《房地产经纪人买房子外文翻译.doc》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《房地产经纪人买房子外文翻译.doc（8页珍藏版）》请在三一办公上搜索。
1、英文翻译题 目 Buying a House and Decision to Use a Real Estate Broker 决定通过房地产经纪人买房子 原文： Buying a House and the Decision to Use a Real Estate BrokerIntroductionWhat is it that residential real estate brokers do and why would a home buyer engage their services? As is often the case, answering this question
2、is not a simple task. Home buyers who acquire their house through a broker do not purchase just a house-they also obtain the services of the broker. In other words, these buyers are consuming a bundled good. One dimension of this good is lower search time, and thus lower search costs, associated wit
3、h buying through a broker. Recent research (Baryla and Zumpano, 1995) suggests that choosing a broker improves the marginal efficiency of search, making it more likely that a buyer will find a satisfactory match earlier in the search process. Buying through a broker also increases the supply of hous
4、es available to buyers, and provides buyers with information on the quality of different houses and the neighborhoods in which they are located. Brokers frequently help buyers identify sources of mortgage financing and property insurance, as well as assist buyers in recording the title.All of these
5、services suggest that brokers provide value added to buyers (in addition to providing a service to sellers), something that these buyers would be willing to pay for. Thus this bundle of services and the house that is purchased would, intuitively, be priced higher than homes purchased without the ass
6、istance of a broker. Several studies (Janssen and Jobson 1980; Jud and Frew, 1986) observe that buyers pay more for homes listed with brokers. It is not possible, however, to determine whether this applies to the entire residential housing market since research to this point has relied on local data
7、. Higher prices indicate willingness by buyers to pay more for broker-listed houses than those sold directly by owners. Alternatively, competition from for-sale-by-owner properties may prevent sellers from passing on commission costs to buyers in the form of higher prices. Therefore, at issue is whe
8、ther broker-assisted sales result in higher prices.If search duration is affected by broker assistance what about price? This study attempts to answer these questions by developing an empirically testable model of broker choice. In the process, this study should provide important insights into the e
9、fficiency of the residential housing market as well as the effectiveness of brokers as market intermediaries. Specifically, this study examines the effects of a real estate broker by hypothesizing a two-stage process. In the first step a buyer decides whether to engage the services of a broker to as
10、sist with the search. Empirically, this decision is modeled as a probity equation where the choice to use a broker is a function of such variables as the cause of the move (i.e. changes in the household, or work-related moves), the income, age, experience, and market knowledge of the buyer, and othe
11、r buyer characteristics.The second step is the purchase. Here selling prices are modeled as a function of house characteristics, buyer characteristics, and whether the sale was broker-assisted. This approach should provide information about the determinants of housing prices. In particular，this mode
12、l should allow us to determine whether the broker-assisted buyers and buyers for-sale-by-owner properties constitute segmented markets which would permit the maintenance of housing price differentials. This study uses cross-section data from a nationwide survey of recent homebuyers and sellers condu
13、cted by the Research Division of the National Association of Realtors. This database includes both broker-assisted sales and sales by owners, allowing an assessment of the impact of the real estate broker on selling price, and by implication, the value of the marketing services which brokers provide
14、 to sellers. Our results indicate that indeed buyers who use brokers do pay more for their homes than those who do not buy through a broker. But our results also imply that it is not because these buyers have used a broker. Rather, this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of th
15、e means by which the purchase was consummated. These buyers have higher incomes, are more likely to be from out of town, are more likely to have employer assistance in the purchase-all factors that lead them to pay more for a house, but also to make them more likely to use a broker in purchasing the
16、ir home. When the decision to use a broker is accounted for, these buyers do not wind up paying more for their homes, and there is some evidence that they actually pay less than a comparable buyer who buys without an agents assistance. The layout of this study is as follows. The relevant literature
