06Use Open Innovation to Cope in a Downturn.doc

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1、Web Exclusive: Use Open Innovation to Cope in a DownturnbyHenry W. Chesbrough and Andrew R. GarmanFive strategic moves will help you reduce the costs of supporting R&D today while preserving opportunities for growth tomorrow.History shows that the companies that continue to invest in their innovativ

2、e capabilities during tough economic times are those that fare best when growth returns. Thats how the U.S. chemicals industry overtook Britains after World War I, how Sears surpassed Montgomery Ward as the leading U.S. retailer after World War II, and how Japanese semiconductor makers outpaced U.S.

3、 companies after the downturn of the early 1980s.In a challenging business climate, focus is crucial. But companies face a real dilemma: how to maintain that focus and manage costs tightly while keeping growth options alive for the future. Deferring or canceling less promising initiatives that might

4、 have been pursued in good times allows a business to survive and eventually thrive again. Many companies give attention and resources only to the projects that are most likely to generate near-term profits, and they end up deciding quickly which initiatives fit best with the companys core business.

5、 Its a smart short-term strategy.The downside of rigorous prioritization, however, is that it halts many potentially promising projects at an early point in their development and leaves them stranded inside the company. Over time, so many projects get abandoned that the companys ability to grow beyo

6、nd its core business is threatened. If focus is maintained for too long or with too much rigidity, it can become the enemy of growth. When the market recovers, the company lacks a foundation from which to rebound.Open innovation can play an important part in the solution. By breaking down traditiona

7、l corporate boundaries, open innovation allows intellectual property, ideas, and people to flow freely both into and out of an organization. To date, much more attention has been paid to the inbound flow, which we call outside-in open innovationoutsiders contributions that enable an enterprise to cr

8、eate offerings whose scale belies its internal capabilities (see “A Better Way to Innovate,” HBR July 2003).However, in a recession such as the one were now experiencing, it is the often overlooked “inside-out” aspect of open innovation that can best serve a company. Inside-out open innovation refer

9、s to processes whereby a business places some of its assets or projects outside its own walls. That not only saves much of the time and money being invested in those projects, but also can nurture new supplier and partner relationships, promote innovative ecosystems, and generate high-margin licensi

10、ng income (see the exhibit “The Inside-Out Process”).The Inside-Out ProcessConsider BT (formerly British Telecom), long the leading phone company in Britain. During the 1990s, the company transformed itself into a global telecommunications services firm. After the telecom bubble burst in 2000, BT ne

11、eded to marshal its resources and refocus. One critical step was to create a process for placing its homegrown technologies and intellectual property in external hands. Since 2003, BT has formed strategic partnerships with venture capital investors that put their own money into launching spin-off co

12、mpanies (see the sidebar “Inside-Out Venture Capital”). These spin-offsincluding Azure Solutions, Vidus, and Psytechnicsproduce telecommunications technologies and services that are key components of larger offerings from BT to its customers. And BT can market these offerings without shouldering the

13、 long-term burden of funding, developing, and upgrading them. According to the firms chief science officer, Mike Carr, “BT needed to focus on being a top provider of network services, not on building hardware and software products. The partnership approach gives us sufficient funds to develop techno

14、logy right through the marketing process.” Inside-Out Venture CapitalIn becoming a customer for its previously internal projects and spinning off nonstrategic initiatives to other firms, BT exemplifies two of the five inside-out open-innovation moves that we have identified (see the exhibit “Move In

15、novation from the Inside Out”). All five allow a company to focus on its core operations today while preserving growth options for tomorrow. Lets examine these moves.Move Innovation from the Inside OutMove 1: Become a Customer or Supplier of Your Former Internal ProjectsIn hard times, companies must

16、 make the tough choice either to continue or to stop funding promising projects. Seldom considered is a third choice that offers greater flexibility: Pursue a project as a customer or supplier instead of developing and bringing it to market on your own. The simple idea is that by taking a smaller ro

