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1、1,新形势下会计问题之探讨,厦门大学会计发展研究中心曲晓辉Email:http:/,2,提纲,一、新形势之概览二、新形势下的会计问题三、新形势下会计问题之理论思考四、新形势下会计问题之实务考量五、新形势下会计研究之机遇,3,一、新形势之概览,（一）企业所处环境（二）会计理念与计量（三）会计准则全球趋同（四）全球金融危机的影响,4,（一）企业所处环境,开放经济买方市场信用制度收益实现币值、物价、汇率等因素的影响,5,（二）会计理念与计量,旨在服务资本市场资产负债表导向估值不可或缺公允价值与现值计量配比正在逐渐弱化主体观得以充分体现,6,（三）会计准则全球趋同,基本理念本质上相同的经济业务，不管发
2、生在何时何地，会计处理方法都应该相同。,7,趋同的目标准则IFRS,国际财务报告准则，由以下部分组成：国际财务报告准则（IFRS）国际会计准则（IAS）国际财务报告解释委员会拟定的解释公告（IFRIC）常设解释委员会拟定的解释公告（SIC）,8,IFRS版本及其改进和修订,9,IFRS在全球的采用或趋同情况,2005：欧盟当时25个成员国、澳大利亚、香港 全面采用2007：中国实质性趋同 美国认可非美国公司按IFRS编制的报表2009：韩国允许采用2011：加拿大、巴西、印度、韩国全面采用 日本全面趋同 美国完成与IASB的备忘录项目,10,IASB工作的最新进展,国际会计准则委员会章程的修改
3、概念框架的改进财务报表列报的重大变化新发布或修订的主要准则和解释公告处于征求意见阶段的有关项目,11,国际会计准则委员会章程的修改,每五年进行一次全面审查，根据需要作出修改。本次重大修改征求意见截止于2008年9月20日。本次修改主要涉及两个方面：在国际会计准则委员会基金会之上设立一个监管小组将国际会计准则委员会委员人数由14人增加至16人,12,监管小组所处层次,已颁布的章程修改建议稿建议在国际会计准则委员会基金会（或托管人委员会）之上成立一个主要由证券监管机构领导人组成的监管小组。,13,成立该监管小组的主要原因,强化国际会计准则委员会公共责任建立与公共监管机构间的正式联系确保国际会计准则
4、委员会按既定的目标运作确保国际会计准则的贯彻实施确保国际会计准则委员会的财政支持,14,监管小组将由四方面组成,欧盟代表1人国际货币基金组织执行董事1人世界银行行长1人证券监管机构的领导人4人：美国证监会主席日本金融监管委员会委员国际证监会组织技术委员会主席国际证监会组织新兴市场委员会主席,15,监管小组的主要职责,参与并批准国际会计准则委员会基金会成员的任命。审查基金会履行章程所规定职责的情况，并提供建议。为此，基金会每年应向监管小组作出报告；监管小组每年至少一次会见基金会成员或其专门小组的成员。,16,概念框架的改进,概念框架(Conceptual Framework)基本质量特征(Fun
5、damental)：相关性(Relevance)如实表述(Faithful Representation),17,概念框架的改进,组成要素(Components)：预测价值(Predictive Value)确证价值(Confirmatory Value)完整性(Completeness)免于重大差错(Free from Material Error)中立性(Neutrality),18,概念框架的改进,强化性质量特征(Enhancing)：可比性(Comparability)可验证性(Verifiability)及时性(Timeliness)可了解性(Understandability),1
6、9,概念框架的改进,财务报告信息的广泛制约(Pervasive Constraints)：重要性(Materiality)成本(Cost),20,21,财务报表列报的重大变化,IAS 1财务报表的列报重大修订主要变化资产负债表名称的改变报告所有者权益变动和综合收益其他综合收益重分类调整和相关税收影响股利的列报,22,IAS 1财务报表的列报,资产负债表的名称改为“财务状况表”当采用追溯调整法运用会计政策，或追溯重述、重分类财务报表中相关项目时，修订后的 IAS 1 要求在一套完整的财务报表中包括一张“最早比较期间期初的财务状况表”。,23,IAS 1财务报表的列报,以所有者身份的交易而导致的权
7、益变化，必须与非所有者交易导致的权益变化单独列报。以所有者身份的交易导致的权益变化，列示在权益变动表中；不允许将综合收益（即与非所有者交易导致的权益变化）列示在权益变动表中。收益和费用应当列示在一张单一的综合收益表中，也可以分别列在两张报表中，即：一张是单独的收益表，一张是综合收益表。,24,IAS 1财务报表的列报,要求主体披露其他综合收益各组成部分的所得税影响。要求主体披露前期在其他综合收益中确认的、本期重分类为损益的金额。例如：本期出售可供出售金融资产时,前期在其他综合收益中确认的公允价值变动,本期转入损益的金额要求主体在权益变动表或其附注中，列示分配给所有者的股利及其相关的每股金额，不
8、允许列在综合收益表中。,25,新发布或修订的主要准则和解释公告,准则（IFRS或IAS）IAS 1财务报表的列报IFRS 3企业合并IFRS 8经营分部IAS 23借款费用IAS 27合并财务报表和单独财务报表解释公告（IFRIC）IFRIC12服务特许权协议IFRIC13客户忠诚度计划,26,处于征求意见阶段的有关项目,对IAS 31合营中的权益的修订：联合安排（Joint Arrangements）修订核心是采用权益法，取消比例合并法对IAS 24关联方披露的修订修订核心是豁免将仅同受控制的国有企业之间发生的交易作为关联方交易披露，这是我国企业会计准则与国际财务报告准则趋同的成果。,27,
9、（四）全球金融危机的影响,1.全球金融危机下的物价 2.全球金融危机下的币值 3.全球金融危机下的汇率 4.全球金融危机下的金融资产与负债 5.全球金融危机下的经营与市场,28,1.全球金融危机下的物价,个别商品价格犹如过山车CPI&PPI下行,29,国际石油价格上天入地,与2008年7月11日创下的每桶147.27美元的历史最高纪录相比，国际油价在短短几个月的时间内下跌逾73%.以12月26日纽约商品交易所的轻质原油期货收盘价为例，2009年2月份交货的合约价格为每桶37.71美元。2008年12月19日纽约商品交易所月份交货的轻质原油期货价格收于每桶33.87美元，比前一交易日下跌2.35
10、美元，处于近年来的最低点。,30,31,32,工业国平均通货膨胀率（CPI）亚洲新兴市场平均通货膨胀率（CPI）,33,拉美新兴市场平均通货膨胀率 其他新兴市场平均通货膨胀率,34,新兴市场平均通货膨胀率（CPI年度环比）中值 四分位,35,工业国平均通货膨胀率（消费物价指数，%）,36,37,38,中国居民消费价格指数（CPI）,2009年2月CPI同比降1.6 6年来首次负增长,39,中国工业品出厂价格指数（PPI）,40,中国CPI与基准利率变动图,41,2.全球金融危机下的币值,人民币美元英镑澳币,42,3.全球金融危机下的汇率,英镑:2008.12.31外汇交易中心公布1英镑对人民币
