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1、现代大学精读英语4 lesson six课文Lesson 6 Groundless Beliefs In future we are going to follow the practice-until it become a habit -of classifying proposition s according to their grounds .Of every statement we come across, we shall ask :HOW DO WE KONW THAT?WHAT REASON HAVE WE FOR BELIEVING THAT？ON WHAT GROUNG
2、 IS THAT STATEMENT BASED? Probably we shall be astonished at the number of propositions met with in everyday life which we shall find it necessary to class as groundless. They rest upon mere tradition, or on somebodys bare assertion unsupported by even a show of proof. It may be a belief which we or
3、iginally accepted as a result of simple suggestion and we have continued to hold it ever since. It has now become one of our regular habits of thought .Perhaps somebody -somewhere-sometime told us a certain thing, and quite uncritically we accepted and believed it. Perhaps it was way back in our ear
4、ly childhood-before we had even developed the power of questioning anything that might be told to us .Many of our strongest convictions were established then；and now ,in about life, we find it most difficult even to question their truth. They seem to us obviously true. But if the staunchest Rome Cat
5、holic and the staunchest Presbyterian ha been exchanged when infants, and if they had been brought up with home and all other influences reversed we can have very little doubt what the result would have been. It is consistent with all our knowledge of psychology to conclude that each would have grow
6、n up holding exactly the opposite beliefs to those he holds now.and each would then have left as sure of the truth of his opinion as he now feels-of truth of the opposite opinion. The same thing is true, of course, of many beliefs other than those of a religious nature. If we had grown up in a commu
7、nity where polygamy or head-hunting or infanticide, or gladiatorial fighting, or duelling, was regarded as the normal and natural thing-then we should have grown up to regard it as obviously natural and perfectly moral and proper. If an English baby had been adopted and brought up in a German home,
8、and had grown up with no knowledge that his parents were English ,all the sentiments and beliefs of that person would be German and not English. Many of our beliefs-many of our most deeply-rooted and fundamental convictions-are held simply as a results of the fact that we happen to have been brought
9、 up” to them. Of course we do not cease, when we cease to be children, to adopt new beliefs on mere suggestion. We continue doing it, more or less unconsciously all our lives: hence, to take only the most striking examples, the enormous influence of newspapers and the effectiveness of skilful advert
10、ising. Much of what passes as such is not, strictly, thinking at all. It is the mere “parroting” of ideas picked up by chance and adopted as our own without question. Most people, most of the time, are mere parrots. But as we leave childhood, we tend to accept only such new ideas as fit in with the
11、ideas we already hold; and all conflicting ideas seem to us “obviously” absurd. Propositions that are accepted simply because “everybody says no,” must be classed under the same heading. The dogma may not be that of any particular individual: it may be a dogmatic statement which has been passed from
12、 one person to another, from generation to generation, perhaps for hundreds-perhaps for thousands-of years. It may be part of the traditional belief of the people or the race. In that case, it is part of our social inheritance from some period in the past. But we should fully face the fact that beli
13、efs which are merely inherited from the past must have originated at a time when men knew much less than they know today. So the fact a belief is “old” is no argument in its favour. We need especially to be on our guard when we come across propositions which seem to be “obviously” true. When we find
14、 ourselves entertaining an opinion about which there is a feeling that even to enquire into it would be absurd, unnecessary, undesirable, or wicked-we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one. When we are tempted to say that any general truth is so “obvious” that it would be absurd even to q
15、uestion it, we should remember that the whole history of the development of human thought has been full of cases of such “obvious truths” breaking down when examined in the light of increasing knowledge and reason. For instance, for ages nothing could have seemed more obvious, more utterly beyond qu
16、estion than the proposition that slavery was natural, reasonable, necessary, and right. Some kinds of men were “obviously” “slaves by nature.” To doubt it was impossible. Again for more than two thousands years, it was “impossible to conceive” the planets as moving in paths other than circles. The c
17、ircle was “obviously” the perfect figure; and so it was “natural” and “inevitable” to suppose that the planets moved in circles. The age-long struggle of the greatest intellects in the world to shake off that assumption is one of the marvels of history. It was formerly “obvious” that the heart-and n
18、ot the brain-was the organ of consciousness. To most people today it seems equally “obvious” that we think with our brains. Many modern persons find it very difficult to credit the fact that men can ever have supposed otherwise. Yet-they did. That the earth must be flat, formerly seemed so obvious a
