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1、WIDER Elites conference 12 June 09When Do Elites Pay Taxes? Tax Morale and State-Building in Developing CountriesMax Everest-Phillips The author is senior governance adviser at the UK Department for International Development (DFID). This article is written in a private capacity and does not necessar
2、ily reflect DFIDs official views. The author is very grateful for inspiration, advice and comments from Richard Bird (University of Toronto), Mary Baine (Commissioner-General, Rwandan Revenue Authority), Mick Moore (the Centre for the Future State, Institute of Development Studies), Jonathan Di John
3、 (SOAS), Birger Nerr Nerr (GTZ), Richard Stern (World Bank/FIAS), and Roger Nellist and Richard Sandall (DFID). AbstractThis paper argues that the international community should pay greater attention to the intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (tax morale) of lites in developing countries. The politic
4、al settlement between lites over how to raise public revenues is critical for state-building, by creating lite tax morale and lite attitudes to constructing the social contract between the state and its citizens over taxation. These processes shape the structure of elites and the political commitmen
5、t to development outcomes, and form the quasi-voluntary tax compliance required for effective and efficient tax systems. Elites need effective tax systems to fund the states sustainable capacity to enforce their own secure property rights on which long-term economic growth depends. So if lites are n
6、ot prepared to tax themselves, prevent lite free-riding and invest in promoting tax morale, national political ownership in developing countries of the international communitys development aspirations is problematic. In developing countries with universal suffrage but extremes of inequality, tax sys
7、tem complexity that facilitates tax evasion and avoidance has replaced repression as the cost-effective way lites contain populist challenges to their power base. Understanding this requires development agencies (that are increasingly recognising the state-building significance of taxation) to pay a
8、ttention to the political dynamics that underpin lite tax morale as critical for sustainable capacity building in revenue authorities. Reflecting insights from ongoing tax reform programmes, this paper offers operational guidance for the design of state-building tax reform to strengthen lite tax mor
9、ale and compliance. This paper concludes that the international community should use tax morale as an indicator of the credible long-term political commitment of lites to good governance, economic development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1.Introduction: From Capacity Building to State
10、 BuildingHow people are taxed, who is taxed, and what is taxed tell more about a society than anything else. C. Adams (1993). For Good and Evil. The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization. London: p.21Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes resulted in the principal variations in the
11、 forms of European states. Tilly 1985, p.182. The state needs revenue to function; how that revenue is raised not only reflects the relationship between society and the state, it also helps to fashion it. In the last few years research has picked up this observation to focus attention on the importa
12、nce of tax as state-building in developing countries (Fjeldstad 2003; Moore 2007; Brautigam et al 2008). As a result, the international development community has started to recognise that taxation is a fundamental part of the process of building the effective states and markets on which the exit fro
13、m aid depends (GTZ 2005; DAC 2008; Everest-Phillips 2008; Everest-Phillips and Sandall 2008). As the OECD secretary-general told the UN Financing for Development conference at Doha in November 2008: “taxation matters for effective state-building. Bargaining between governments and taxpayers plays a
14、central role in the emergence of democratic governance. Citizens want more responsive government. They want the state to be accountable for its actions or inaction and taxes are the vital link between governments and societies. Improved tax relationships between state, businesses and society have pr
15、ovided a strong underpinning for broad-based growth and state accountability”. http:/www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_37413_41765091_1_1_1_1,00.html Promoting capable, accountable and responsive government is not simply a technical task of putting the right institutions in place, but depends
16、fundamentally on changing the nature of political incentives so that political leaders and elites have a shared fiscal interest in becoming more capable, accountable and responsive. The root cause of weaknesses in tax systems in developing countries is ultimately not poor tax policy or capacity cons
17、traints in tax administrations but the lack of political agreement among those with political power and influence (the lites) to make taxation effective. In effective states such as advanced democracies many citizens are taxpayers and, all citizens being voters the state must develop high trust and
18、credibility with the population. But many developing states have weak institutions and no or limited democratic legitimacy exacerbated by high inequality. In such contexts, elites may not trust in the states long-term development prospects, yet control much of the assets of society. Elites fear an e
19、ffective tax system as threatening redistribution not just of their wealth but, more importantly, of their power base. Creating effective tax system is therefore a collective action problem (how to fund publicand collectivegoods). Any solution to this depends on rulers and elites discount rates or t
20、ime horizons; on the transaction costs involved; and on their relative bargaining power. E.g. Paul, E. et al. 2006. Taxation, economic prosperity, and distributive justice.Cambridge University Press. Effective and efficient taxation requiresestablishing quasi-voluntary tax compliancebased upon a con
21、sensus on national purpose, combined with a sense of fairness that rulers deliver their promises. Tax is also, of course, the art of the possible: taxpayers not only need to be convinced that tax is fair and represents some sort of value for money; they also need to be convinced that other taxpayers
22、 are also complying (no free-riding). Elite capacity for tax free-riding (through evasion, avoidance and exemptions) is only efficiently counter-balanced if elites share the political conviction that paying taxes is a productive investment in their own and the countrys long-term future. Effective an
23、d efficient taxation therefore requires elites to believe that paying taxes is a civic responsibility to fund social, political and economic development. Elite attitudes towards the purpose of the state and what type of state taxation should fund, are therefore critical for an effective tax system.