11、9.8798元，再创新低，上一日中间价9.8975元为英镑对人民币的中间价首次破10。与2007年底14.5807元的中间价相比较，同样1英镑所兑换的人民币已经缩水了4.7元。欧元：2008.10.28欧元对人民币的中间价报8.4890元，再创历史新低。澳元:从2008.7的1:6.6跌至1：4.5左右，跌幅超过25。,43,澳元对人民币一年走势图,44,45,人民币对美元汇率再创新高,2008-9-1银行间外汇市场美元对人民币汇率的中间价为：1美元对人民币跌破6.8320元，再创汇改以来新高。,46,4.全球金融危机下的金融资产与负债,股票、债券、期货、套期损失惨重的例子比比皆是,47,次贷
12、是怎么来的？,次级住房抵押贷款(Subprime Mortgage Loans)：借款人没有稳定可靠的收入来源、没有信用记录或信用级别低下、债务负担沉重、还款能力极低或缺失。次贷打造：次级市场-住房抵押贷款机构-政府发起企业（GSE）和投资银行-次级债券-放大20倍。售与：社保基金、投资基金、对冲银行、商业银行、保险公司；再卖给最穷的国家。根本原因：缺乏监督的金融创新滋生严重的道德风险,48,次贷影响的外溢,中国政府持有“两房”发行的3763亿美元债券,次贷危机以来增持了640亿美元,成为全世界持有“两房”债券最多的政府。截止2008.8,中国政府持有5410亿美元美国国债,仅次于日本(585
13、9),高于英国(3074),三国占80.7%。,49,5.全球金融危机下的经营与市场,金融行业大幅收缩资本市场萎靡不振实体经济举步维艰消费情绪空前低迷企业资金岌岌可危人力市场极不景气,09年解禁股的供给将是解禁规模最大的一年。全年总计有约6852亿股各类限售股份解禁,按12月1日收盘价计算,市值规模为33379亿元。,50,上证指数攀升至6124.082007.10.16,51,上证指数探底至1664.912008.10.28,52,深成指数走势,53,上证沪综指周跌8%创九年最大单周跌幅,54,中国股市过山车,从2007年10月16日中国A股（沪）创下6124点以来，仅仅五个半月，中国股市已
14、大跌46%以上，而有不少股票已跌掉一半，甚至三分之二。如中国平安从149元跌到48.3元，云南铜业从98元跌到28元.中国石油按2008.9.5最低价11.92元计算，较上市首日的48.46元下跌了36.54元，跌幅高达75.4。,55,新形势有感,世事难料及时调整与时俱进逆市求生,56,二、新形势下的会计问题,货币计量单位伸伸缩缩难以把握计量属性与历史成本渐行渐远稳健计量与财务信息相关性的矛盾尖锐会计数据融入更多职业判断外币货币性项目风险敞口加大监管面临更为严峻的挑战,57,三、新形势下会计问题之理论思考,会计准则理论之分野财务报告目标之层次会计计量属性之争论会计计量单位之困惑财务信息质量之
15、评价,58,四、新形势下会计问题之实务考量,财务报告可能存在的问题持有资产及其风险举债及其限度,59,财务报告可能存在的问题,契约和监管临界点财务操纵几率增加上市公司操高利润动机应该更为强烈提前确认收入或推迟确认费用和损失操纵可能从应计项目和期末重估值入手关注商誉和使用寿命不确定的无形资产其他长期资产减值损失准备计提不足递延所得税资产、弃置费用和预计负债,60,持有资产及其风险,行业风险无形损耗风险处置风险内含价值与供求债权是否带息？债权利息是否随通货膨胀调整？债权利息是否涉税及税率？是否涉及外币及其汇率走势？,61,举债及其限度,合理利用财务杠杆还款贬值？债务是否带息？债务利息是否随通货膨胀
16、调整？是否涉及外币及其汇率走势？在财务风险可控之内举债,62,五、新形势下会计研究之机遇和挑战,充满机遇的研究领域实证研究的严峻挑战,63,充满机遇的研究领域,会计准则研究盈余管理研究公允价值研究金融工具研究审计质量研究,64,充满机遇的研究领域,研究选题Katherine Schipper：会计准则执行在实现会计国际协调中的角色研究选题Mary Barth：研究、准则制定和全球财务报告研究选题Wayne R.Landsman：公允价值会计信息相关且可靠吗？来自资本市场研究的证据（当代会计评论研究选题“公允价值研究”研讨会,65,充满机遇的研究领域,研究选题Katherine Schipper
17、会计准则执行在实现会计国际协调中的角色The Role of Implementations of Accounting Standards in Achieving International Accounting Convergence作者讨论假定：单一的一套高质量财务报告准则，适用于所有司法管辖区，并一贯严格的实施，这是一个理想的结果。这并非所有人都会同意。,66,Implementations of financial reporting standards are one step in a processStandardsImplementation decisionsAuditi
18、ngOversight(governance)EnforcementPublic scrutinyImplementations are shaped by(among other things)expertise,available data and measurement technology,and incentives.They can be characterized as:Conscientious and skilled applicationGood faith but uninformed or unskilled applicationSubversive applicat
19、ionWillful violation,Implementations are one step in financial reporting,Questions to consider:Which characterization of implementations is most empirically descriptive?Does the most empirically descriptive characterization vary by jurisdiction?What should standard setters assume about implementatio
20、ns?What do accounting researchers tend to assume about implementations?,67,Accounting research often implicitly or explicitly assumes that only differences in incentives matter for accounting implementations,or that other effects are second-order and can be safely ignored(i.e.,implementers are exper
