药物和其他医疗产品的绩效风险分担安排(34).ppt

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1、Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangementsfor Drugs and Other Medical Products:An Overview,April 3,2011 IHE Innovative Approaches to Industry-Payer Agreements:National Roundtable Program Pre-Conference Event CADTH Symposium April 3rd,2011 The Fairmont Hotel Vancouver Vancouver,British Columbia Lou

2、Garrison,Ph.D.,Professor and Associate DirectorPharmaceutical Outcomes Research and Policy ProgramUniversity of Washington,Seattle,Washington,USA,1,Acknowledgments,Collaborators:Sean Sullivan,Josh Carlson,Adrian Towse,David Veenstra,Peter Neumann,Rick CarlsonSponsors:NovartisJohnson&JohnsonGSKGE Hea

3、lthcareRochePfizerEli LillySanofi-AventisAbbott LaboratoriesAmgen,2,Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements:A Variety of Names,outcomes-based schemes risk-sharing agreements coverage with evidence developmentaccess with evidence development patient access schemesconditional licensingmanaged entr

4、y schemespay-for-performance programs And others?,3,outcomes-based schemes,risk-sharing agreements,coverage with evidence development,access with evidence development,patient access schemes,conditional licensing,managed entry schemes,and pay-for-performance programs.For purposes of this discussion,w

5、e group all of these under the broad term“performance-based risk-sharing arrangements.”,4,Why the“sudden”interest?Fad or trend?,Understanding the cause should be helpful to predict long-term adoption and impact.Two general explanations:1)Innovationits a new invention.2)Environment has changed.Some“t

6、rends”may be fads:Example:disease management(carve-outs)But we are seeing more formalized processesKey principles for Patient Access Schemes in the UK,Cost Pressures,Increasing drug expenditures attributed to:Use of high cost biopharmaceuticals for common,chronic conditions(RA,Asthma,Psoriasis,etc)E

7、xpensive,combination biopharmaceutical treatments in oncology and infectious diseasePrescribing beyond evidence and approved indicationsOther factors(aging population,fewer resources,etc),Real cost of new branded drugs is risingfewer approvals and higher R&D spending.,Why the interest in performance

8、-based risk-sharing?,Health care production is complex:Economists think of it as a“Health Production Function”:Output=f(Inputs)Health=H(hospital stays,doctors visits,drugs,OTHER)The physician acts as the“patients agent”in organizing and advising on this process.Historically,either(1)all of these inp

9、uts were provided by a system of care or(2)each input is purchased on a fee-for-service basisor some mix of these.,But the process is so complex that no one has offered guarantees of good outcomes.,7,8,Greater interest in“pay for performance”,In the U.S,for health plan processes and for physician se

10、rvices.Internationally,for branded drugs.,9,Why the new interest?What has changed?Working hypothesis:Performance-based agreements are a market response to increasing cost pressures:manufacturers have incentive(esp.in US)to push prices to limit of willingness to pay,and payers are pushing back.,Defin

11、itions,Performance-based agreement:An agreement between a payer and a pharmaceutical,device,or diagnostic manufacturer where the coverage,price,and/or revenue received is related to the future performance of the product in either a research or real-world environment.Risk-sharing agreement(de Pouvour

12、ville,2006):“a contract between two parties who agree to engage in a transaction in which there are uncertainties concerning its final value.Nevertheless,one party has sufficient confidence in its claims of either effectiveness or efficiency that it is ready to accept a reward or a penalty depending

13、 on the observed performance.”(emphasis added).,We use these terms interchangeably.,10,Key Elements of Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements,There is an agreement about a program of data collection to reduce uncertainty about the expected cost-effectiveness of the drug(or device or diagnostic)

14、.The coverage,price,and/or revenue is linked to the outcome of this program of data collection.This may be prospective or retrospective.It can be about health outcomes and cost-effectiveness or about budgets.These arrangements provide a different distribution of risk as between the payer and the man

15、ufacturer than“conventional”arrangements*.*de Pouvourville EJHE,2006,11,Two Analytic Approaches,Economic Theory(deductive)What does theory say about the historical risk-sharing between manufacturers and payers?Why might this have changed?Empirical Practice(inductive)What examples have arisen in the

16、real world?What do their characteristics tell us about potential factors?,12,Some Theory,13,Some Important Economic Terms and Concepts,“Market failure”when“free markets”do not provide an“optimal”allocation of resourcesoften when the conditions for a free market are not met.For example,public goods,e

17、xternalities,informational asymmetry,uncertainty,etc.patent protection to incentivize investment and risk-taking“Public good”a good for which one persons usage or consumption does not keep other from using it,e.g.,national defense.The free market can be expected to undersupply public goods.We addres

18、s this with interventions,such as“intellectual property”and public subsidies.There can be a“free rider”problem.Information and scientific advances can be public goodseven“global public goods”The whole world has a stake in innovative pharmaceutical R&D.Economists agree that“differential pricing”would

19、 be an improvement:the challenge is how to implement it.,15,Basics:The Pervasiveness of Uncertainty,Drugs are approved,launched,and reimbursed under conditions of uncertainty,affecting many key parameters:Efficacy(heterogeneity)Effectiveness in real worldRisks(safety)Models,including links between s

20、urrogate markers and long-term outcomesCost-effectivenessBudget impact.,VariabilityUncertainty(=Risk)Gathering more evidence to reduce uncertainty is costly.,16,The Historical Risk-Sharing“Equilibrium”,Risk to manufacturer:we operate with a blockbuster financing model for R&D.Intellectual propertypa

