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1、Constructing Post-Cold War Collective SecurityBrian FrederkingPresented by Kim Yun KeaSupporting Theory: Language Games: Dialogical Analysis of INF NegotiationGavan Duffy; Brian K. Frederking; Seth A. TuckerOpposing Theory: The False Promise of International InstitutionsJohn J. MearsheimerSummary: R
2、ule-oriented constructivism is built on an interpretive method called dialogical analysis. Dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments. It assumes the existence of constitutive social rules and communicatively rational age
3、nts constructing those social rules through the performance of speech acts. Building on the rule-oriented constructivism, the author posits four social arrangements constituting the security structures on world politics: war, rivalry, collective security, and security community. The dominant post-co
4、ld war global security trend is the gradual construction of collective security rules and September 11 did not fundamentally change the exiting world political order; instead, it exacerbated it. Moreover, the Kosovo and Iraq wars are embedded in collective security social arrangement. Q1: Can dialog
5、ical analysis effectively explain the international relations? Frederking: Yes. Dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments. It assumes the existence of constitutive social rules and communicatively rational agents constru
6、cting those social rules through the performance of speech acts. The development of interpretive methods like dialogical analysis is important if we are to move beyond epistemological debates between advocates of Science and advocates of Anti-Science. (p. 363) Duffy and Tucker: Yes. It dialogical an
7、alysis combines linguistics analyses of the discourse contents, argument analyses of parties moves and countermoves in this discourse, and logical deductions to test counterfactual hypothesis. By tacking between the negotiation discourse and the (empirically supported) background assumptions that ma
8、ke that discourse comprehensible, dialogical analysis progressively elaborate deeper and more refined understandings of the interaction, (p. 290)Q2: Does dialogical analysis reflect the existence and importance of social structures such as norms, beliefs, and identities? Frederking: Yes. Dialogical
9、analysis helps make the speech acts constructing post-cold war security intelligible by showing those acts to be logically consistent with the social rules-beliefs, norms, identities-constituting global security structures. (p. 376) Duffy and Tucker: Yes. Game theory provides a powerful set of forma
10、l tools for explaining political interactions. Yet the formality of game models sometimes limits their empirical application. Contextual factors generally held exogenous to game models may prove decisive for outcomes. These factors include actors belief about the nature of the interaction, their bel
11、iefs about other actors beliefs, and the means by which actors convey and infer intentions to and from one another. Scholars concerned with the role of norms, beliefs, and identities in social interaction (e.g., constructivists, cognitivists, negotiation theorists, diplomatic historians) could benef
12、it from a model of social interaction that captures these contextual factors. (p. 271)Q3: Are the existence and development of social arrangement rules characterized by multilateralism? Frederking: Yes. Social rules are constantly negotiated and mediated through the actions of many agents. Whether f
13、uture global security rules are constituted by collective security rules or war rules is always being negotiated and renegotiated. (p. 376) Duffy and Tucker: Yes. They the INF negotiations consisted of intentional exchanges of intent as the parties progressively elaborated a largely mutual context t
14、hat promoted the mutual intelligibility of their utterances. On the constructivist account of global politics, the substantive commitments that accompany such an interaction constitute a regime. If so, then the INF language game helped to transform that regime and, with it, world history. (p. 291) Q
15、4: Are states behavior and action determined by the nature of shared understanding regarding norms and identity, rather than materialist concept such as military capability? Frederking: Yes. Norms are shared understandings of appropriate action. Norms guide action and make action possible, enabling
16、agents to criticize assertions and justify actions. Identities tell agents who they are and who other are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and others intelligible interests stems from a particular, constructed representation of the relationship between self and other material st
17、ructures have meanings for human agents only within the context of social rules. For example, a states military capability has different meanings depending on whether it belongs to an ally or an enemy. (p. 365) S. D.: Yes. Why are Iraq, Iran, and North Korea dangerous to America?Table 1: The Worlds
18、Nuclear ArsenalsCountrySuspected Strategic Nuclear WeaponSuspected Non-Strategic Nuclear WeaponsSuspected Total Number of Nuclear WeaponsChina 250120400France3500350India60?60+?Israel100-200?200+?Pakistan24-48?24-48Russia6000 400010,000United Kingdom1805185United States8,6462,01010,656Source: CDI: N
19、uclear Issue. Last updated February 4, 2003http:/www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfmIraq: 0 (Jehl, 2004)Iran: 0 (Smith, 2004)North Korea: 1 - 8 (Edward qtd. in excerpts in New York Times)Table 2: Military Budget (1995)CountryMilitary Budget (in Billion)China$29France$41India$8Israel
20、$7Pakistan$4Russia$63United Kingdom$35United States$254Iraq$3Iran$2North Korea$6Prepared by Center For Defense Information. Sources: IISS, DOD, CDIhttp:/www.cdi.org/dm/dm/images/country.gifQ5: Are the international involvement, legitimacy, and justification ground important in institutionalizing the
21、 collective security arrangement? Frederking: Yes. Collective security orients agents to act with a sense of duty to generate rules of peaceful behavior and punish those who break the rules. Through the explosion of multilateral treaties, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping missions, and n
22、ongovernmental organizations, agents have been slowly institutionalizing a global collective security arrangement in the post-cold-war world A collective security enforcement may enforce only the rule of state sovereignty, or it could enforce rules regarding weapon of proliferation, terrorism, human
