《Russian Theory of International Relations.doc》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《Russian Theory of International Relations.doc（14页珍藏版）》请在三一办公上搜索。
1、Russian Theory of International RelationsAndrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A. TsygankovSan Francisco State University, Moscow State UniversityIn International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert A. Denemark. Vol. X, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2010, pp. 6375-6387.IntroductionRussian society
2、 has changed dramatically since the Soviet disintegration, and the emergence of new theories of international relations heralded this change. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and its officially sanctioned “Marxist” social science, Russian scholars have been making intellectual headway in ad
3、justing to new realities. Analyzing the emerging Russian IR studies helps us answer some of the key questions about Russia. How does the new Russia see itself in the world? How does it perceive the new international environment? Which social and political institutions does it see as appropriate to d
4、evelop after the end of the Cold War? These are the questions that are at the heart of the new Russian IR scholarship, and these are the questions that continue to drive Western scholarship about the new Russia.The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition in international studies has d
5、rawn scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in certain social conditions and may reflect cultural premises. Historically the tradition is rooted in work by Karl Mannheim (1936) and Max Weber, among others. (For contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations of knowl
6、edge, see Hoffmann 1977; Weaver 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2001.)In particular, it has become more common to view international relations as a branch of research that often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, civilization (Hoffmann 1977; Craw
7、ford and Jarvis 2001). Recently scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand IR from the perspective of various peripheries Asian (Callahan 2004a; Acharya and Buzan 2007), East European (Guzzini 2007), Latin American (Tickner 2003), and Russian (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007; Tsygankov
8、 2008) suggesting the emergence of a new subdiscipline of comparative IR theory (Callahan 2004b).In addition, some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of IR theory in the West, such as realism, liberalism, and critical theory or constructivism (Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Weber 2005Pag
9、e: 1Not in refs. Please supply details.; Nau 2006), are shaped by theorists ideological preferences. As they each emphasize concepts of balance of power, international institutions, and human exploitation/emancipation in their research, these theories reflect broader ideological concerns about Self/
10、Other relationships. Realists, for example, tend to perceive the rise of alternative communities or Other as threatening and recommend that Self prepare to defend its security. On the other hand, many Western liberals, while recognizing the increasingly globalized character of world politics, mainta
11、in an image of a progressive assertion of Selfs values and overlook the forces of identity and diversity associated with the Other. Some critical theorists too have a tendency to oversimplify the Self/Other relationships (Shani 2008).In this essay we argue that Russian theory of international relati
12、ons is nationally specific, yet it is also grounded in three main intellectual traditions of presenting Self, Other, and their relationships. We refer to these traditions as Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism because they each emphasize categories of the West, the independent state, and the di
13、stinct civilization as their desired identifications of the Russian Self. Although the Russian intellectual traditions have recovered their strengths after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the history of Russias relations with Europe and the nineteenth century debates about the “R
14、ussian idea.” We therefore adopt a broad definition of IR theory, viewing it as a systematically developed image of the world that is grounded in a local cultural history, rather than in evolution of the Western social science.The essay is organized as follows. We first review the nature of Russian
15、historical intellectual debates and the impact of the Soviet legacy on discussions of international relations in Russia. We then discuss some post-Soviet discussions within the field, focusing on theories of international system, regional order, and foreign policy. Although Russian IR cannot be full
16、y reduced to these areas of research, they remain the most developed. (For other overviews of the Russian discipline of international studies, see Sergounin 2000; Bogaturov et al. 2002; Shakleyina 2002; Lebedeva 2003; 2004; Torkunov 2004; A. Tsygankov and P. Tsygankov 2004; 2006; Kokoshin and Bogatu
17、rov 2005.)We conclude by reflecting on future directions of Russian international studies and the dialectic of global and local in development of IR theory.Three Intellectual Traditions in RussiaAcross different historical eras, Russia has developed three traditions or schools of thinking about Self
18、 and Other Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationist. Throughout centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists sought to present Russias international choices in ways consistent with their historically established images of the country and the outside world. This section relies on discussio
19、ns in Tsygankov (2006), Neumann (1996), Prizel (1998), Ringmar (2002), and Hopf (2002).Westernizers saw the Russian idea as an essentially Western idea, and they placed the emphasis on Russias similarity with Western nations and viewed the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the
20、world. The early Westernizers sought to present Russia as a loyal member in the family of European monarchies. Alexander I, for instance, championed the so-called legitimist policies and established the “Holy Alliance” with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary activities on the con
21、tinent. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Westernizers, such as Alexander II, identified with the West of constitutional freedoms and political equality. Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing too far apart from European social-democratic ideas. For instance, on
22、e of Gorbachevs favorite lines of thinking was that the Soviet Union had to “purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). Finally, the post-Soviet liberal Westernizers argued the “natural” affinity of their country with th
23、e West based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. Sharing the prejudices of many in the West, liberal Westernizers, like Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin, were fearful of the Other and warned against relations with former Soviet allies. They insisted that only by buil
24、ding Western liberal institutions and integrating with the coalition of what was frequently referred to as the community of “Western civilized nations” would Russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its economic and political backwardness.Statists have equated the Russian idea with that