17、is reviewed in section 2.In section 3 the data, variable selection, and model are described. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section contains the conclusions of the study. Literature review A broad range of research has focused on the determinants of housing prices. These incl
18、ude traditional estimates of housing demand hedonic modeling of housing prices, the determinants of the tradeoff between price and time on the market, and models of the search process. Other literature has examined the role of real estate brokers and has focused on the impact of brokers on buyer sea
19、rch, or has examined the welfare and/or moral-hazard implications of broker intermediation. Few studies have tried to measure the direct effects of real estate brokers on the housing market, and fewer still on home selling prices. The work that has been produced to date has often generated conflicti
20、ng results. In part, these disparate results may reflect data availability problems, as virtually all of these earlier studies have been based on local data, and samples tended to be small, making generalizations difficult. In one of the first empirical studies of broker choice, Janssen and Jobson （
21、1980）find that real estate agents do have an impact on price. Using data from the Canadian housing market, Janssen and Jobson results indicate that with real estate firms of comparable size, brokers who list comparable properties for higher prices than competing brokers tend to realize significantly
22、 higher selling prices. The higher selling prices tend to be associated with transactions involving executive transfers and broker-arranged secondary financing. These results may in turn indicate that brokers obtain higher prices when dealing with buyers who are both less knowledgeable about local m
23、arket conditions and less sensitive to price. Yavas and Colwell (1994) suggest that selling price may also be, at least to some degree, a function of the type of broker listing arrangement used by the seller. In a study of the residential market Jud (1983) estimates the demand for real estate broker
24、age services. Using housing transactions data from three urban areas in North Carolina, Jud finds that brokers do not affect the prices of the houses which they sell, although they do appear to influence the level of housing consumed by buyers. In a subsequent study Jud and Frew (1986), using differ
25、ent data, find that brokers do obtain higher prices for the homes they sell. Evidence is also presented that broker-assisted buyers have a greater demand for houses than their non-broker-assisted counterparts. Their results lead them to conclude that broker intermediation has an effect analogous to
26、that of advertising in markets with imperfect information. More recent research by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) examines the extent to which differences in information and search costs are related in housing prices. Using data from the Baton Rouge market area Turnbull and Sirmans compare the prices p
27、aid by first-time and out-of-town buyers to the prices paid for comparable housing by more knowledgeable local and repeat homebuyers. Their results indicate that home prices are similar across buyers with different information sets and search Costs. Since these were all broker-assisted transactions,
28、 Tarnbull and Sirmans conclude that existing brokerage institutions, such as the MLS, successfully eliminate the potential price effects of asymmetric information and, thereby improve the efficiency of the housing market. It is not possible, however, to determine from this study whether price differ
29、ences exist between broker-assisted and non-broker assisted transactions. Although selling prices are not compared, a study by Baryla and Zumpano (1995), for the first time, uses a national sample of broker-assisted and non-broker sales transactions to assess the impact of intermediation by the agen
30、t on search effort. This study indicates that information asymmetries are present in the residential real estate market and that intermediation by agents does affect buyer search efforts. First-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local home buyers. Equally impo
31、rtant real estate brokers are able to reduce search time for virtually all classes of consumers whether first-time experienced local or out-of-town buyers. A follow-up study by Baryla, Zumpano, and Elder (1995) finds that the mechanism by which agents reduce buyer search duration is an increase in s
32、earch intensity. Having more market access and housing information than buyers working without brokers, broker-assisted consumers are able to visit more homes during a given period of time. These results suggest that buyers with high information and search costs are more likely to seek out the servi
33、ces of real estate brokers. Whether this implication is true, and what effect such a search decision has on selling price however remains to be seen. The next logical step, therefore, is to examine this choice and its consequent effect on home prices. Data and methodology This study uses data from a