21、ts).This assumption may not be correct.,An observation about expertise and incentives,Example 1:Kurt Eichenwald,Conspiracy of Fools,p.11:Crime at Enronwas just one ingredient in the toxic stew that poisoned the company.Shocking incompetence,unjustified arrogance,compromised ethics,and an utter conte
22、mpt for the markets judgment all played decisive roles.Ultimately,it was Enrons tragedy to be filled with people smart enough to know how to maneuver around the rules,but not wise enough to understand why the rules had been written in the first place(emphasis added).Example 2:Report of the Special E
23、xamination of Fannie Mae,May 2006,emphasizes the adverse consequences of failing to invest the necessary resources in accounting and financial reporting.From p.238:The failure to invest adequately led to critical resource shortages and a lack of technical accounting expertise.(emphasis added)Example
24、 3:General Motors 2006 10K report acknowledges material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting.The Corporation lacked the technical expertise and processes to ensure compliance with SFAS No.109.and in certain instances lacked the technical expertise and did not maintain adequate pr
25、ocedures to ensure that the accounting for derivative financial instruments was.appropriate(emphasis added),68,Complexity of the transaction,of the standard,or of the required measurement probably implies larger confidence intervals around the reported numbers(which are point estimates).Conjecture:W
26、idth of confidence intervals in reported numbers has increased irretrievably because of the nature of commercial arrangements combined with limitations of available measurement technology.Together,these limit the precision of implementations,but not necessarily their consistency.Various high-level c
27、ommittees and task forces in the US are charged with reducing“complexity in financial reporting”(although there does not appear to be agreement as to how complexity is to be defined and measured,let alone reduced).,An observation about complexity,Questions to consider:What is the level of uncertaint
28、y of measurement that should result in either a change in the accounting or no accounting at all?Are some standards particularly difficult to implement and if so,what are the implications for consistency of reporting outcomes?Examples:SFAS 133,IAS 39What are the implications for education and traini
29、ng of accountants?,69,Non-neutral standards Accounting“subsidies”create incentives for implementations that obtain the subsidy(standard affects implementation)Examples:SFAS 13 and IAS 17(leasing),portions of SFAS 133 that pertain to the“short-cut”method for hedge accounting Conservative standards in
30、tended to counteract perceived incentives to overstate assets and income(the standard setters perceptions about implementation affect the standard)Examples:Impairment testing in both IFRS and US GAAP,An observation about neutrality,Question to consider:In light of well recognized incentives to overs
