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1、First Draft: February 2006This Draft: May 31st 2006Very preliminary: Comments most welcomeDoes Good Government Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining Chinas Exceptional FDI InflowJoseph P.H. Fana, Randall Morckb, Lixin Colin Xuc, and Bernard YeungdAbstractChina is now the worlds largest destination of FDI
2、, despite assessments highlighting its institutional deficiencies. But this FDI inflow corresponds closely to Chinas predicted FDI inflow from a model that predicts FDI inflow based on government quality indicators and controls and is estimated across a sample of other weak-institution countries. Th
3、e only real discrepancy is that, if government quality is measured by constraints on executive power, China receives somewhat more FDI than the model predicts. This might reflect an underestimation of the strength of these constraints in China, a unique institutional setting for FDI operations, FDI
4、based on expected future institutional improvements, or a unique Chinese model of development. We conclude that Ockhams razor disfavors the last. We also note that, if FDI is elevated because foreign firms are cosseted by uniquely sound institutions, Chinas FDI inflow may be inefficiently high. a. P
5、rofessor, School of Accountancy and Department of Finance, Chinese University Of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T. Hong Kong. Phone: (852) 2609-7839; Fax: (852) 2603-5114; Email: pjfancuhk.edu.hk. b. Stephen A. Jarislowsky Professor of Finance, The University of Alberta Business School, Edmonton Canada T6G 2R
6、6. Phone (780) 492-5683; Fax (780) 492-3325; E-mail: randall.morckualberta.ca. Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Mass Ave. Cambridge MA 02138c. Senior economist, Development Research Group, World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433, USA. Phone: (202) 473-4664
7、; Fax: (202) 522-1155; Email: LXU1WORLDBANK.ORG. d. Abraham Krasnoff Professorship in Global Business, Professor of Economics, Professor of Management, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 W. 4th Street, KMC 7-65, New York NY 10012, USA. Phone (212) 998-0425; E-mail: byeungstern.nyu.edu
8、. We are grateful for Steve Knack for providing the cross-country data on rule of law and bureaucratic quality. Randall Morck thanks the SSHRC for partial funding. 1. IntroductionChina now receives more foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) than any other country, despite on
9、going and sometimes vociferous criticism of the quality of its government in the foreign media. This is curious because foreign direct investment involves much irreversible fixed investment, which is sensitive to investors perception of public policies and property rights. This study examines how th
10、e quality of Chinas government affects its allocation of FDI, and whether or not Chinas inflow of FDI is in some sense “exceptional” given the quality of its government. In this paper, we show that Chinas FDI inflow goes disproportionately to provinces that have better institutions. We then show how
11、 the allocation of inward FDI across countries correlates with three key dimensions of “good government.” These are 1. The general quality of government. To measure this, we use appraisals of official respect for private property rights, freedom from official corruption, and the quality of public in
12、vestment in infrastructure. 2. The strength of constrains on executive power. Here we again use appraisals, but focusing specifically on the freedom of action the countrys institutions accorded to its head of government. Intuitively, constraints on executive power prevent a countrys head of governme
13、nt from ruling by decree, arbitrarily nullifying or modifying contracts and property rights, or capriciously altering the rules of the economic game in other ways. If legislatures must be consulted and court rulings must be sought before such actions can be taken, the future policy direction will le
14、ss likely to be arbitrary and opportunistic. This variable captures how dependent the quality of government is on the decisions of the head of government and his immediate associates. 3. The governments track record. A government that has generated impressive economic growth in the past is likely to
15、 interest foreign investors regardless of outsiders appraisals of its institutions. We therefore consider past economic growth as an implicit measure of government track record. Since past policies are most useful in predicting the future in countries with stable governments, we also include past go
16、vernment stability as a variable in our analysis. Within this framework, we show that Chinas track record of past growth goes far in explaining the magnitude of its FDI inflow, despite offsetting deficiencies in the quality of its government. This framework, estimated using country-level FDI inflows
17、 and national government quality measures, is applied out-of-sample to predict the allocation of FDI inflow to China, given analogous measures of its quality of government. The errors in this out-of-sample prediction exercise are comparable to those in the initial cross country data used to calibrat
18、e the model. Repeating this exercise using different subsets of our “quality of government” measures is also instructive. If we calibrate the cross-country model using only general indicators of “general government quality”, such as “rule of law” from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Chi
19、na actually seems to attracts “too little” FDI. But if we calibrate the model using only measures of the “strength of constraints on executive power”, China seems to attract “too much” FDI. The “rule of law” index and other similar measures gauge how willingly a countrys citizens accept its establis
20、hed legal and political institutions, the validity of laws and decisions that emerge from those institutions, and the legislators, civil servants, and judges charged with formulating and implementing those laws and decisions. Such measures therefore capture both a countrys governance quality and its
21、 influences on peoples behavior. In contrast, checks on executive power protect people, including foreign investors, from capricious or arbitrary decisions by the countrys chief executive. The strength of these checks measures the extent to which an open competition for political power exists. It is
22、 a narrower measure, but one that is perhaps especially relevant to foreign investors. We draw three conclusions from these results: 1. “Good government” and expectations of stable and strong economic growth attract foreign direct investment. Chinas large FDI inflow, interpreted in this light, is no
23、t mysterious. Indeed, if China had higher quality government, it would attract even more foreign direct investment. 2. The dimensions of “good government” that matter to FDI inflow include not just general measures of the quality of government limits on corruption, expropriation risk, government con
24、tract repudiations, and the like but also gauges of the way the countrys government functions and especially on how limited executive powers are.3. Our findings that general measures of the quality of government predict a higher inflow of FDI into China than we observe, and that measures of the stre
