《本科生土建施工组织设计外文翻译.doc》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《本科生土建施工组织设计外文翻译.doc（14页珍藏版）》请在三一办公上搜索。
1、毕业设计译文及原稿译文题目：施工项目成本上升的因素原稿题目：Construction Project Cost Escalation Factors原稿出处：Engrg. Volume 25, Issue 4, pp. 221-229 (October 2009)施工项目成本上升的因素J. Mgmt.文摘：私人和公共的建设项目，一直以来有成本增长的问题。交通运输项目，在计划和建设过程中具有典型的较长生产前置时间，这在历史上是被低估的。如图所示，通过对荷兰隧道建设的经验回顾增长的成本。在美国，大约50%的现役的大型运输项目都超出他们的最初的预算。大量的研究和研究项目已经确认个体因素导致增加的工程
2、造价。虽然这个因素能影响私人资助项目鉴定效果，但是对公共资助的项目尤其不利。公共基金用于一些项目的建设效果是有限的，并且有积累的重要的基础设施的需要。因此，如果任何项目超过预算，其他项目被从这个计划删除或降低范围以提供必要资金来抵消成本的增长。这样的行为会加剧恶化的一个国家的运输基础设施。这项研究是通过对个人作品集的深入了解，来分门别类的鉴定费用增长因素。通过超过20个州际公路机构的验证，这18种分门别类的基本影响因素对各类建设项目的成本影响都适用。这些因素描绘了有据可依成本超支问题的原因。工程师在估计未来项目的成本因素，寻求减少它们的方法时考虑这些影响因素可以，提高他们的成本估算和项目预算的
3、准确性。介绍：历史的大型建筑工程已经饱受成本和时间超支的困扰（Flyvbjerg李玮2002）。在很多情况下，最后的项目成本一直高于估计的成本，发布时间可能在最初工程计划时，最终设计时，抑或在开始建设时“Mega项目需要更多的前提研究来避免成本超支。” （2002）早期的项目成本估计与最终报价结果或最终工程成本可以存在显著差异。在这个时间跨度里，项目启动发展概念和最终结束之间，许多因素会影响施工项目最终成本。这段时期通常持续几年，但对于高度复杂和技术挑战性的项目可以轻易超过10年。组织面临重大挑战的项目预算控制的时间跨度将从开始一直持续到完成的项目建设。开发成本估计准确反映工程范围、经济条件、
4、社会利益协调和宏观经济条件提供基线成本管理，可以用来传递学科的设计过程。项目可以兑现预算，但需要一个好的开始，一个估算成本超支因素的意识，及项目管理法则。当缺少法则的时候，在一个项目上显著的成本增长会毁坏整体计划，因为经费将不适应未来项目的建设。History-Holland隧道的案例研究过去的历史经验，可以为建设一个优质项目的预算提供更好的理解。同样使工程造价增长的问题和经验都可以从过去的事实中学到。荷兰隧道，当它在1927年开放时，是最长的水下隧道，它也是人类建筑史第一个机械通气的海底隧道。它的初始成本的估计是由著名的土木工程师George Washington Goethals做出的。回
5、顾荷兰隧道工程，它突出反映了一个具有争议性的问题：关系到对复杂重大工程建设预算的估计和实际成本时，即使是最杰出的工程师也会在评估一个超过本身物理特性的工程的启动成本时遇到麻烦。许多次没有认识到工程外部物理配置的运作成本问题，纽约和新泽西委员会在1918年建设一个交通隧道在河里“敦促新隧道，哈德逊”，“让国人共用去球衣的隧道。”汽车是为主导的交通方式,隧道被决定用于通车。正因如此,隧道会使用新通风技术来净化内燃机所产生的废气。11项设计被考虑在隧道建设里，最值得注意的是，一个由工程师负责整理最近为完成巴拿马运河建设的George Washington Goethals。他想像一个单一的、二层隧道
6、与对方的交通每一层。Goethals做出规划项目成本估计1200万美元和3年建筑时间。第一次世界大战已经耗尽了很多国家的钢铁产品，所以他的设计，利用水泥街区为隧道结构的外壳。他的设计是领先的计划“赫德森车辆管。”（1919）。但他在别处有责任，并且不是这个项目的总设计师。他以荷兰克利头工程连同董事会的5号州际公路工程咨询的名字。荷兰带着在构建地铁、隧道项目的丰富经验来到在纽约的这个项目。“Goethals”计划的估计，这个项目的成本有120万美元。荷兰基于他的研究分析，在1920年2月份发表了一份报告，报告中说：他的发现并不是什么预期的好。荷兰发现：原来Goethals报告中7.47米的宽度不
7、能适应车流。混凝土块不能承受隧道结构附件。Goethals所需的施工方法的设计完全是未经证实的。估计的建设成本是非常低的。工作不能在3年内完成。咨询工程师的一致支持了荷兰的分析。提出了一个荷兰自己的设计，支持的咨询工程师一致通过。荷兰的设计，这是一个大范围的变化，称为“双铸铁管”。一个好处是将根据建设在东方河的隧道的经验和比哈德逊河更进一步。荷兰估计费用28,669,000美元，请求28,669,000美元的球衣试验，施工时间在三年多。讨论了隧道的设计分歧已经持续了超过一年，创造了纽约和新泽西的佣金和延缓工作一个时间表改变。一个合同授予了新泽西侧进一步推迟启动建设和增加超过一半的100万美元的
8、成本。在纽约的建设开始于1920年10月之后，在1921年12月底，在新泽西的一部分隧道出价“允许球衣方式。”隧道委托的竣工日期是1926年12月31日。现在的施工进度已增加到5年。估计项目成本在早年的施工的蠕变、进度拖延、范围和通货膨胀上增加了多次。增加的交通量预测需要更大的出入口广场和获取更多的权利的方式“汽车隧道在增加”。然后材料和劳动力成本将另一个600万美元增加到项目的通货膨胀。在1924年，成本已经提高1400万美元，车辆隧道费用高达1400万美元。由于功能和美学的因素范围蠕变，更复杂的道路设计方法，拓宽路面的途径，增加了更多的成本建筑治疗范围蠕变。重新设计的通风系统加15.24公
9、分的隧道直径及4,422,000美元的支出。荷兰也决定替代铸钢为铸铁增加强度和安全因素的多隧道范围蠕变。最后，在新泽西的通风井不得不重新设计相应的基础，随着他们的付出的代价，因为意想不到700,000美元的土地条件，所有的这些变化增加了42.5亿美元，超过估计。新的资金拨款，它被认为足以完成项目，但到了二月，另一项增加3,200,000美元，隧道申请另外3,200,000美元。委员会解释说，这是新的成本是由于增加成本挑战劳动和材料成本控制。这时荷兰总工程师死于心脏衰竭，他的助手，Milton H. Freeman接替总工程师4个月后死于肺炎。Ole Singstad，设计通风系统的设计师便成了
10、总工程师并且把项目完成。有三个不同的总工程师，耗费5个月是可以遇见混乱。1924年4月份，水从一个裂缝冲进其中一个隧道，迫使工人匆忙逃跑的意外情况。最后一笔专用款项被使用在早期1927年工程，总造价48,400,000美元。1927年11月13日隧道正式投入使用。隧道建造工作开始于7年前。方法论增长的成本因素导致项目成本增长已通过大样本的研究记录，研究证实了单独或团体。每个因子的概念，提出了一种挑战，一个机构对项目的成本估计准确。作为一项大型研究试图提高成本预算和成本管理的概念，从项目的投标的一天，一个文献进行彻底的了鉴定费用估计影响因素等（2006）。文献包括勘探研究报告、出版物、政府报告、
11、新闻文章，和其他公开来源。竣工后的文献回顾的因素进行了分析和分类的人员进入成本因素所经历的交通建设项目的增加。这是由三角在多个调查者或资料来源暗示同一因素。这种分类方法把个人因素,在先前的研究已经确定，并建立了全球框架，用于解决这个问题的工程造价升级。在最后的分类的成本因素框架是通过验证升级的数据，从采访了三角法等20多个国家SHAS公路部门先前的工程支持识别的因素包括电话采访了50个沙斯党等面谈的准备和测试仪器是最初在现场采访两个沙斯党。修订后的采访乐器被送到了沙斯党面谈前，以便他们能准备。在随访现场为五个人访谈和通过沙斯党通过一组“同伴交流”剩下的随访电话。在所有情况下，研究人员追踪采访的
