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1、附录二：外文文献译文1反倾销行为的流行为讨论倾销政策创造条件会帮助我们调查全球流行的倾销活动。反倾销政策的重要性做为一个论点与反倾销活动在全球流行成比列的增长。此外，怎样为美国制定合适的政策的概念从某种程度上依赖于别的国家现在的做法。打个比方，假如别的国家精力旺盛的制定反倾销政策但是美国却很少花精力在这上面，没有为多边协议跟别的国家谈判。很多观察员将会看到结果对美国公司不利，同时将会反对这些新政策。美国反倾销政策的反对者宣称相反的事物是正确的跟其他国家比起来，美国已经在运用反倾销政策上过于激进。在美国的带领下一些国家只是最近开始使用反倾销政策。一些国家开始对这种激进的反倾销政策感到不满，希望能
2、在WTO协议里对这些政策加入一些限制。哪些国家在使用反倾销法律只有一些国家很严重地在使用反倾销法律，在这些国家中美国是最活跃地使用者。通过估计，到目前为止至少是。没有别地国家可以和它相提并论。在对美国进口市场合理地设想下，美国巨大的进口量和巨大的国内生产总值不能够解释这么高水平的针对别的国家的反倾销活动。从1991年到1995年美国发起的反倾销案件每年平均超过49起。据报道，这占世界每年278起反倾销案件的18%,远远大于其他国家。在这五年期间，超过四分之三的美国出口货物出口到反倾销不到美国一半的国家去，只有5个国家的平均水平达到每年20起，10个国家只有每年8起反倾销案件。包括美国，总共有2
3、5个国家在这5年内发起反倾销案件。三个国家澳大利亚、芬兰、瑞典在1995年1月1号加入了欧共体。因此现在发起的都是欧共体市场的反倾销案件，而不是他们自己独自发起了。19911995年各个国家平均发起的反倾销案件当我们看看美国常用的反倾销措施就会感到更震惊，美国有294款反倾销措施在1995年12月31号实施。占世界全部的35。没有哪个国家能比的上它的一半。下一个很积极反倾销的就是欧共体。它有133起反倾销措施，再下面就是加拿大（98）、墨西哥（81）。1991年到1995年期间，四分之三的美国出口货物出口到反倾销没有美国三分之一的国家去。这么高的反倾销案件和措施不一定指出美国的行为是特别激进的
4、。美国是一个有很大进口数量的大国，所以我们可以想到，比起小进口量的国家它会更频繁的遭到倾销。反倾销不应该随进口数量的增长而增长。相反，因为国内生产总值反倾销措施的征税应该降低，原因就是一定数量的倾销对一个有这么大GDP的国家的伤害应该是很小的。使这种可能变小的方法是让任何强加的反倾销案件都通过具体伤害标准。在把大数量的进口货物考虑进去的同时也应该同时考虑美国自己巨大的国内生产总值。反倾销案件的精确功能是否会随着进口数量和GDP的改变而改变取决于怎样去假设市场和出口公司的行为。在一个合理的假设下。反倾销案件的数量和措施应该大致上和进口在GDP中的比率成比列。这些假定和相应解释性的论点如下所述。假
5、定一个出口商希望出口的数量跟这个国家的规模成比列，依次大致上和GDP成比例。外国出口商的数量大致上跟全部进口量除以国内的各公司的平均进口量成比列。假设从事倾销公司的数量和出口商的数量成比列，那反倾销案件和措施也应该大致上跟全部进口量除以这个国家的GDP成比列。有人可以提出其他合理的功能方式勿庸置疑的改变这个假定。然而，在全部的方式中的案件和措施应该有增加进口的功能和减少GDP的功能。为了说明进口数量和经济之间的相互影响，中央预算办公室已经建立了一个跟前面描述的假定一致的有开始指数和活动措施索引的案件。创造者根据一个国家从1991年到1995年每年平均的反倾销案件除以这个国家每年平均的进口占国内
6、生产总值比率的值得出。同样，后者等于在1995年12月31日反倾销措施的数量除以这个国家每年平均的进口占国内生产总值比率。按照这些指数的标准，美国的反倾销活动比现在发布的更多，美国的反倾销指数大于任何国家，他几乎是欧洲共同体的一半，也是使用反倾销措施最多的国家。同样的，美国反倾销措施指数也是大于任何国家，他是欧洲共同体的一倍。欧洲共同体排在第二名。美国对别的国家实施的反倾销跟别的国家对美国的反倾销比较是怎么样的前面的统计表指出美国的反倾销活动远远高于其他的国家。美国对别的国家实施的反倾销跟别的国家对美国的反倾销比较是怎么样的更可能引起政策制定者的关心。比起别的国家对美国实施的反倾销措施，美国有
7、更多更充分的措施来对付这些国家。（虽然令人惊讶，事实不能必然的说明美国是这些反倾销措施最积极的使用者，因为别的国家可能对美国执行不成比例的反倾销。）总之。在1995年12月31日美国对别的国家实施了294起反倾销，但是别的国家对美国的反倾销却只有87起，在国家跟国家的基础上。美国对这47个国家的反倾销都比这47个国家对美国的多（除了东德，他被包括在各国之内）。只有11个国家对美国采取了更多的措施。这11个国家包括加拿大、墨西哥。跟他们比起来美国有更多的贸易量。然而，这些里面也有欧共体的成员国(澳大利亚，丹麦，芬兰，希腊，爱尔兰，卢森堡公国，葡萄牙)。像全部的欧共体国家一样。他们没有自己的反倾销
8、政策，但是他们统一使用欧共体的反倾销政策。表1中各欧共体国家对美国实施的反倾销措施就是欧共体的主张的政策。然而根据那样来计算反倾销措施，可能不是最好的反映欧共体反倾销政策障碍美国出口货物到每个欧共体国家的指标。美国有57项针对各个欧共体的措施，但是欧盟只有2项针对美国的措施。即使乘以15（欧共体国家的数量）只会给欧共体带来30项针对美国的措施，只有美国针对欧盟措施的一半。像以前，有人可能会企图用这些数量的措施来解释潜在的交易量。美国处于贸易赤字，进口大于出口。因此，假如有人希望一个国家针对别的国家的反倾销措施应该大致上跟这个国家进口的量成比例，那比起别的国家针对美国的反倾销措施，美国应该要有更
9、多的反倾销措施来针对别的国家。然而美国的贸易赤字不足以解释反倾销措施的不同。在1995年12月31日，美国对别的国家每100亿出口到美国的货物几乎有5项反倾销措施。但是别的国家对美国每100亿的出口货物只有两项反倾销措施（相当于别的国家100亿的进口量）。在国家跟国家的基础上，区分美国针对别的国家出口到美国的货物的反倾销措施和区分别的国家针对美国出口到这些国家货物的反倾销措施几乎不能改变这个统计表。美国在对48个国家每单位上的反倾销措施大于这些国家对美国的。只有11个国家是相反的。 June E. ONeill:在全球和美国流行的反倾销行为: 一个对全球数据的分析，芝加哥大学出版社M 原文1
10、THE PREVALENCE OF ANTIDUMPING ACTIONTo set the stage for discussing antidumping policy, it helps to examine the prevalence of antidumping activity around the world. The significance of antidumping policy as an issue increases in proportion to the prevalence of antidumping activity. Furthermore, noti