25、ngth of executive constraints predict a lower FDI inflow than we observe. This might imply that part of Chinas FDI inflow is in some sense “exceptional”. But more prosaic explanations also present themselves: the strength of checks on executive power in China may be underestimated; or FDI investment
26、s may be subject to atypical institutional environments within China; or FDI may reflect expectations about future institutional reforms along this dimension. While data problems caution against overstressing this third conclusion, we suspect such misperceptions may well be systematic in Chinas case
27、. In exploring these issues, we note that deficiencies in Chinas institutional environment that disadvantage local firms relative to foreign controlled operations may well deter domestic entrepreneurs to the relative advantage of foreign investors. Any elevation in Chinas FDI inflow then reflects st
28、ructural inefficiency foreign controlled operations doing what domestically controlled firms might do given better institutions rather than an intrinsic contribution of FDI to growth. If this explains the third point above, Chinese exceptionalism is hardly a role model for development. (See Huang 20
29、03.) In the next section, we motivate our research question. Section three describes our research issues, while sections four and five present our Chinese and cross-country analyses, and section six fits China within the latter Section seven discusses our results and what they imply about FDI flows
30、and Chinas institutional environment, and section eight concludes. 2. The IssuesThe importance of sound institutions to economic development is now received wisdom. Solid property rights protection and respect for the rule of the law are viewed as basic factors that determine macroeconomic stability
31、, capital market development, business sector development, and investment in innovation - see La Porta et al.(1998), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Durnev et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and many others. The successful development and maintenance of sound institutions is therefore now seen as a crit
32、ical function of government; indeed, as a fundamental test of “good government”. From this perspective Chinas economic growth seems a puzzle. China features a one party political monopoly. By most reckoning, democracy and political transparency are not integral to the Chinese polity. Stories of corr
33、uption, scandals, and embezzlement starring government bureaucrats, bank executives and corporate insiders contribute to a general perception of weak property rights. More formal evaluations of the quality of Chinese institutions concur with these impressions. Table 1 shows Chinas sandwiched just ab
34、ove a cluster of Latin American countries and just below the former East Bloc states in terms of its respect for the rule of law and limits on corruption. But Chinas growth outpaces both of these other regions. This success understandably draws economists, such Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) and other
35、s, to envision a “Chinese model” of development that permits vigorous growth despite feeble institutions. But Table 1 also sounds a note of caution. Chinas per capita GDP is markedly lower than the averages for either the East Bloc or Latin America. This low starting point gives China more room than
36、 most countries to grow simply by catching up. Even though many equally poor countries do not manage to grow rapidly, a low starting point makes Chinas rapid per capita GDP growth rate less impressive: any capital allocated to any entrepreneur may well generate quick economic growth. Table 1 about h
37、ereThat the same might be true in economies at higher initial levels of development is debatable. The validity of a “Chinese model” is even more problematic if we consider the environmental degradation, mine and factory casualties, and other costs complementing Chinas recent growth. It is difficult
38、to establish conclusively that these externality costs have been greater in China than in, for example, Latin America or the former East Bloc. But we suspect that recent democratization in both regions makes such costs less politically feasible than they are currently in China. A full analysis of th
39、e importance of political economy to economic development is clearly beyond the scope of this study. We focus on only one factor of economic development inward FDI flow and thus investigate only one small part of a greater picture. We adopt this focus first because it is our assigned task; but also
40、because the assignation is justified investment is a key determinant of growth. Foreigners capital is more footloose than domestic capital, and is thus more sensitive to outside opportunities. Foreign investment ought therefore to be more sensitive to institutional deficiencies. If foreign capital f
41、lowing into China is unaffected by the institutional factors that determine the allocation of foreign capital elsewhere, there may well be a distinct “Chinese model”. But if the same determinants affect FDI allocation in China as in other countries, Chinese exceptionalism is rendered dubious. Of cou
42、rse, its domestic savings might still be allocated uniquely; but even if this were so, our study narrows the scope for any possible Chinese singularity. Figure 1 about hereChina surpassed the U.S. as the worlds largest FDI recipient in 2001. But China is a very large country economically, geographic
43、ally and in terms of population. Comparisons across countries must be scales by country size. Table 1 shows that Chinas inward FDI as a fraction of GDP is still higher than that of both Latin America and the former East Bloc. But when FDI is scaled by population, China fairs notably worse. This make
44、s sense because Chinas low per capita GDP makes its inflow of FDI appear large, just as Chinas rapid per capita GDP growth rate is possible, in part, because of its extremely low starting pointFigure 1 pursues this issue further. Before 1990, Chinas FDI fails to surpass the world average, regardless
45、 of whether it is expressed per capita or as a fraction of GDP. But as China embarked upon a series of reforms during the 1990s, its FDI inflow surged. From 1990 through 2003, Chinas FDI inflow averages 4.3% of its GDP double the worlds average of 2.1%. But, Chinas FDI inflow per capita remains quit
46、e low. Even the highest level it achieves in Figure 1, about US$40 per capita, is only about one fifth of the world average. The world mean is heavily skewed by the highest income countries, such as Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. When judged against benchmarks representing other countries with low st
47、arting points, China looks better. For example, China exceeds by 50% the average FDI per capita of the countries ranked in the lowest forty percent by institutional development, which we define below.Thus, whether Chinas performance is exceptional or not depends critically on how it is measured, aga
48、inst what benchmarks it is compared, and how much of Chinas economic performance is “easy growth” as China makes up for decades of stagnation under Maoist socialism.But let us accept that Chinas ability to attract FDI is of economic interest, and seek an economic explanation of it. Given this motivation, we use a straightforward empirical specification to consider two questions: 1. Is Chinas FDI allocation affected by government quality?2. Is Chinas FDI allocation explained by the same factors that explain FDI allocation elsewhere in the world