12、协议，以确保在数据采集。结果分类的成本因素可以帮助升级项目业主和工程专业人员将注意力集中在这个关键问题，导致成本估算不精确。成本因素的分类升级从分析方法生成的已有研究成果的基础上，认为面谈来创建一个分类的成本的原因的规模。一个更好的理解成本因素是理解升级的部队各因素的驱动因素或者来源。在这层了解可能的设计策略，为应对这些成本升级的因素。这个因素影响的评估中，每一个项目都是由自然发展阶段的内部和外部的因素在起作用，控制成本升级的机构/业主为内部，而现有的直接控制的因素外，该机构/业主分为外部。这个报告的因素为不应被视为暗示一水平的影响并构建提供了潜在的因素。总结成逻辑划分的因素，并帮助在可视化分
13、类项目成本预算是如何影响。值得注意的一个因素，指出问题劳动和材料成本的估计，但是大部分的因素，是指出“影响项目范围和影响”的时机。Construction Project Cost Escalation Factors J. Mgmt. Abstract: Construction projects, private and public alike, have a long history of cost escalation. Transportation projects, which typically have long lead times between planning and
14、 construction, are historically underestimated, as shown through a review of the cost growth experienced with the Holland Tunnel. Approximately 50% of the active large transportation projects in the United States have overrun their initial budgets. A large number of studies and research projects hav
15、e identified individual factors that lead to increased project cost. Although the factors identified can influence privately funded projects the effects are particularly detrimental to publicly funded projects. The public funds available for a pool of projects are limited and there is a backlog of c
16、ritical infrastructure needs. Therefore, if any project exceeds its budget other projects are dropped from the program or the scope is reduced to provide the funds necessary to cover the cost growth. Such actions exacerbate the deterioration of a states transportation infrastructure. This study is a
17、n anthology and categorization of individual cost increase factors that were identified through an in-depth literature review. This categorization of 18 primary factors which impact the cost of all types of construction projects was verified by interviews with over 20 state highway agencies. These f
18、actors represent documented causes behind cost escalation problems. Engineers who address these escalation factors when assessing future project cost and who seek to mitigate the influence of these factors can improve the accuracy of their cost estimates and program budgets Introduction：Historically
19、 large construction projects have been plagued by cost and schedule overruns Flyvbjerg et al. 2002. In too many cases, the final project cost has been higher than the cost estimates prepared and released during initial planning, preliminary engineering, final design, or even at the start of construc
20、tion “Mega projects need more study up front to avoid cost overruns.” The ramifications of differences between early project cost estimates and bid prices or the final cost of a project can be significant. Over the time span between project initiation concept development and the completion of constr
21、uction many factors may influence the final project costs. This time span is normally several years in duration but for the highly complex and technologically challenging projects it can easily exceed 10 years. Organizations face a major challenge in controlling project budgets over the time span be
22、tween project initiation and the completion of construction. The development of cost estimates that accurately reflect project scope, economic conditions, and are attuned to community interest and the macroeconomic conditions provide a baseline cost that management can use to impart discipline into