31、tate income and assets and evidence that overstatements occur,should standards be non-neutral(conservatively biased)so as to counteract these incentives for a biased implementation?This question speaks to what the standard setter should assume about implementations.,70,Managements implementations ta
32、ke account of and are constrained by:Standards themselvesneutrality,complexity and required knowledgeExpertise and available data and measurement technologies Auditing and oversight Enforcement Public scrutiny Implementations of certain auditing,tax and financial reporting standards are interrelated
33、 Example:Auditors judgment about the financial reporting treatment of an uncertain tax position.,Summary comment about other elements of the financial reporting process,Observations:Research that focuses on managers financial reporting incentives controls for these other effects,assumes they do not
34、vary across treatment conditions,or assumes they are second order effects that can be safely disregarded.How likely is it that these other elements do not vary across the jurisdictions that apply IFRS?,71,Potentially observable in experimental settings Capture the judgments and decisions of implemen
35、ters directly Not observable in general in archival dataObservation:In principle,archival records of PCAOB inspections could provide indirect evidence on implementation decisions in the US.I am not aware of an equivalent source of information outside the US.Observation:Analyses of discovered frauds
36、provide direct evidence of outcomes of implementation decisions that involve willful violations of reporting standardsArchival research usually selects outcome indicators that are presumed to capture,summarize or reflect implementations Properties of reported numbers Auditor decision to qualify a re
37、port Number of segments reported Properties of analysts forecasts Statistical measures of the relation between reported numbers and market variablesArchival research also selects correlated indicators that are presumed to be related to implementations Fees for audit and nonaudit services are viewed
38、as correlated with(or even causing)lack of auditor independence.,From a research perspective,implementations are behaviors,72,Outcome indicators and correlated indicators capture both the influence of implementation decisions and the influence of other elements of the financial reporting process tha
39、t are related to(and affect)implementations Example:Business or accounting fundamentals.After the researcher controls for fundamentals,the remaining portion of the outcome indicator is presumed to capture the influence of implementation decisions Example:Accruals that are not explained by accounting
40、 fundamentals capture earnings management(an outcome indicator)Example:Audit fees that are not explained by business fundamentals capture auditor-client bonding(a correlated indicator)Example:Nature of the standard that is being implemented Research typically does not control for the difficulty(or c