21、tent protection to incentivize investment and risk-taking There is no ex ante clause to share innovation cost or to purchase drugs.Risk to payer:The payer negotiates a price and/or use.The payer bears the risks of making a bad buy(i.e.,when incremental health benefits are not worth the additional co

22、st).The payer is free to collect post-launch data.Manufacturers will only do this if it is in their competitive interests.Individual countries strike different types of deals with manufacturersRange of country environments:negotiated prices free pricingAll of this provides an incentive for manufactu

23、rers to seek highest justifiable price at launch.Manufacturers would like to price for future(larger)indications.,17,An Economic Framework:The Marginal Condition,Equilibrium condition:Demand Price=expected net monetary benefit(ENMB)=(.QALY gain)+nondrug cost offsetswhere is willingness to pay for QA

24、LY gains.However,if the buyer is risk-averse,and the demand price should be lower the greater the uncertainty.,Four Relevant Theoretical Approaches,Value of information(Eckermann and Willan,2008,2009)AN:to Adopt with No additional evidence collection DT:to Decline to adopt and seek further evidence

25、for example from a TrialAT:to Adopt but seek/require further evidence(for example via a Trial),e.g.,coverage with evidence collection.New option:AT+RSReal option theoryUncertainty and irreversibility make real options theory relevant.We can view DT(delay and trial)as a call option for the buyer,i.e.

26、,the payer is given the right to buy at a point in the future at the current price(i.e.,to take up the option of AN).,Four Relevant Theoretical Approaches(contd),Money-back guarantees and warrantiesCan get full rebate for non-performance:The consumer(payer)can“sell”the product back to the seller/man

27、ufacturer at the price paid.4.Portfolio theory(OBrien and Sculpher,2000)A risk-averse payer should only be concerned about risk they cannot diversify away by“portfolio diversification”:that is,covariance rather than variance matters.But covariance is an issue in medical care.,What insights do they p

28、rovide?,Importance of“efficient risk-bearing.”Importance of the value of informationweighing benefits and cost of delayDifferent risk preferences of public vs.private payers may matter.Diversifiability of risk matters.Importance of the public good nature of information.,A Taxonomy,Review of Performa

29、nce-Based Arrangements:Methods,Sources:PubMed,Scrip,Embase,and GoogleExperts and peers20 year time frameIncluded:Health outcomes based agreements:price,level,or nature of reimbursement are tied to measures ultimately related to patient quality or quantity of life.Excluded:non-outcomes based models i

30、ncluding price volume agreements,market share agreements,utilization caps Develop a taxonomy of agreements:Inductive approachRefined using a modified Delphi approach with experts in the area.,25,CED:Coverage with evidence development;CTC:Conditional treatment continuation;PLR:Performance linked reim

31、bursement;FU:Financial or utilization based agreements,Performance-based schemes by year,50 schemes,Performance-based schemes by country,26,CED:Coverage with evidence development;CTC:Conditional treatment continuation;PLR:Performance linked reimbursement;FU:Financial or utilization based agreements,

32、Taxonomy Definitions,Performance-based health outcomes schemes:price,level,or nature of reimbursement are tied to future performance measures of clinical or intermediate endpoints that are ultimately related to patient quality or quantity of life,Taxonomy Definitions(cont.),Conditional coverage:cove

33、rage is granted conditional on the initiation of a program of data collectionCoverage with evidence development:coverage is conditioned on collection of additional population level evidence,from pre specified study,to support continued,expanded,or withdrawal of coverageOnly in research:coverage cond

34、itional on individual participation in research(i.e.only patients participating in the scientific study are covered)Only with research:coverage conditional on agreement to conduct a study that informs the use of the medical product in the payer patient population,Taxonomy Definitions(cont.),Performa

35、nce-linked reimbursement:reimbursement level for covered products is tied,by formula,to the measure of clinical outcomes in the“real world”;Outcomes guarantees:manufacturer provides rebates,refunds,or price adjustments if their product fails to meet the agreed upon outcome targetsExample:J&J agreed

36、to reimburse the NHS in either cash or product for patients who do not respond(Response measure:50%decrease in serum M protein)after 4 cycles of treatment with Velcade.Responding patients receive additional 4 cycles.Pattern or process of care:reimbursement level is tied to the impact on clinical dec

37、ision making or practice patternsExample:UnitedHealthcare agreed to reimburse OncotypeDx test for 18 months while it and Genomic Health monitor the results.If the number of women receiving chemotherapy exceeds an agreed upon threshold,even if the test suggests they do not need it,the insurer will ne

38、gotiate a lower price.,*Of note,there were hybrid examples that had two or more of the above components.,Performance-based schemes in the U.S.,Barriers to Risk-Sharing Schemes(Carlson,Garrison,Sullivan;JMCP,2010),Associated transaction and administration costs;Limitations of current information syst

39、ems in terms of tracking performance;Agreeing on the scheme details(e.g.,the appropriate outcome measure or the financial adjudication process);Physician push-back;“Free-rider”problemother manufacturer or payer competitors may benefit from the information or schemes developed;and Lack of trust betwe

40、en payers and developers.,Conclusions,Performance-based agreements are in line with healthcare trendsThey are intrinsically appealingAlign incentives toward realized valueSubstantial barriers to implementation that will limit both the short-term and long-term impactEspecially in the US.They will not apply to all medical products,but rather to a select group where the payer and manufacturer can find common groundKey principles for implementation of Patient Access Schemes in the UK are an indication of continued interest,Fad or a trend?Stay tunedyet to be determined.,Thanks!lgarrisnuw.edu,

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