23、the design process. Projects can be delivered on budget but that requires a good starting estimate, an awareness of factors that can cause cost escalation, and project management discipline. When discipline is lacking, significant cost growth on one project can raze the larger program of projects be
24、cause funds will not be available for future projects that are programmed for constructionHistoryHolland Tunnel Case StudyA history of past project experiences can serve one well in understanding the challenges of delivering a quality project on budget. Repeatedly, the same problems cause project co
25、st escalation and much wisdom can be gained by studying the past. The Holland Tunnel was, when it opened in 1927, the longest underwater tunnel ever constructed and it was also the first mechanically ventilated underwater tunnel. Its initial cost estimate was made by the renowned civil engineer Geor
26、ge Washington Goethals. A review of the Holland Tunnel project serves to highlight the critical issues associated with estimating the costs of large complex projects and the fact that even the most distinguished engineers have trouble assessing cost drivers beyond the physical characteristics of a p
27、roject. Many times there is no recognition of the cost drivers operating outside the projects physical configuration. A joint New York and New Jersey commission in 1918 recommended a transportation tunnel under the river “Urges new tunnel under the Hudson.” 1918; “Ask nation to share in tunnel to Je
28、rsey.” 1918. The automobile was emerging as the predominate means of transportation and it was decided that this tunnel should be for vehicular traffic. As a result the tunnel would employ new ventilation technologies to purge the exhaust gases produced by the internal combustion engine. Eleven desi
29、gns were considered for the tunnel, most notably, one by the engineer recently responsible for finishing the Panama Canal, George Washington Goethals. He envisioned a single, bilevel tunnel with opposing traffic on each level. Goethals made a planning project cost estimate of $12 million and 3 years
30、 for construction. World War I had consumed much of the nations steel and iron production, so his design made use of cement blocks as the tunnels structural shell. His design was the frontrunning plan “Hudson vehicle tube.” but he had responsibilities elsewhere and was not named chief engineer for t
31、he project. Clifford M. Holland was named to head the project along with a board of five consulting engineers “Name interstate tunnel engineers.” 1919. Holland came to the project with vast experience in constructing subways and tunnels in New York. The cost of the project was taken to be $12 millio
32、n, Goethals planning estimate. Holland produced a report in February of 1920 based on his analysis of the Goethals design of the project. His findings were not what had been expected. Holland found Goethals width of 7.47 m would not accommodate the volume of traffic. Concrete blocks would not withst
33、and the structural loads exerted on the tunnel. The construction methods required by Goethals design were completely untried. The estimated cost of construction was grossly low. The work could not be completed in 3 years.The board of consulting engineers gave unanimous support for Hollands analysis.
