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1、行政管理全球媒体和政治：跨国沟通制度和公民文化兰斯班尼特摘要:有很多关于媒体市场放松管制以及由此产生的庞大的全球性媒体公司增长的影响的争论。一些观察家认为该放宽的压力，破坏了公共服务广播和媒体社会责任规范，导致在许多国家信息质量的恶化和公民脱离与政治的接触。其他先驱为扩大信息的选择，放宽趋势，使公民能够找到自己喜欢的水平参与政治。这项分析建议，我们了解全球媒体放宽限制的趋势在一个跨国政治制度组成部分中，许多参与者和领域的体制等形成规范的媒体所有权，社会责任，和公民信息。参与者包括跨国公司，政党，公众官员，利益团体，组织和公民。机构设置包括国家立法机构和监管委员会以及国际贸易组织，欧洲联盟委员会
2、和联合国机构。那个在这些处在不同体制水平中的参与者的竞赛结果影响所有权和解释了国家怎样从事与媒体放松管制和逐渐形成的民主公共生活内容的市场力量的内容政策规范性共识的程度。媒体公司：重新界定问题如果规范促进新自由主义媒体放宽政策并没有这么受欢迎，媒体巨头将不会如此强势，并在依据如此少量的公共问责制制作节目。这意味着，了解公司的规模较之了解他们所经营的规范性环境和产生于这些环境中的公共信息的质量可能不太重要。尽管如此，不难看出为什么讨论二线国家巨头对全球媒体的倾向于企业数量的惊人的增长和减少，以及掠夺性的模仿行为的。在本文写作之时，全球媒体市场的主导力量只有7大公司，他们以惊人的增长速度进入纵向和
3、横向的综合庞然大物：迪斯尼（美国在线）时代华纳，索尼，新闻集团，维亚康姆，维旺迪环球和贝塔斯曼集团（麦克切斯尼2001年） 。一个上市控股公司的摘要，将填补缺页，并且这摘要将在这篇文章出版之前过时。一个用来跟踪这些公司的增长和辩论他们的影响力的来源，是媒体渠道。有些人认为，谋求支配地位本身，就是值得担忧的政治问题。例如，麦克切斯尼（ 2001 ）提供了一个简单的模型，即公司媒体行为帝国主义，涉及这些内容： （ a ）竞争以征服新领域（市场） ， （ b ）摆脱国家规章和鉴定，这使公司成为世界上半自治的权力机构，（ c ）追求规模或范围，其目的是使市场远离替代性产品。虽然这似乎是一个很好的考虑到
4、企业的动机，即使巨头本身也谈论他们，我看到几个问题，更注重帝国主义的动机，而不是制度规范的冲突，这些制度规范将确定这些动机在实践中，在不同国家的工作情况。一个重点放在规模和范围的问题是，企业的庞然大物根本不是能保持稳定，且组织严密的机器（如帝国征服的概念所意味的） 。许多未能创造利润整合其庞大集团，更不用说实现协同各产品线和交付机制，这些机制为竞争添加染料使比赛扩大（ 2002年经济学） 。事实上，在本文写作之时，大多数上述上市公司正在剥离主要控股，消除分歧，或考虑集体解体。美国在线时代华纳挣扎在内部组织和对外形象的问题的角度考虑从公司名称中取消“美国在线”，意味着在此记录失败的合并提供其承诺
5、的内容和收敛媒体平台。贝塔斯曼首席执行官托马斯Middlehoff曾经驳回对收购了很大一部分美国图书和音乐市场的担心，他说贝塔斯曼已不再是一个德国公司;后来盈利的问题引起了关于首先进入这些市场的问题。前维旺迪环球首席弗兰克比昂迪播出的常规企业智慧，即“这些公司99 的成功，”将“在成功的境外执行” 中被发现（麦克切斯尼2001年） 。在本文写作之时，维旺迪正在试图全部售出其既遥远又灾难性且无利可图的世界媒体和娱乐资产。总之，帝国的动机并不总能收获成功的帝国。另一项对于媒体帝国主义的挑战的论点是，当被应用于被设想为领土的通信领域时隐喻分解。被媒体巨头征服的领土只是整体中的一部分（即消费大众统计学
6、） 。或许媒体领土中更有趣的一部分是媒体传输能力和媒体接收能力，它的扩大得益于技术在数字通信方面的创新。如果只有这么大的空间能够征服，吞并的渠道和团体可能会提出一个更大的问题。但是在一个不断扩大的宇宙中，大型企业的竞争不仅必须在彼此间进行，但往往在自己内部进行，导致在近几年许多大型企业中的许多组织经历惨败。（ Compaigne 戈梅里， 2000年）。接下来的论点是，虽然跨国巨头们可能会瓜分欧洲和北美市场，这些只不过是在全球市场中的两个（尽管重要）地区。如上所述，其他国家和地区的媒体系统（例如，中国，伊斯兰国家，俄罗斯及一些文化区域，如拉丁美洲 ，中东，和东南亚）生产的内容，不仅有新自由方面
7、的，还有文化方面和不同程度上政治方面。其中的一些文化流动甚至达到更广泛的世界观众。低成本的传输和接收技术使编程从亚洲，拉丁美洲和中东地区的生产者向外流动到周围区域的观众社区，以及在欧洲和北美洲的大量移民社区（辛克莱等人。 1996年） 。最后，即使是跨国巨头们可能会产生的新闻和内容的图像反映出对跨国政治活动家网络的关注（贝内特2003年，凯克 Sikkink 1998年 ） ，这似乎将被更多的公众所关注。这些公众通过各种媒体了解关于全球环境，经济，贸易，人权权利和劳工问题等方面的新闻。阿皮尤通过对44个国家的调查，发现了对全球化带来的好处与对媒体霸权模式可能预测相比有更多多样性的国家的意见（佩
8、尤研究中心2003年，第177 页） 。此外对反对全球化示威者的优点也有相当大的意见和分歧（皮尤研究中心2003年，第187页） 。伽汉姆表明，普通公众对相互依存的世界体系的政治意识可能是一个媒体全球化的意外后果： “我认为，历史上经济和政治方面的制度的合理性，不仅成为全球性的，而且可以通过所占比例越来越大的世界人口理解为全球性的，部分恰恰是因为全球系统的中介通信的生长和扩散 “ （伽汉姆1992年，第369页）。这些对媒体帝国主义论点的挑战鼓励我们要在某种程度上更谨慎的思考媒体集团实际上对实现这一跨国媒体制度所做出的贡献。我建议，我们应该往公司的经济增长和公司的主导动机之外更远的地方看并认为
9、这些企业的操作者有着明显的共同规范的政策议程，对此积极的促进构成了一极的政治制度。默多克（ 1990年）概述了这个议程方面的4个阶段。这从企业操作者的角度来看被我们称为制度的形成， “非国有化” （即公司的一些业务计划，它们使公司从系统的国家管制或条例中脱离出来） ， “ 自由化 “ （即压力，为了放松所有权和在各国间的竞争规则的压力），”商业化的公有部门“ （也即压力，为了打破公共服务性的电视台和广播电台的垄断而通过对商业竞争的授权和减少公共资金的压力，目的是迫使公共服务性的媒体公司采取商业赞助和发展以普及率为基础的方案） ，以及“重新管制” （即政策措施，它们允许纵向和横向，通过多种所有制
10、和生产，分配，发放许可证，并对多个控股提供内容的收购的方式的一体化） 。这些规范性指示，可以反映企业帝国的野心，但他们不会以统一的结果在不同的国家自动迸发。把全球媒体的新自由主义制度理解为一个有活力的比赛，在其中规范企业的极受到其它制度操作者的争议，这使我们的操作者占不到决定性成果，其中包括公司的失败，各联合国家抵制政治内容的恶化的能力，以及增加人民抵抗和替代性的沟通渠道。接下来的一段内容回顾了这些政治竞赛举行的一些设置。GLOBAL MEDIA AND POLITICS: TransnationalCommunication Regimes and Civic CulturesW. Lanc
11、e Bennettp131-134ABSTRACT:There is much debate about the effects of media market deregulation and the resulting growth of vast global media corporations. Some observers argue that deregulatory pressures have undermined public service broadcasting and media social-responsibility norms, resulting in d
12、eterioration of information quality and politicaldisengagement of citizens in many nations. Others herald deregulatory trends as expanding information choices and enabling citizens to find their preferred levels of political engagement. This analysis proposes that we understand global trends in medi
13、a deregulation as part of a transnational political regime in which many players and institutional arenas shape norms for media ownership, social responsibility, and citizen information. The players include multinational corporations, parties and public officials, interest associations, and citizen
14、advocacy organizations. The institutional settingsinclude national legislatures and regulatory commissions as well as international trade organizations, European Union commissions, and United Nations agencies. The outcomes of contests among these players at different institutional levels influence t
