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1、中 文 摘 要 崇尚自由贸易政策的纯贸易理论与现实中的贸易干预和扭曲政策之间形成鲜明的反差，近年来发展起来的贸易的政治经济学理论将公共选择的分析范示引入传统贸易理论，从政策决策过程的角度去探求贸易扭曲政策存在的真正原因，这一贸易政策内生化的理论增强了人们对作为公共政策形式之一的贸易政策的“科学”认识。 本文利用国际贸易政治经济学的方法论和概念框架分析中国对外贸易政策制定的政府行为、决策过程和制度约束，考察的对象包括贸易发展战略、进口和出口贸易政策体制、贸易自由化进程以及中国的多边、地区和双边贸易关系，并以中国工业行业的保护结构为重点研究中央政府、利益团体、公众和世界贸易体系对贸易政策决策的影响
2、。本文的根本目的并非着重于提出中国贸易政策的最优方式，而是在于如何认识和理解其贸易政策的产生和实施过程。 本文共分为九章。第一章为导言，阐述写作的背景、主题、目的和篇章结构。第二章文献评述从贸易的政治经济学的问题的提出出发，对近十多年来该领域理论研究和实证研究发展的脉络进行了总结，并对不同分支研究的基本观点、基础模型、方法论、技术特点和结论进行了比较和综合性的学术评论。第三章首先利用政治学理论中结构功能论和系统论的方法勾画出中国经济政策决策的一般政府过程框架，并结合中国政治体制的特点对框架中的不同环节进行了剖析，从而描述了中国经济政策决策的宏观政治制度本质、特征以及中国经济改革的政治经济学，为
3、分析贸易政策提供广阔的时空背景。ass=MsoNormal style=text-indent:21.75pt第四、五、六章首先勾勒和描述了中国贸易政策决策的总体框架结构，然后分别从国家目标和权威、利益团体和外国政府及国际贸易制度约束三个层面对中国贸易的公共选择问题进行了详尽的阐述，分析了它们各自的行为动机、行为方式和行为绩效。其中涉及了大量的部门、政策和机构的案例分析，力图从一个比较广阔的视角来展现中国贸易政策决策和执行的现实情况。 接下来的两章将分析的重心集中于贸易保护的政治经济问题，这是对该领域实证研究在中国的一个扩展。在第七章中构造了适用于民主集中政治体制下的理论模型，它吸收和借鉴了第
4、二章理论文献评述中的某些技术。在此理论基础上，第八章利用计量回归模型结合实际数据（作者建立的统一分类标准的3年36个工业行业的数据库）对中国工业贸易保护结构的政治经济决定因素进行了实证检验，在统计上检验了第四至六章描述性分析的真实性和显著性。最后第九章总结了本文的主要观点和结论，并就进一步扩展和深化对中国贸易政策政治经济学研究的若干问题进行了初步的探讨。 通过对中国个案的分析和考察，作者得到以下主要结论： （一）在“依存市场的权威主义”和“国家战略主义”的制度下，政府目标和国家利益是中国对外贸易政策制定和实施中所考虑的首要因素，其基本理念包括贸易发展规划、贸易控制、贸易发展战略、产业政策、维护
5、国家经济安全和保障国际收支平衡等。概括地说，政府通过贸易发展规划引导贸易的数量、质量和结构的变化以促进经济增长和工业化，并注重独立自主和自力更生的原则；通过审批外贸经营权和核定商品目录的“气塞”效应实现对贸易的控制，但这种特别而严厉的限制的程度正在减缓；贸易发展战略已经从最初计划体制下的进口替代演变成为目前的贸易自由化阶段，并获得了良好的经济绩效，在过渡时期政府采取了“受保护的出口导向”战略以减少既得利益对改革的反对，今后在贸易自由化进程的同时适时适度地采取战略贸易政策以发展重点产业或高科技产业可能是较好的选择；在“非中性”的产业政策体系中，贸易政策扮演着重要的保护支柱产业和幼稚产业发展的功能
6、，但这似乎并没有起到预期的效果，反而导致了更大程度上的经济扭曲；维护国家经济安全和保障国际收支平衡也是中国官方在贸易政策决策时考虑的因素，前者特别针对竞争力较弱而又对政治、经济和社会的宏观稳定有举足轻重影响的农业和金融服务业，而后者主要为了节省稀缺性的外汇资源和避免严重的冲击失衡。 （二）政治民主化和经济改革使中国社会中利益的多样化逐步得到政府的承认和重视，并且可以通过正式和非正式的渠道和机制进行利益表达。他们对贸易政策的影响比以前得到加强，其中中央行政机构和地方政府具有较显著的影响，体现了“代理主义”的作用，而国内各类企业、外国投资者、特殊利益团体以及消费者对最高决策的直接影响效力则仍然是边
7、际性的或趋向减弱。利益团体对贸易政策的疏通和影响作用在今后的政府过程中可能会越发重要，这表明中国需要建立一套完整、简明、公正和透明度高的决策制度和机制，使更多的利益（特别是那些被忽视的集团，如消费者）能够在政策决策中被倾听，并避免“政出多门”的官僚主义以及为少数特殊利益所左右。 （三）世界贸易体系和国际集体行动对中国的贸易政策有非常显著的影响。融入世界经济体系，接受国际通行的惯例和规则，在承担合理义务的同时享受外部市场准入的权利符合中国建立市场经济的总体目标。但这意味着中国必须面对和承受其他贸易伙伴国家的压力和要求，包括贸易摩擦和争端，这主要体现在三个方面，即：中国在加入以法规为基础的GATT
8、/WTO多边体制框架中的谈判；中国在APEC区域贸易组织内的复边协商和贸易自由化进程；中国与主要贸易国之间的双边贸易争端与解决，特别是中美贸易关系。而外国政党的对华战略、外国政府贸易政策的基本理念、利益集团乃至公众的各种要求和观念将通过这些渠道影响中国的政策决策过程。外部压力和制度约束对中国贸易政策决策的影响是双重的。一方面，贸易改革的日程、幅度和速度必须跟上国际集体行动的步伐，另一方面，政府也希望通过参加多边或区域贸易协定来推动国内的经济改革，以“锁定”的方式保持改革政治上的可预见性和可信性，当然这种对外承诺对于中国来说必须是建立在“可接受”的公平的基础上的。 （四）中国贸易保护的特征是平均
9、水平较高，而且在结构上易变而分散。实际征税率与名义关税率的差别较大，以配额和许可证等数量限制为核心的非关税壁垒的频数比依然较高，同时关税保护和非关税措施之间多呈现出互补而非替代的关系。但随着时间的推移，政府在贸易自由化方面采取了更为激进的改革，使贸易的扭曲程度和结构有了显著的改善，贸易的中性刺激增强了。实际保护率的水平和结构比名义保护率更高而离散，鼓励下游行业生产而歧视上游行业生产的倾向更明显，统计检验还表明名义的和实际的保护率在部门排序上是近乎相同的。不同贸易保护形式在工业行业之间的差别表明它们在国家的发展战略目标中具有不同的地位以及它们自身行业特征所导致的迥异的政治和经济影响力。 （五）利
10、用中国36个工业行业三个年度的实际数据对贸易保护率的计量回归分析结果表明促进和发展战略产业的“国家利益模型”最能反映中国贸易保护结构的政治经济决定因素，而“利益影响模型”的效果是“边际”性的，维护社会公平、减少调整成本和收入再分配的“公共利益模型”并不十分适用于中国的现实情况。应用“向后法”和截面与时间序列合并数据法估算的“混合”模型也印证了这些结果。实证检验表明那些人均增加值高、比较优势大、对产业需求关联强、劳动密集型生产、创造利润和税收多、国有企业作用较小、反对势力薄弱的行业越能够获得更高的保护率，同时关税和非关税壁垒的贸易保护措施之间呈现出显著性的互补而非替代关系。总之，本文的研究说明中
11、国未来贸易自由化改革的成功不但要取决于最高决策层在贸易政策的经济哲学思想上向市场导向的根本转变，而且还取决于在改革的进程中能否通过形成优势性的政治联盟和适当的补偿和结构调整机制克服某些利益集团在政治上的阻碍。国际贸易制度和规则既可以为中国的贸易改革提供目标和参照，也能显著地推动这一进程的实施。 在理论方法上，论文在以经济学分析为主的基础上吸收了政治学的某些研究范示；在实证方法上，注意了将理论框架与中国现实情况的尽可能结合；在研究方式上，既包括18个部门、政策和机构案例的描述性分析，也应用了统计和计量经济工具的科学检验。由于政策信息和数据资料的有限性，本文的研究仍然是尝试性的，面对结构复杂的中国