41、omplexity)of implementing he standard,From a research perspective,implementations are behaviors,73,Choice of outcome indicator dictated by the research questionExample:Do abnormally large audit fees lead to auditor-client bonding and(therefore)less-rigorous auditing which in turn implies less rigoro
42、us implementations?Outcome indicator should capture effects of less-rigorous auditing,presumed to be lower-quality financial reportingExamples:Restatements,enforcement actionsExamples:Abnormal accruals;earnings response coefficients;explanatory power of earnings for returnsTest variable is audit fee
43、s(predicted to increase with presumed bonding,taken to imply less-than-independent implementation of auditing standards)Research design must control for other effects on the outcome indicator and for other effects on audit feesExample:Abnormal audit fees are fees not explained by fundamentals such a
44、s size,merger activity,leverage and auditor tenure(e.g.,Ashbaugh et al.,The Accounting Review,2003).,Choosing outcome indicators,74,Choice of outcome indicator constrained by available data Not possible to observe auditor-client bonding directlyMeasure bonding as audit fees that are not explained by
45、 fundamentals Not possible to observe audit implementation decisions directlyHowever,good(poor)audits should increase(decrease)earnings quality Well known difficulties in this kind of settingUncontrolled factors that affect the observed relation between an outcome indicator(earnings quality)and the
46、test variable(audit fees)Association between earnings quality and audit fees may be due to auditor-client bonding,failure to control for fundamental determinants of fees and earnings quality,or misstatement of the relationExample:High audit fees might be caused by auditors assessments of higher risk
47、 in firms with poorer earnings quality(e.g.,Gul,Chen and Tsui,Contemporary Accounting Research,2003),as opposed to higher audit fees being a cause of auditor-client bonding.Conjecture:Are audit fees and implementation quality jointly determined(that is,mutually dependent and also driven by many of t
48、he same fundamentals)?Size,losses,business model complexity appear as determinants of both audit fees and accruals quality(Dechow and Dichev,The Accounting Review,2002),Choosing outcome indicators,75,Choice of outcome indicator affects the answer to the research questionAn income-based measure of ac
49、counting quality could decline while other measures increaseIncome based measures include smoothness(volatility),predictability and persistenceMarket based measures include earnings response coefficients and explanatory power of earnings for returnsAnalyst based measures include analyst forecast err
50、or,dispersion and biasExample:Kohlbeck and Warfield(working paper 2005)examine the influence of four US accounting standards on accounting qualityStandards pertain to pensions(SFAS 87),other post-retirement benefits(SFAS 106),investments(SFAS 115)and taxes(SFAS 109)Outcome measures of accounting qua