11、ons of what constitutes proper policy for the United States can depend to some extent on what the rest of the world is doing. For example, if most of the world was vigorously pursuing antidumping policy and the United States began to pursue it less vigorously without first negotiating a multilateral
12、 agreement for all countries to do so, many observers would view the result as unfair to U.S. firms and oppose the new policy on those grounds. Opponents of U.S. antidumping policy claim that the opposite is true-that the United States has been more aggressive in its use of antidumping policy than m
13、ost countries; that many countries have only recently begun to make significant use of antidumping policy, following the lead of the United States and a few other countries; and that a number of countries have been unhappy with aggressive antidumping enforcement and have wanted more severe constrain
14、ts put on such policies in the WTO agreement. Which Countries Make Use of Antidumping Laws? Only a few countries make significant use of antidumping laws, and the United States is the most active user among those countries. By some measures it is by far the most active user, with no other country co
15、ming close. Under a reasonable set of assumptions about the import market, the large quantities of U.S. imports and the large U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) do not explain the high levels of U.S. activity relative to those of other countries. The United States initiated an average of just over 49
16、 antidumping cases per year from 1991 through 1995 (see Figure 1 and Table B-1). That number was 18 percent of the reported total world average of 278 initiations per year and was more than the number reported by any other country.(10) Over three-quarters of U.S. exports during the five-year period
17、went to countries that averaged fewer than half that many initiations per year. Only five other countries averaged as many as 20 initiations per year, and only eight averaged as many as 10. Including the United States, 25 countries reported initiating cases during the five-year period. Three of them
18、-Austria, Finland, and Sweden-joined the EC/U on January 1, 1995, and therefore now come under the EC/U antidumping policy and no longer initiate cases on their own. The picture is more striking when one looks at the stock of active antidumping measures. The United States had 294 antidumping measure
19、s in effect on December 31, 1995-35 percent of the reported world total. No other country had as many as half that number. The next most active user of antidumping laws was the EC/U, which had 133 active measures, followed by Canada (98) and Mexico (81). Over three-quarters of U.S. exports from 1991
20、 through 1995 went to countries that had fewer than one-third the number of active measures that the United States had at the end of the period. The high numbers of U.S. cases and measures do not necessarily indicate that U.S. activity is particularly aggressive. The United States is a large country