12、社会，对中国贸易政策的政治经济分析有待于丰富和扩展关键词：中国 贸易政策 政治经济 贸易保护 中国对外贸易政策的政治经济分析 南开大学国际经济研究所 盛斌Abstract Most of economists, who prefer either to the classical trade theory or to the latest emerging new trade theory, adhere to the doctrine of free trade. However, the perplexity between theoretical ideology and ever-la
13、sting protectionism in reality demonstrates that the political decision-making process of trade policy is often less understood or even ignored. Political economy of trade policy, or simply called the endogenous tariff theory, may offer a plausible and decent answer to the dilemma from the perspecti
14、ve of income distribution rather than economic efficiency. The dissertation is basically an analytical-cum-empirical study of trade politics in China on the basis of the latest theoretical development of political economy of trade. For this purpose, Chinese trade policies, including trade developmen
15、t strategy, export and import regime, and trade liberalization reform are thoroughly examined so as to yield a comprehensive and far-reaching insight into the political economy of trade policy in China. In particular, the pattern of trade protection of industrial sectors is studied by cross-sector a
16、nd time series data to explain its political and economic determinants. Instead of figuring out an optimal trade strategy and reform package for the government, the aim of study attempts to present a profound understanding to the distorted trade regime and piecemeal trade liberalization process of C
17、hina, the country never exploited in previous literature case studies but significantly impacting on world trade. The dissertation is arranged for nine chapters. In Chapter1, the research background, motif, methodology and structure of study are deliberately explained. Chapter 2 reviews the literatu
18、re in the realm of political economy of trade policy from the perspective of theoretical framework, analytical approaches and empirical studies. Chapter 3 discusses the nature of Chinese political system and institutional characteristics in the decision-making process, and argues that economic trans
19、ition, including trade reform, should be better understood in view of political logic. Illustrated by a number of case studies, Chapter 4, 5 and 6 describe main playing roles of trade policy decision-making in China, e.g. the party and central government, domestic interest groups, external pressure
20、of world trade system and foreign governments. A formal revised model of political economy of trade protection, which is fit to Chinese political institution, is developed in Chapter 7, and then used as a benchmark to produce regression models to estimate determination of industrial trade protection
21、 structure in Chapter 8. Meanwhile, a data bank with the uniform classification standard is established to constitute empirical samples. Finally, in Chapter 9 I summarize main conclusions of the study and give the outline for further research. The general conclusions of the thesis are as follows:待添加
22、的隐藏文字内容3 (1) Due to the politically institutional features of market-preserved authoritarianism and state activism, party ideology, government preference and national interests are the most essential factors influencing the decision-making of trade policy in China. More specifically, trade planning,
23、 trade flow controlling, export promotion and import substitution, industrial policy, national economic security and balance of payment are concrete objectives, and policies of trading rights, automatic import registration, automobile production, grain import and banking service are those typical ca