24、Musgrave (1996) offers four basic patterns: the service delivery state; the welfare state; the communitarian state; and the government failure (rather than market failure) state. Too often however tax reforms are focused only on implementing solutions to technical problems without paying adequate at
25、tention to overcoming the underlying political economy constraints crucial for long-term building of an effective state (e.g. Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). The focus of this paper on the institution of lite attitudes to taxation is therefore motivated by the need to rectify the current inadequate atte
26、ntion paid by development agencies to addressing the politics behind effective tax reform. The aim is to complement the attention in current tax reform programmes given to administrative capacity constraints of tax administrations in developing countries (e.g. Snchez 2006). Better taxation systems,
27、better states Sound and fair domestic taxation systems both promote and reflect good governance because it is hard to raise tax efficiently without citizens consent. Bargaining between rulers and taxpayers increases both the states capacity to collect and administer taxes, and its accountability to
28、citizen-taxpayers. Then governments have incentives to promote broad economic prosperity as this increases the tax base; while negotiation with taxpayers encourages political transparency, as well as better public policy and spending. So tax reforms can stimulate governments to be accountable and re
29、sponsive to the demands of citizens and civil society, including representative organisations such as business associations. This in turn can stimulate greater government capability, building a more legitimate and effective state.Effective tax systems are associated with a strong, developmental stat
30、e: That a strong positive correlation exists between tax extraction and level of development suggests that overall, the negative effects of excessive state scope are in the long-run counterbalanced by the positive effects of greater administrative capacity. F. Fukuyama: State-Building: Governance an
31、d World Order in the 21st Century Cornell University Press, 2004: pp.20-21. Political ideas, interests, incentives and identitiesare constructed by leaders and litesthrough the tax system. Concepts such as citizenship, fairness, trustandequality develop practical manifestationthrough taxation: the t
32、ax system is therefore a very effective way of articulating assumptions about the market, consumption and social structures. Daunton. Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain 1799-1914:Cambridge 2001, p.21. So an effective tax system is an investment in the public goods which the econ
33、omy and society need, not just the cheapest cost but the right quality. The state and elite tax compliance Elite choice in promoting or thwarting tax compliance is at the heart of the development challenge. Donor efforts increasingly focus on enhancing the accountability of political elites for deve
34、lopment outcomes in developing countries. Elites are those small groups of people who, formally or informally, exercise power and influence decision-making, through some formal or informal system of authority and accountability, and by control of resources. Elites are not homogeneous, can be governi
35、ng or politically competing, but can be identified as those persons with disproportionate influence over policy who can generate, accept or block institutional reform. Elites develop formal or informal political coalitions horizontally or vertically in society, to overcome collective action problems
36、. Whether elite coalitions prove predatory or developmental depends on creating political consensus on collective purpose, in part through agreement between political and economic lites over the efficient raising and effective use of public revenues for development depends (Nerr 2002). Elites theref
37、ore, in both commitment to revenue raising and capacity to apportion or appropriate public expenditures, are central to the construction of state-building tax systems that support economic development and political stability. As Moore (2007, 1415) puts it:“ if state lites need to depend on general t
38、axation because they lack alternative, easier revenue sources, they generally have to put considerable organisational and political effort into obtaining the revenue, and face strong incentives to bargain and negotiate, directly or indirectly, with at least some taxpayers, rather than simply to extr
39、act revenue forcibly. In other words, dependence on general taxation provides incentives for state lites and taxpayers to resolve their differences through bargaining.”Tax moraleThe state-building outcome of that bargaining depends on how tax morale (inherent willingness to pay taxes) and tax compli
40、ance emerge and develop. Attitudes to the legitimacy of the state, the extent of corruption, voice and accountability are critical to trust in the state on which economic growth depends. Tax effort and tax collectiondepends not just on the income base but also on the political and institutional base
41、s, specifically the extent to which taxpayers trust their governments (Bird, Martnez-Vazquez, and Torgler 2006). Taxpayers are more compliant than the traditional economic models of effective coercion and deterrence predict. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) for example provided an influential model sugge
42、sting that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with both the probability of detection and the degree of punishment. Deterrence predicts too little compliance and too much tax evasion (for an overview, see Alm, 1999; Torgler, 2002). Torgler (2005) shows that deterrence does not often a
43、ffect tax morale significantly. A recent upsurge of attention to tax morale in OECD countries has started to resolve this puzzle by showing a strong correlation between tax morale and tax evasion or compliance (Torgler 2007). Tax morale however too often remains a residual explanation of tax complia
44、nce without adequate analysis of the factors that shape tax morale. Citizens tax culture and morale are significantly and positively associated with their perception of the benefits derived by society from the public delivery of goods and services, weighted against the risk of free-riding by others
45、(Everest-Phillips and Sandall 2008). Torgler et al 2008 looking mainly at OECD countries show that institutional quality has a significant influence on tax morale: if the governance quality scale rises by one unit, the percentage of persons reporting the highest tax morale level increases between 8.
46、4 and 11.2 percentage points. Op.cit, p.29. The strongest governance effects were in voice and accountability and rule of law: an increase in the voice and accountability scale by one unit raised the probability of reporting the highest tax morale level by 11.6%; and for rule of law by 9.4%. Op.cit.
47、, p.29. Similarly, the level of trust in government also proved statistically significant with marginal effects between 2.1 and 2.8 percentage points.The political governance determinants of tax morale in different contexts are therefore significant. Although little research has yet been done to stu
48、dy tax morale in developing countries, the importance of governance quality and political processes are likely to be the decisive factors. (Nerr 2003; Everest-Phillips 2008). In developing country contexts, where often huge inequalities, weak government capacities and the economy controlled by narro
49、w elites often limit the prospects of improvements to both administrative capacities and to tax morale. Yet tax morale is poorly understood even for developed countries with usually stronger governance contexts (Torgler 2007). Even fewer studies have analysed tax morale and the fiscal sociology in developing countries. The result is that not enough attent