21、 with large quantities of imports, and one would expect such a country to encounter dumping more frequently than a country with small quantities of imports. In addition to increasing with the quantity of imports, however, the number of antidumping measures imposed should decrease with the size of gr
22、oss domestic product. The reason is that the degree of injury resulting from a given quantity of dumped imports should be less for a country with a large GDP, making it less likely that any given case will pass the material-injury standard required for imposing antidumping measures. Analysis that ta
23、kes the large quantity of U.S. imports into account must also take the large size of U.S. GDP into account. The precise functional form according to which the number of cases would be expected to vary as import quantities and GDP change depends on what one assumes about the markets and the behavior
24、of exporting firms. Under one reasonable set of assumptions, the number of cases and measures imposed should be roughly proportional to the ratio of imports to GDP. Those assumptions and the corresponding explanatory argument are as follows. Assume that the quantity a foreign exporter will want to e
25、xport to a country is roughly proportional to the size of the market, which in turn is roughly proportional to GDP. The number of foreign exporters would be equal to the total quantity of the countrys imports divided by the average quantity imported from each firm. It follows that the number of fore
26、ign exporters is roughly proportional to a countrys total imports divided by its GDP. If one assumes that the number of firms engaged in dumping is proportional to the number of firms exporting to the country, then the number of antidumping cases and measures should be roughly proportional to total
27、imports of the country divided by its GDP. One could undoubtedly alter the assumptions and come up with other reasonable functional forms. However, in all reasonable forms the number of cases and measures should be an increasing function of imports and a decreasing function of GDP. To account for th
28、e effects of import quantities and the size of the economy, CBO has constructed a case initiation index and an active measure index in accordance with the assumptions just described. The former is equal to the average number of cases a country initiated per year from 1991 through 1995 divided by the
29、 countrys average annual ratio of imports to GDP over the period. Similarly, the latter is equal to the number of active measures the country had on December 31, 1995, divided by the countrys average annual ratio of imports to GDP from 1991 through 1995. As measured by those indices, U.S. antidumpin