24、ses. (2)Thanks to the gradual political democratization and fast economic growth, more diversified social interests become virtually legitimate and active in a corporatism state, consequently leading to their increasing lobbying pressures and rent-seeking activities for import protection and export
25、preferential trade policies. Bureaucracy in central executive bodies and local governments, fxdyored in “clientelism” net-work culture, appear to be a dominated interest group, while others, mainly composed of domestic enterprises of various kinds, foreign investors, military, and consumers, however
26、 only hxdye a marginal or diminishing impact on the decision-making. Such an argument can be demonstrated by several case studies, for example, policies of protecting telecommunication sector, import quota and license requirement, export quota bidding, foreign exchange retention and multiple exchang
27、e rates, antidumping enforcement and anti-smuggling campaign. (3) With the integration into the world economy, Chinese authority can no longer make final decisions by neglecting the world trade institution settings and international collective actions. The prevailing diplomatic strategy and trade ph
28、ilosophy of foreign governments as well as commercial interest of multinational corporations will impose a more significant external pressure on China to ratchet up her trade liberalization reform in the context of multilateralism (WTO), regionalism (APEC) and bilateralism (mainly with the United St
29、ates). On the other hand, in the long run, China will benefit herself from bargain-induced trade reform by fully integrating into a market-oriented and rule-based world economy.(4) The trade protection rates (nominal tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and effective protection rates) are not only relative
30、ly high but also quite dispersed among 36 Chinese industry sectors, which reflects both national strategic activism and different lobby capacity of interest groups. The empirical study indicates that those sectors which hxdye the characteristics of higher labor productivity, higher comparative advan
31、tage, higher backward linkage, higher labor intensity, higher profits and tax creating, lower value-added proportion of public enterprises and higher consumer-goods ratio are usually able to obtain higher nominal and effective protection. Additionally, there is the complementary relation between tar
32、iffs and non-tariff barriers. The result of regressions shows the “social concern model” in the literature seems to be more appropriate to explain Chinas trade protection pattern than the “self-interest model”. Nevertheless, the social concern herein primarily deals with implementing governmental in
33、dustrial policy, rather than mitigating structural adjustment cost and pursuing the equality of income distribution. As regards policy implications, the study argues that if trade liberalization reform could be viable in the future in China, leaders in the party and central government hxdye to adopt
34、 the innovative market-oriented trade philosophy and succeed in dismantling obstructions of some interest groups by restructuring political bargaining process in policy-making. Commitments to international agreement and institutional rules in the world trade system can provide China with a benchmark and “bicycle effect” for the pending reform. Key words: China, trade policy, political economy, trade protection