25、 of a strong independent state and emphasized the states ability to govern and preserve the social and political order. They too showed their wariness of the Other and introduced the notion of external threat as central to Russias security. Depending on a situation, the threatening Other was present
26、ed as coming from either an eastern or western direction. Ever since the two-centuries-long conquest by Mongols, Russians has developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty. For instance, when justifying the need for rapid ind
27、ustrialization, the leader of the Soviet state Josef Stalin famously framed his argument in terms of responding to powerful external threats.The history of the old Russia was the continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Tur
28、kish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the English and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her for her backwardness We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We
29、must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed” (Sakwa 1999:1878).The Statists are not inherently anti-Western; they merely seek for the Wests recognition by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities. The Statists of the monarchical era valued Rus
30、sias autocratic structure of power, partly because such were the structures of European monarchies as well. The socialist Statists insisted on the importance of the Communist Partys firm control over the society for the purpose of maintaining political order and averting external “capitalist” threat
31、s. In foreign policy, some Statists advocated relative accommodation with the West, while others favored balancing strategies. Maxim Litvinov, for instance, supported a “collective security” system in Europe in order to prevent the rise of Fascism. Nikita Khrushchev, too, wanted to break taboos of i
32、solationism and to bring Soviet Russia closer to Europe. On the other hand, Stalins pact with Hitler, as well as Brezhnevs “correlation of forces” strategy, reflected the will to balance perceived dangerous influences from the outside world. That dualism survived the Soviet era. For instance, both P
33、rimakov and Putin viewed Russias greatness and strength as key goals of their foreign policies, yet the former was trying to rebuild the former Soviet Union and contain the United States through a strategic alliance with China and India, whereas the latter emphasized bilateral relations in Russias p
34、eriphery and had the ambition to develop partnership with America to deter terrorism.Finally, Civilizationists conceptualized the Self/Other relationships in terms of cultural oppositions. This intellectual tradition positioned Russia and its values as principally different from those of the West. V
35、iewing Russia as a civilization in its own right, many Civilizationists insisted on Russias “mission” in the world and spreading Russian values abroad (Duncan 2000). As a policy philosophy, Civilizationism dates back to Ivan the Terribles “gathering of Russian lands” after the Mongol Yoke and to the
36、 dictum “Moscow is the Third Rome” adopted under the same ruler. Some representatives of this school advocated a firm commitment to values of Orthodox Christianity, while others viewed Russia as a synthesis of various religions. In the nineteen century, Civilizationists defended the notion of Slavic
37、 unity, and their ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the Tsars foreign policy decisions. Born out of the agony of autocratic and liberal Europe, the Soviet Russia saw itself as superior to the “decadent” and “rotten” Western capitalist civilization. The early socialist Civilizationists challen
38、ged the West in a most direct fashion, defending at one point the doctrine of the world revolution. Other Soviet thinkers, however, advocated a peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation with the world of “capitalism.” Yet another version of Civilizationist thinking was the so-called Eurasianism t
39、hat saw Russia as an organic unity distinctive from both European and Asian cultures. (On Eurasianism and its influence in the contemporary Russia, see Solovyev 2004; Bassin and Aksenov 2006; Shlapentokh 2007; Laruelle 2008.)The Soviet InterludeSoviet Marxism helped to legitimize Russias new sociali
40、st identity and provided intellectuals with new lenses through which to analyze the outside world. Both ontologically and epistemologically, Marxism presented an important challenge to Western social sciences and international relations. At least three key features deserve to be mentioned here. Firs
41、t, the new way of thinking about the world was socially critical or emancipatory. Marxs dictum that philosophers must go beyond explaining the world and toward changing it radically drew attention to the relationships between theory and practice and therefore shattered the very foundations of status
42、-quo-oriented positivist thinking. Second, Marxist historically structural approach meant to link world affairs to the existing phenomena of global exploitation and inequality and to reveal their origins and social roots. Finally, Marxist analysis was holistic and global, as it understood the world
43、as globally united and globally divided at the same time. As opposed to the three familiar levels of analysis in mainstream international relations individual, national, and systemic Marxism viewed the struggle for human liberation and emancipation as universal and without boundaries.The Soviet peri
44、od in Russias development also suppressed the described debate among Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists. By legitimizing Russias new socialist identity, the Soviet regime also developed a self-serving vision of Marxism and legitimized the countrys relative isolation from Western intellectu
45、al developments. In addition to some of its progressive and liberating elements, the Soviet version of Marxism served as an ideologically pretentious way to preserve the state-favored status quo and as a tool for suppressing dissent. The official ideological hegemony of Soviet Marxism stiffened crea
46、tive thought by imposing rigid cannons on scholars of international relations and encouraging dogmatic interpretations of world affairs. IR “scholarship” was all too often reduced to interpretations of official documents and speeches of the leaders to the Communist Party congresses. Soviet Marxism a
47、lso allowed for only a minimal dialogue with non-Marxist scholars. Even Marxist and neo-Marxist developments outside the Soviet Union, such as the Frankfurt School in Germany, were not welcome. Cross-fertilization with the outside world was therefore negligible and confined to narrow circles of elit
48、e scholars with privileged access to information.Still, the centuries-old intellectual debate on the Russian idea could not be eliminated partly because Soviet Marxism had never been entirely homogeneous ever since the death of its founder Vladimir Lenin in 1924, at least two schools competed for th
49、e status of official ideology and “loyal” interpreter of Leninist intellectual legacy. Radicals advocated forceful methods of industrialization, whereas moderates argued for a more gradual process of development and proceeded from the late Lenins notion of “coexistence” with the Western “capitalist world.” This debate had been terminated by Stalin after his break with Lenins post-1921 philosophy of moderation in relations with the peasant class and the external world,
