天津大学ppt课件模板.ppt

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1、目录,1. Introduction2. Literature Review3. Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5

2、.2 Performance-Based Contract6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers8. Conclusions,1. Introduction,供货商,买方,

3、产品,PBC,RBC,可靠性私有信息,使用,备用库存,维护,背景介绍,文献回顾,2. Literature Review,PBC for outsourced servicesasymmetric information in operations managementthe use of warranties as a signaling mechanism,建模,3. Model,3.1 Repair Process and Inventory PolicyN: identical copies;B: inventory backorder;s: inventory;The expecte

4、d backorders in steady state isAvailability is equal to,建模,3.2 Cost StructureEach time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0.The buyers expected cost is equal toThe vendors expected cost is equal to,建模,3.3 Information StructureWe assume that the product offered by the vendor is

5、 one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering(危险率序):Excess wealth ordering(剩余财富序):,建模,3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsWe can write the buyers expected payoff asThe vendors expected payoff is given byRBC:PBC:,建模,3.5 Signaling Ga

6、meWe assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at .We seek a perfect Bayesian e

7、quilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.,建模,4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information,Given the vendor type , the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.,建模,5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory,We now consider the setting in which the vendor possesse

8、s private information about product reliability.,5.1 Resource-Based ContractThe value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.,建模,5.1 Resource-Based Contract,In summary, successful signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC

9、when her inventory choice is verifiable, but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.,建模,5.2 Performance-Based Contract,Therefore, successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable. However, PBC pres

10、ents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.,建模,6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory,6.1 Resource-Based ContractWith inventory no longer verifiable, the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the

11、 verifiable inventory case.An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.,建模,6.2 Performance-Based ContractThe reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium.Overall, we find that the interaction between the vendors discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive c

12、reates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.,建模,Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?Thus, the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overi

13、nvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC, which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.,扩展,7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies,Endogenizing Inventory VerifiabilityPooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers,结论,8. Conclusions,Suggestions: The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency.An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling, in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.,谢谢!,

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