究该政策对所有群体产生的影响。The distinction may seem obvious. The precaution of looking for all the consequences