30、g activity stands out even more than by the numbers already presented. The antidumping case initiation index for the United States is larger than that for any other country, and it is almost half again as large as that for the EC/U, which is the next most active user of antidumping law by this measu
31、re. Similarly, the active antidumping measure index for the United States is also larger than that for any other country, and it is over twice as large as that for the EC/U, which is the next most active user by this measure. How Does U.S. Antidumping Activity Against Other Countries Compare with Th
32、eir Activity Against the United States? The foregoing statistics indicate that U.S. antidumping activity is much higher than that of other countries. What may be of more concern to policymakers, however, is how U.S. activity against other countries compares with the activity of those countries again
33、st the United States. The United States has substantially more active measures against other countries than those countries have against it. (Though surprising, that fact does not necessarily follow from the fact that the United States is the most active user, since other countries might aim their e
34、nforcement disproportionately at U.S. firms.) Overall, the United States had 294 active antidumping measures against other countries on December 31, 1995, compared with only 87 measures against it. On a country-by-country basis, the United States has more active measures against each of 47 countries
35、 than those countries have against the United States (excluding the former East Germany, which is included with Germany for this tally). Only 11 countries have more measures against the United States than the United States has against them. The 11 include neighbors Canada and Mexico, with whom the U
36、nited States has large amounts of trade. However, they also include seven members of the EC/U (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal), which, like all EC/U members, do not have their own antidumping policies but instead are covered by the policy of the EC/U. The number
37、 of measures against the United States attributed to each EC/U member in Table 1 is the number maintained by the EC/U. Counting the measures in that way, however, may not be the best indicator of the degree to which EC/U antidumping policy hinders U.S. exports to each of the members individually. Th
38、e United States has 57 measures against various EC/U members, whereas the EC/U has only two against the United States. Even multiplying the two by 15 (the number of EC/U members) brings the EC/U up to only 30 measures against the United States, which is just over one-half as many as the United State
39、s has against the EC/U. As before, one might be tempted to explain those numbers as being the result of underlying trade volumes. The United States runs a trade deficit with the rest of the world, importing more than it exports. Consequently, if one expects the number of antidumping measures that on