17、le in the project, you reduce your costs and your risks. If the project is successfully developed by another firm, you still participate in that success, albeit in a more limited way. For example, Eli Lilly began a project called Bounty Chem to improve its sourcing of external ideas for developing n

18、ew drugs. The company quickly realized that the project would be more effective if it sourced ideas for lots of other companies, too. So Lilly helped launch what became InnoCentive and was its first customer. Lilly paid only for the services it actually used; the costs and risks of the InnoCentive p

19、roject were shared by multiple customers and outside investors.An interesting variation on Move 1 makes sense in situations where three conditions are met: A company has identified a new market or application for a product; the cost of engineering a solution or building a channel to market is high;

20、and the solution doesnt fit with the firms core strengths. For example, Element Six, a subsidiary of De Beers, is the worlds leading supplier of diamond supermaterials for industrial applications. The company discovered that an appropriately engineered diamond wafer could be used to create the anode

21、 in a small electrolytic device that generates ozone in water at a low cost. (Ozone can be used to help kill waterborne pathogens.) Element Six has a strong core competence in manufacturing diamond wafers but not in engineering and distributing electrolytic devices. In 2009, Element Six created a ne

22、w company, Electrolytic Ozone, to design, manufacture, and market the devices. The spin-off company will ultimately become a significant purchaser of the parents diamond wafer product, with the majority of the capital and resources coming from third parties.Move 2: Let Others Develop Your Nonstrateg

23、ic InitiativesAn economic crisis calls for focus and crisp execution and, thus, is an opportune time to eliminate distractions. Simply killing projects that havent yet proven their potentialor that lie outside the coreis an easy way to refocus, but ending too many of them diminishes the companys lon

24、g-term growth prospects. A better strategy is to spin off some of those projects to outside investors, perhaps keeping a piece of the action for yourself. If the spin-off fails, you save the additional time and money you would have spent on the project. If it fares well, you have several attractive

25、options: maintaining or increasing your equity position, acquiring the spin-off, or selling your position to other investors.One obvious caveat is that spinning off projects means sharing the upside value with third parties. In a downturn, that makes sense: The outflow of scarce funds to support “fr

26、eed” projects is reduced or eliminated. However, when a project succeeds, management may need to be reminded that the spin-off kept options alive and that owning part of something is better than owning all of nothing.Spin-offs, of course, face demanding survival challenges. They have to find outside

27、 sources of capital, recruit talented leaders and staff, and ultimately attract customers. These are difficult tests that many projects will not pass. However, those that do will develop with others time and money, not yours. Consider Lucents experience with an internal project that eventually becam

28、e Lucent Digital Video. Initially, management viewed the technology as being ahead of its time and, therefore, too small to be of strategic interest. So the company spun it off as a separate venture. Once up and running, the venture demonstrated that China and other key markets in the developing wor

29、ld had a pressing need for technology that would help them accommodate future digital traffic. Moreover, many of those markets were buying Lucent equipment alongside the venture companys digital video encoders. As a result, Lucent eventually decided to reacquire the company.The odyssey of Lucent Dig

30、ital Video illustrates how you can get an unexpected dividend from this kind of spin-off. Having offloaded the burdens of funding and managing the project, Lucent was able to profit from the markets “second opinion,” which revealed the projects true strategic value. If Lucent had kept the project in

31、side, it probably wouldnt have identified the opportunity so quickly.Move 3: Make Your IP Work Harder for You and OthersMany companies own lots of intellectual property (IP) that delivers no direct financial benefit because it sits on the shelf. A valuable inside-out open-innovation move is to put t

32、hat IP to work in other companies.One recent example comes from CH2M Hill, a $6 billion environmental services company. With partner ADA Technologies, it codeveloped valuable patents describing an inexpensive and effective way to control mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. Neither partne

33、r is a product company, so they both contributed IP to a new product-based start-up funded by outside investors. This mercury-control technology will be jointly marketed by CH2M and the start-up, thereby complementing CH2Ms utility-service offerings to its customers (and using the principle of Move