23、 rights, and so on. (p.368) S.D.: Yes. Kosovo war is embedded in collective security. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea: Serb forces were holding 700 Kosovo-Albanian boys prisoner, using them as “blood banks” for injured troops, and using Kosovo Albanians as human shields, forcing them to stand in front of
24、Serb tanks for two days, and upwards of 100,000 Albanian men of fighting age were unaccounted for in Kosovo, more than 3,500 had been executed. http:/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/324173.stm 4/20/99 With a NATO cease-fire in place, the U.N. Security Council gave its backing Thursday on a NATO-led
25、 force that will enter Yugoslavia as peacekeepers while Yugoslav troops withdraw from Kosovo As the cease-fire was announced, the vanguard of a 50,000- strong peacekeeping force dubbed KFOR prepared to move into Kosovo. 06/10/99 The U.N. war crime tribunal indicted the former Yugoslav president Slob
26、odan Milosevic and his four aides: the president of Serbia, the Yugoslav deputy premier, Serbias interior minister, and the head of Yugoslav army. 5/27/99 Q6: Can it be assumed that in war social rule, states sovereignty is not recognized and its survival is determined by military capability? Freder
27、king: Yes. In war, agents identify each other as enemies (rule 1), perhaps even an enemy that threatens their existence. Agents do not recognize the autonomy of others or perhaps even the right of others to exist (rule 2). Survival demands a military capability greater than ones immediate enemies (r
28、ule 3) because the military capabilities of others are interpreted as a threat to ones existence. The directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), supported by the commitment to attack until the other does surrender (rule 5). Because others are enemies with the military capability to threaten one
29、s existence, the use of force is considered inevitable, necessary, and appropriate (rule 6). S.D.: Yes. At dawn of World War II, Japan invaded Manchuria and Germany acquired Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively by force. During the course of the war, nine formerly independent states had submitted
30、to the domination of Berlin in various guises, ranging from outright annexation in the case of Austria to a fictitious independence in the case of the Vichy regime in France. The remaining nations of the continent had become either military allies or economic vassals of Germany except Spain, Portuga
31、l, Switzerland, and Sweden that managed to cling to precarious neutrality. In Asia, the Western colonial possessions such as Singapore, the Philippines, Malaya, Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, and Burma had come under Japanese military occupation, while Thailand became the subservient clie
32、nt state of Tokyo. The war was brought to an end when the ally army captured Berlin and two nuclear bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan, forcing Germany and Japan unconditionally surrender to the U.S. and ally force. (Keylor, 2001:137-247) Q7: Is the international security system c
33、onstituted by the rules of social arrangement? Frederking: Yes. These social arrangements war, rivalry, collective security, security community constitute global security in the way that the rules of chess constitute chess; participants use them to “go on” and act in intelligible ways. Sometimes one
34、 social arrangement is more institutionalized than the others; sometimes the social arrangements are more institutionalized in different geographical areas. (p.367) Mearsheimer: No. The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each
35、other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position. (p. 9)Q8: Are genuine cooperation and globa
36、l peace feasible in the international politics? Frederking: Yes. In security communities, agents identify each other as friends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict (rule1). Agents in security communities have a strong consensus about the obligation to follow the rules of their community
37、 (rule 2) and they engage in peaceful, multilateral decision making to ensure security through political relationships (rule 3). The directive rule to follow the rules of community does exist in security communities (rule 4), but enforcement does not include the possibility of force (rule5 and 6). (
38、p. 368-9) Mearsheimer: No. Genuine peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely. state inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other. A state
39、s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals of a state could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another statestate can never be certain about the intention of other states. Specif
40、ically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first they may miscalculate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfect information, where potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness
41、and to conceal their true aims. (p. 9-10)Q9: Is the relationship between agents and social structures a two-way relationship? Frederking: Yes agents and structures construct each other. Rules make agents and agents make rules. The (social) world is made by people, who in turn are made by that (socia
42、l) world. (p. 364) Mearsheimer: No those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In th
43、is view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships.” In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process. (p. 13)Q10: Is it likely that states self-interest and freedom of actions a
44、re limited by the shared responsibility? Frederking: Yes. In collective security arrangements, agents states are citizens whose sovereignty is limited by obligation to follow community rules and to use multilateral military force to ensure compliance with those rules. (p. 369) O.D.: No. Table 3: War
45、s 1990-2002CountriesType of warSite of warWar beganCombat status 2002United KingdomInterstate clashesRegional civil warInterstate warIntervention in Sierra LeonIntervention in AfghanistanIraqNorthern IrelandKuwait / IraqSierra LeonAfghanistan19981969199120002001ContinuingSuspended by agreement 1994S
46、uspended by agreement 1991Withdrew 2001ContinuingUnited StatesInterstate clashesInterstate warInterstate warIntervention in Afghanistan IraqKuwait / IraqYugoslaviaAfghanistan1998199119992001ContinuingSuspended by agreement 1991Suspended by agreement 1999Continuing(Smith, Dan. 2003)Q11: Can the types
47、 of social rules be detected by looking at the validity claims that the disputing parties assert and challenge? Frederking: Yes. In the post-cold war construction of collective security, the meaning of the use of force is defined by how agents understand the act. How will the international community interpret the use of force? Does it invoke collective security rules or war