34、 Holland then presented a design of his own which was supported unanimously by the consulting engineers. Hollands design, which was a major scope change, called for twin cast-iron tubes. One advantage was that construction would follow established methods of tunnel construction that had been impleme
35、nted for rail tunnels under the East River and further up the Hudson. Holland estimated the cost at $28,669,000 “Asks $28,669,000 for Jersey tube.” 1920 and construction time at 31/2 years.Debate about the tunnel design continued for more than a year creating disagreements between the New York and N
36、ew Jersey Commissions and delaying the worka schedule change. A disagreement about awarding a contract on the New Jersey side further delayed the start of construction and added over half of a million dollars in cost. Construction started on the New York side in October of 1920 and in late December
37、1921 the New Jersey portion of the tunnel was bid “Way all cleared for Jersey tunnel.” The mandated completion date was December 31, 1926. The construction schedule had now grown to 5 years. Estimated project cost increased multiple times throughout the early years of construction as a result of sco
38、pe creep, schedule delays, and inflation. Increased traffic forecast necessitate larger entrance/exit plazas and acquisition of more right of way “Vehicular tube is growing.” 1923. Then increases in material and labor costs had added another $6 million to the project inflation. By the beginning of 1
39、924, reestimated costs had been increased by $14,000,000 “Vehicular tunnel cost up $14,000,000.” 1924 due to functional and aesthetic factors scope creep. More intricate roadway designs for approaches, widening of the approach roadways, and architectural treatments increased the costs more scope cre
40、ep. Redesign of the ventilation system added 15.24 cm to the tunnel diameter and $4,422,000. Holland also decided to substitute cast-steel for castiron to increase the strength and safety factors of the tunnel more scope creep. Last, the New Jersey ventilation shafts had to be redesigned along with
41、their corresponding foundations at a cost of $700,000 due to unexpected soil conditions unforeseen conditions. All of these changes increased the estimate to over $42.5 million. New funds were appropriated and it was believed that these were sufficient to complete the project, but by February of 192
42、6, there was another increase of $3,200,000 “$3,200,000 more asked for tunnel.” The commission explained that the new costs were due to increases in labor and material costs challenge in controlling cost. At this time Holland died of heart failure and his assistant, Milton H. Freeman, took over as c
43、hief engineer only to die of pneumonia 4 months later. Ole Singstad, the designer of the ventilation system then became chief engineer and brought the project to completion. Having three different chief engineers within 5 months created confusion unforeseen events. In April of 1924 water rushed into
44、 one of the tunnels from a leak forcing workers to make a hasty escape more unforeseen conditions. A final appropriation was requested in early 1927 brought the total project cost to $48,400,000. On November 13 of 1927 the tunnel officially opened “Work on tunnel began 7 years ago.” MethodologyThe c
45、ost escalation factors that lead to project cost growth have been documented through a large number of studies. Studies have identified factors individually or by groups. Each factor presents a challenge to an agency seeking to produce accurate project cost estimates. As part of a larger study seeki
46、ng to improve cost estimates and management of costs from project conception to bid day, a thorough literature review was conducted to identify factors that influence cost estimates Anderson et al. 2006. The literature review included exploration of research reports and publications, government repo
47、rts, news articles, and other published sources. Upon completion of the literature review the factors were analyzed and categorized by the researchers into factors that drive the cost increases experienced by transportation construction projects. This was accomplished by triangulation where multiple
48、 investigators or data sources suggested the same factor. This categorization took the individual factors which had been identified in previous research and established a global framework for addressing the issue of project cost escalation. Upon final categorization the cost escalation factor framew
49、ork was verified through triangulation of data from interviews with more than 20 state highway agencies SHAs around the nation . A previous project that supported identification of the factors had included telephone interviews with all 50 SHAs Schexnayder et al. 2003 . An interview instrument was prepared and tested initially during onsite interview with two SHAs. The revised interview instrument was