34、1).Royal Philips Electronics, of the Netherlands, has done something similar. A global leader in consumer electronics, Philips has sought to restructure in response to intense, low-cost competition from Asian manufacturers. It has spun off its semiconductor business and now focuses on the health car

35、e and wellness markets. This strategic shift stranded many internal ideas and IP assets originally developed for the legacy electronics business, and the company is using them to make several open-innovation moves. Its capitalizing on the more than 60,000 patents in its portfolio to earn hundreds of

36、 millions of euros annually from licensing (Move 3). It has also embraced incubation, launching more than 20 new ventures. Some of theseincluding Liquavista, Silicon Hive, and priv-IDare potential future suppliers (Move 1) and have attracted external investment (Move 2). According to Ronald Wolf, a

37、senior business development manager at Philips Corporate Technologies, “The goal of incubation is to transform new ideas that otherwise would have been left unused into successful businesses for Philips. This allows us to extract more value from our R&D efforts.”Developing this internal capability,

38、though time-consuming, can generate significant income thatapart from legal costsflows directly to the bottom line. At scale, this flow can be substantial, though it varies by industry. IBM often reports licensing income of $1 billion or more and spends roughly $6 billion annually on R&D. John Tao,

39、formerly of Air Products and now VP of open innovation at Weyerhauser, estimates that once a chemical company (or a company in a related industry) establishes a licensing process, 15% or more of R&D is a reasonable target for licensing income.Putting unused IP assets to work also generates new busin

40、ess possibilities in the form of further discoveries and growth options. Assets kept on the shelf create no new value, and their value-generating potential diminishes over time, as competing approaches emerge and as the people who developed the IP leave for new jobs or retirement. However, companies

41、 should be aware that stranded technology, once liberated, may turn into competition. A project that could become a substitute for one of the companys current offerings might better be left on the shelf. Bear in mind, though, that internal managers sometimes overstate competitive threats and underes

42、timate the complementarities and learning that liberating a project might yield. You should manage these stranded assets at the corporate rather than the business-unit level, so that concerns about minor competitive risks dont thwart additional growth opportunities.Move 3 also has a potential “blowb

43、ack” bonus: The external success of previously unused technology can prompt managers to reconsider their assessment of its prospects. For example, Air Products developed an industrial burner, based on large-scale vortex technology (LSV), which decomposes the by-products of a chemical process. Althou

44、gh LSV was pioneered for internal use, the companys plant managers chose not to invest the money to retrofit it in their plants. So Air Products licensed the technology to another company, which managed to sell it successfully to customers who then used it to advantage. Air Products plant managers a

45、re now adopting LSV technology.The LSV example raises the further point that before a company adopts inside-out moves, business-unit managers enjoy an exclusive right to either use or reject the fruits of internal R&Dand suffer no ill effects from that decision. Once the moves have been implemented,

46、 however, business units that dont use internal technology may lose it to an outside party. If it later succeeds, managers will face the uncomfortable task of explaining why they rejected it. Ironically, therefore, inside-out moves can prompt more-thoughtful evaluationand may even catalyze greater u

47、seof internally developed technology.Move 4: Grow Your Ecosystem, Even When You Are Not GrowingEcosystems offer a variety of partners, allies, researchers, and other resources to innovative companies (see the exhibit “The Birth of a Company from the Inside Out”). And firms with active R&D programs c

48、ontinually generate technology options that may eventually prove valuable. However, options that dont align closely with a companys core businesses can be hard to preserve in tough times. Luckily, some might prosper outside the company but within its ecosystem.The Birth of a Company from the Inside

49、OutUnilever, the global consumer products and health care company, has developed a series of ecosystem-related innovation processes. It frequently uses incubators to nurture promising projects that have commercial potential but arent ready for one of its businesses. The offspring of its incubators can either be adopted by a Unilever business that sees a good fit or seek outside funding for further commercialization. That choice benefits R&D staffers, who see more paths for their wo

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