15、he degrees of normative consensus on ownership and content policies in the regime and explain how different nations engage with media deregulation and the market forces that increasingly shape the content of democratic public life.Media Corporations: Redefining the IssuesIf norms promoting neolibera
16、l media deregulatory policies were not so popular,media giants would be less muscular, and surely less free to produce programming with so little public accountability. This means that the size of corporations may be less important to understand than the normative environments in which they operate
17、and the quality of public information produced within those environments. Still, it is easy to see why discussions of the global media gravitate toward the breathtaking growth and shrinking number of corporations, along with the imitative predatory behaviors of second-tier national giants.At the tim
18、e of this writing, the global media market was dominated by as few as seven giant corporations that have grown at astonishing speed into vertically and horizontally integrated behemoths: Disney, (AOL) Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi Universal, and Bertelsmann (McChesney 2001). A
19、 summary listing of the holdings of these companies would fill pages,and it would be outdated before this article is published. A useful source for tracking the growth of these corporations and debating their impact is the Media Channel (http:/www.mediachannel.org/ownership). Some argue that the que
20、st for dominance is, in itself, a political problem worth worrying about. For example, McChesney (2001) offers a simple model of corporate media behavior as imperialistic, involving these elements: (a) the race to conquer new territories (markets), (b) the escape from national regulations and identi
21、fications that enables corporations to become semiautonomous world powers, and (c) the quest for size or scale, which aims at depriving markets of alternative sources of products.Although this seems a good account of corporate motives, even as the moguls themselves talk about them, I see several pro
22、blems with focusing more on imperialistic motives than on the conflicts over regime norms that determine how those motives work, in practice, in different national contexts. One problem with the focus on size and scale is that the corporate behemoths are anything but stable, well-organized machines
23、(as the notion of imperial conquest would imply).Many have failed to create profitable integrations of their vast holdings, much less achieve the synergies across product lines and delivery mechanisms that fuel the race for expansion (Economist 2002). Indeed, at the time of this writing, most of the
24、 giants listed above were divesting major holdings, eliminating divisions, or contemplating wholesale breakup. AOL TimeWarner was struggling over internal organization and external image problems to the point of contemplating removal of “AOL” from the company namesignaling the failure of this record
25、 merger to deliver its promised convergence of content and media platforms. Bertelsmanns CEO Thomas Middlehoff once dismissed concerns about its acquisition of a large share of US book and music markets by saying that Bertelsmann was no longer a German company; later profitability problems raised qu
26、estions about its entry into those markets in the first place. Former Vivendi Universal chief Frank Biondi aired the conventional corporate wisdom that “99% of the success of these companies” would be found “in successful execution offshore” (McChesney 2001). At the time of this writing, Vivendi was
27、 trying to sell off its far-flung and disastrously unprofitable Universal media and entertainment assets. In short, imperial motives do not always yield successful empires.Another challenge to the media-imperialism argument is that the metaphor breaks down when applied to communication conceived as
28、territory. The territory being conquered by the media giants is only partly physical (i.e., consumer audience demographics). Perhaps the more interesting part of media territory is the transmission and reception capacity, which is expanding thanks to technological innovation in digital communication