40、e country maintains against another to be roughly proportional to the amount that it imports from that country, the United States should have more antidumping measures against the rest of the world than the rest of the world maintains against the United States. The U.S. trade deficit, however, is no
41、t enough to explain the differences in the numbers of active measures. On December 31, 1995, the United States maintained almost five active antidumping measures against other countries for every $10 billion of U.S. imports, whereas other countries maintained fewer than two active measures against t
42、he United States for every $10 billion of U.S. exports (equivalent to $10 billion of imports by other countries from the United States).On a country-by-country basis, dividing U.S. measures against other countries by U.S. imports from those countries while at the same time dividing other countries m
43、easures against the United States by U.S. exports to those countries (equivalent to imports by those countries from the United States) does almost nothing to change the statistics. The United States maintains more measures per unit of trade against each of 48 countries than those countries maintain
44、against the United States. The reverse is true for only 11 countries. June E. ONeill:ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DATA，University of Chicago PressM译文2不公平贸易的法律魔鬼在细节里Brink Lindsey 和 Dan Ikenson著摘要：因为很少有人知道美国的反倾销法实际上是如何工作的,所以一部分这些法律在美国得到了广泛的
45、政治支持。它令人费解的复杂性技术除了少数业内人士和专家能了解,几乎所有的人都不知道它所谓的“公平”和“正当的竞争”这些听起来很吸引人的花言巧语下的本质。在本研究中我们希望通过详细审查它来洞察反倾销法复杂盾牌下的迷雾。在这里我们提供了一个详细的、一步步的向导来说明在目前的统治下倾销是怎样被定义和执行的。另外，我们发现他们使用许多遁词和偏见的方法把本来正常和建康的竞争诬蔑为“不公平”，然后经常征收极其高的反倾销税。从这个分析得出的勿庸置疑的结论就是反倾销法以它现在的立场对维持“正当的竞争”起不到任何作用。事实上反倾销政策主要的作用就是给守旧的保护主义提供美妙的借口。我们用各种不同的方法来举例说明反
46、倾销法严重的方法缺陷。首先，我们用一个简单的例子来演示倾销计算操作是如何的挑剔以致使人对倾销产生了幻影。再次，我们用从18个不同在倾销中记录下来的实际案例对在特殊的和现实生活中被扭曲的倾销方法的作用进行量化。最后，我们提出一个详细的假设案例，通过对案例中倾销计算的每个步骤的说明和如实地重现进行研究。在这个案例中，我们说明了一个在美国的国外生产者是怎样用比自己家乡市场高13.95%的网络价格出售小器具的，尽管倾销利润高达7.37%。导言：许多年来，美国的反倾销政策法得到了像共和党人和民主党人这样一些人的强大的政治支持。这样有威望的持久的两党连立的原因是什么呢？首先，反倾销政策法的花言巧语是引人注
47、目的。毕竟，有哪个国会的成员喜欢坚持说他赞成违法和不公平的倾销进口货？谁又会反对“正当竞争”呢？同时，花言巧语背后的事实是模糊的。反倾销政策法的臭名是难以理解的，它内部的工作方式仅仅是少数几个精挑细选出来的对象、使用者、官僚主义和律师知道。单单它的专业术语像概率误差、国概率误差、调查阶段、回顾阶段、返回后付款、匹配模型、成本检测、安全测试、设备管理控制与时间调度程序的可行性、商品差价等等就足以使一双并不特殊的的眼睛变得呆滞了。结果，大多数反倾销政策法的支持者就很容易地把它那吸引人的花言巧语做为表面的价值。假如听起来很好，那肯定就是好。由这篇论文其中之一的一个执笔者研究的一篇早期的加图学会研究继
48、续提出了类似的反对。那篇论文题目为“美国的反倾销政策法与事实相违背的花言巧语”。他们聚焦在由反倾销政策法支持者为此法提出的正当理由上，并根据这些正当的理由对反倾销政策的实践进行了调查。结论是：反倾销政策的执行很少能成功地与反倾销政策支持者所谓的“公平交易”相吻合。这篇论文关注的是更多的实践和较少的理论。这里强调的是美国商业部门对倾销所下的定义和计算的具体细节。尤其是我们要揭露反倾销政策背后肮脏的小秘密导致倾销结果的遁词和偏见的方法，甚至当美国进口产品的价格与国外厂商索取的价格相同或比国外厂商家乡市场更高的价格时也依然会导致倾销结果。一旦这些遁词和偏见被了解，对当前仅仅被限定在“公平交易”的反倾
49、销法的幻想就破灭了。在这里我们不是企图对反倾销法做全面的分析或批评。由于在美国法律下要征税的反倾销措施，两个主要的要求必须得以满足，一是DOC必须找出正在被倾倒的进口货，二是国际贸易委员必须发现倾倒进口货会对国内工业造成伤害或威胁。这片论文我们并不是在演说国际贸易中心的伤害分析，也不是在演说反倾销政策调查表面上的各种程序包括正义的要求，开始时的标准，可行性的用途或所谓的伯德改善下了国内产品关税的分配。虽然反倾销政策实践更多的其他方面的原理接受批评的时机已经成熟，但是我选择对反倾销政策方针的中心问题进行目标导向追踪，什么组成倾销？这个问题的如何回答决定了反倾销法的基本原理特征。假如由于方法的缺陷和偏见，正常的、健康的竞争很有平常地被诬蔑为“公平”倾销，那么法律本身就是最根本的缺陷，它并不是依照经济学家和政策书呆子的象牙城堡的标准，而正是根据反倾销法支持者赞成的标准。反倾销政策现状的拥护者争辩反倾销法不是保护贸