34、 nationwide survey of home buyers conducted by the National Association of Realtors in 1987. The survey, The Home Buying and Selling Process was mailed to over 30,000 households. After eliminating incomplete or faulty questionnaires the database totaled 2495 observations all of which took place in19
35、86. Table 1 displays summary statistics from the survey sample, categorized by whether the transaction was agent-assisted or non-agent-assisted. Table la displays agent usage based on differences in information and search costs among the buyers. Evaluating the impact of the real estate broker on pri
36、ces paid by home buyers would seem initially a straightforward process: One estimates a price equation using ordinary least squares, controlling for differences in housing characteristics (as in a hedonic price model) and the impact of buyer characteristics on the price, including a dummy variable d
37、efined to indicate whether the buyer used a broker in the transaction. Or one could estimate separate equations for the broker-assisted and non-broker-assisted buyers. The difficulty is that the price paid by the buyer and the choice of whether to utilize a broker may be linked. A higher price paid
38、by buyers using a broker may not imply that prices are higher for homes listed by brokers. Instead it may be that this group of buyers would have paid a higher price regardless of whether or not they used an agent. This is a classic example of self-selection: If those who use an agent are predispose
39、d to pay a higher price, the ordinary least squares estimate of the coefficient on the agent variable will overestimate the effect of the agent on the price paid by the buyer. The presence of selection bias could imply a number of possibilities. One is that the bias exists and that after taking into
40、 account the self-selection by these buyers, housing prices are still higher for the group using a broker (as indicated by the coefficient of the broker variable). This result would imply that there are two separate residential real estate markets: one for broker-assisted properties and the second f
41、or the for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) properties. This separation could permit the maintenance of housing-price differentials between the two groups of consumers. If selection bias is present and housing prices are higher for broker-listed properties the price differences observed could be attributed to t
42、he predisposition of buyers using a broker to pay more for their homes. If no selection bias is present the higher prices may represent the value added by the broker which the buyers are willing to pay for. Alternatively no price differentials may exist due to the competitive impact of FSBOs on the
43、prices paid for broker-assisted transactions. The choice of whether to use a broker and its subsequent effect on price is modeled using a Heckman two-stage model. In the first stage, a probity equation is employed to model the decision to choose a real estate broker. The decision is modeled as a fun
44、ction of eight variables. Buyer income (AINC) is employed as a measure of the opportunity cost of search. It has already been shown that buyer search duration can be reduced by working with a real estate broker. If higher income buyers have higher opportunity costs we would expect that they would ch
45、oose to buy through a real estate broker. Source: Leonard V. Zumpano, Harold W. Elder, Edward A.Baryla.1996. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. Academic Publishers13:169-181. 6译文： 决定通过房地产经纪人买房子简介 房地产经纪人究竟是做什么的，为什么购房者会激发他们的服务呢？在通常情况下，这是一个不容易回答的问题。其实购房者在通过经纪人买房子的过程中买到的不仅仅是房子，而同时是在取得经纪人的服务。换
46、言之，这些购买者通过经纪人拥有了一个很好的的购房途径。通过经纪人购买房子的一个好处就是可以减少搜寻房子的时间，从而降低了买房过程中的成本。最近的研究认为（巴雷拉和祖帕诺 1995），通过房地产经纪人买房子，大大提高了购房者购房的效益，因为这样这些购房者在寻找房子的过程中更有可能找到称心如意的房子。通过经纪人买房子增加了可供购房者选择的房源，购房者还可以向经纪人提出自己对房子的要求，如要求的房屋的质量以及希望房屋的街道位置。经纪人经常会记录买家的信息并协助买家办理按揭融资和财产保险服务。 这些服务都表明，经纪人向买家提供了额外的有价值的服务（除了向卖方提供服务），有时候，那些买家愿意支付那些额外
47、的费用。因此，包含这些服务的房屋的销售价格会高于无经纪人协助置业的房屋的价格。一些学者注意到买家对于那些业主代理上市的房子会支付更多。然而，要确定这是否适用于整个住宅市场是不可能的，因为研究这一点要依靠当地的数据资料。较高的价格预示着买家相对于那些直接出售的房子更愿意较多支付那些业主代理上市的房子。另外，来自自有产权出售的竞争可能会阻止卖家以高价的形式将委托成本传递给买家。因此，问题是业主辅助销售是否会导致价格的提高。如果购房者是在经纪人的协助下搜寻房子的，那么价格会是怎么样呢？本文尝试从经纪人选择的发展经验检验模式来回答这些问题。在这个过程中，本文对整个住宅市场的效率以及经纪中介市场的有效性
48、提供了重要的见解。 具体来说，本文探讨的是在以两阶段进程的假设条件下对一个房地产经纪人的影响。第一步，买方决定是否聘请一个协助搜寻房屋的服务经纪人。根据经验，这个是由普罗比模型方程决定的，而收入，年龄，经验和对买方市场的认识，以及其他买主的特点都将作为变量引起函数的移动（即改变在家庭或工作有关方面的移动），从而影响买方是否选择使用代理。第二步是购买。在这里房屋的销售价格是根据房屋的特色，购买者的喜好，以及是否需要提供经纪协助而确定的。这种方法需要提供相关决定因素的信息才能确定住宅的价格。尤其，这个模型可以让我们确定买家是否可以接受代理协助房屋与业主自行出售房屋之间的差价。 本文参考了美国房地产
49、经纪人协会研究部对全国购房者和销售者所进行的调查的数据。该数据包括了房地产经纪人对经纪辅助销售和业主销售的两种模式在影响销售价格方面的评估，并揭示了经纪人为卖方所提供的营销服务的价值。 我们的研究结果表明，通过经纪人买房的买家的确要比不通过经纪人的买家支付更多的费用。但我们的结果也同样表明，支付更多的费用并不是单单因为使用了经纪人。相反的，这类买家无论以何种方式购买房子都会比其他买家花更多的钱。导致他们花更多钱的因素是：可能这些购买者的收入很高，可能他们来自其他地方，也可能是受别人的雇佣而这么做，更有可能的是他们通过经纪人来购买自己的房子从而使自己的房子升值。当这些卖家决定使用经纪人来买房时，他们也并不打算为此而付出更多的钱，并且有一些证据表明，他们实际支付的钱比不使用经纪人协助的卖家要来的少。本文的布局如下：第二部分的回顾有关文献，第三部分对数据、变量选择和模型进行描述，第四部分用实例证明结果，最后一部分记载本文的结论。