29、s. If there were only so much space to conquer, the gobbling up of channels and bands might present a larger problem. But in an expanding universe, large corporations must compete not only with each other but often within themselves, resulting in many of the organizational fiascoes witnessed in rece
30、nt years among the corporate behemoths (Compaigne & Gomery 2000).Next comes the argument that although the global giants may be carving up the European and North American markets, these are merely two (albeit important) regions in the largerworld picture. As noted above, other national and regional
31、media systems (e.g., China, Islamic states, Russia, and cultural regions such as Latin.America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia) produce content that is culturally and, to varying degrees, politically apart from the neoliberal.Western media regime. Some of these cultural flows even reach larger
32、world audiences. Low-cost transmission and reception technologies enable programming to flow outward from Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern producers to audiences in regional neighborhoods, as well as to large immigrant communities in Europe and North America (Sinclair et al. 1996). Finally,
33、 even the global giants may produce news and content images that echo the concerns of transnational political activist networks (Bennett 2003a, Keck & Sikkink 1998), which appear to be surrounded by larger publics receiving news of global environmental, economic, trade, human rights, and labor probl
34、ems through various media. A Pew survey of 44 nations found more diversity in national views on the benefits of globalization than a media hegemony model might predict (Pew Research Center 2003, p. 177). There were also considerable differences of opinion about the merits of antiglobalization protes
35、ters (Pew Research Center 2003, p. 187). Garnham suggests that the general publics political awareness of world system interdependence may be an unintended consequence of media globalization:“I would argue that historically both the economic and political aspects of system rationality have not only
36、become global but are understood as global by a growing proportion of the worlds population, in part precisely because of the growth and spread of global systems of mediated communication” (Garnham 1992,p. 369).These challenges to the media imperialism argument encourage us to be somewhat more caref
37、ul in thinking about what the media conglomerates actually contribute to this transnational media regime. I propose that we look beyond the growth and domination motives of the corporations and consider that these corporate players share a remarkably common normative policy agenda, the aggressive pr
38、omotion of which constitutes one political pole of the regime. Murdock (1990) outlined this agenda in terms of four stages of what I would call regime formation from the standpoint of the corporate players: “denationalization” (corporate business plans that remove companies from systematic national
39、control or regulation), “liberalization” (pressures to relax ownership and competition rules within nations), “commercializing the public sector” (pressures to break public service television and radio monopolies by licensing commercial competition and reducing public funding, with the aim of forcin
40、g public service media corporations to take on commercial sponsors and develop ratings-based programming), and “reregulation” (policy initiatives that permit vertical and horizontal integration through multiple ownerships and acquisition of the means of production, distribution, licensing, and deliv
41、ery of content across those multiple holdings).These normative directives may reflect imperial corporate ambitions, but they do not automatically burst forth with uniform results in different nations. Understanding the neoliberal global media regime as a dynamic contest in which the normative corpor
42、ate pole is contested by other regime players enables us to account for less deterministic outcomes, including failures of companies, the capacities of nations to resist deterioration of political content, and the rise of popular resistance and alternative communication channels. The next section reviews some of the settings in which these political contests take place.