19、nd self-evident that the very suggestion of any other possibility would have been-and was-regarded as a joke. It was for two thousand years “taken for granted” as “obvious” that a heavy weight must fall faster than a light one. An assumed or dogmatic proposition which had been universally accepted a
20、s “obvious”; and which, when challenged, was supported by reference to a dogma of Aristotle. Until Galileo actually demonstrated the contrary, nothing could have seemed more beyond possibility or doubt. Propositions which are accepted blindly, without question the grounds of mere assumption or dogma
21、, need to be frankly recognized as such. Progress in human thought seems to consist mainly in getting rid of such ideas. Other beliefs are held through self-interest. Modern psychology leaves us no room for doubt on this point. We adopt and cling to some beliefs because-or partly because-the world t
22、o be able to recognize this in himself. Indeed, he would probably be highly plainly. It would be quite wrong to attribute all opinions-even political opinions-to self-interest. But it would be equally wrong to deny that this is one potent factor. “Self-interest” is to be understood first in the ordi
23、nary sense, as referring to a mans way of earning his livelihood and acquiring wealth. But we may extend the term to cover also his interest in social position; popularity with his fellows; the respect and goodwill of those whose respect and goodwill he values. It covers his interest in his own care
24、er; in whatever prestige he enjoys as one of the leaders-or at least as a valued supporter-of some movement or institution, dome religious body, some other kind of society or group. There is many a man who is unconsciously compelled to cling to a belief because he is a “somebody” in some circle-and
25、if he were to abandon that belief, he would find himself nobody at all. Putting it broadly, we should always suspect any of our opinions when we recognize that our happiness depends, directly or indirectly, upon our continuing to hold them-when we might lose anything, material or otherwise, by chang
26、ing our opinion. Somewhat similar is the acceptance of an opinion through the desire-probably not recognized by the person concerned-to justify his own nature, his own position, or his own behaviour. The coward can so easily adopt a philosophy which seems to justify cowardice-though, of course, “cow
27、ardice” is not the name he gives it! The lazy and bungling person can adopt a set of opinions which prove to his satisfaction that “the grapes are sour”-the “grapes” being the rewards that more energetic and competent men can win. Many groundless opinions are held through sentimental associations. T
28、he thought is associated with memories-pleasant or unpleasant as the case may be of particular persons who held similar opinions. It is found that many a man who in childhood was hostile to his father, in after life is always prejudiced against whatever opinions his father used to express. And conve
29、rsely in the case of one who has pleasant recollections of his father, his mother, a teacher perhaps, or some other person who played a big part in his early life. In adult life, as we have often observed, a bitter quarrel may change a mans opinion entirely. Antagonism to a man usually produces some
30、 antagonism to his opinions; and the bitterness felt against the man usually spreads to the idea for which he stands. What keen satisfaction we find in belittling the opinions, or attacking the opinions, of somebody of whom we are jealous, or of somebody against whom we bear a grudge! But, on the ot
31、her hand, it is equally true that friendly feelings to a man have an effect in disposing us to feel friendly to his views. Other opinions again are determined by what we may best called Fashion. To take one example: how largely our opinions on the merits of certain authors, or poets, or composers, a
32、re dictated merely by fashion! But the effect of fashion is very much wider than that: we trace it almost everywhere, in every field of thought. We tend very strongly to feel and to believe as others are feeling and believing. Not all others, perhaps; but others of our own set. But we do not, as a r
33、ule, continue all our lives changing our sentiments and opinions with every change of fashion. Sooner or later our minds become fixed. Many a man holds his opinions today-because they happened to be in fashion ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years ago. Once an opinion is accepted, whatever be t
34、he cause of its acceptance, it has a strong tendency to persist. Every time we think along a particular thought-pattern, makes it easier for us to think the same way again. It is quite legitimate to speak of “habits” of thought. The “brain path” becomes so well worn; the pattern of brain-centres bec
35、omes so well connected up by continual use, that nerve current finds a route of practically no resistance, and so it always takes almost exactly the same course. We all know the person who has a string of stock anecdotes. We all know too the person who has certain stock arguments and opinions which
36、he expresses, almost in the same words, whenever he receives the “cue.” We all know men and women whose minds work like gramophones. Put them on to the “record” about the good old days; or about prohibition; or about the wicked capitalist; or about the lazy and improvident workers; or about the coun
37、try going to the dogs; or about the modern girl; or some long, tedious anecdote about what I said to him, and what he said to me, and I said and he said and then I told him straight ! All we have to do is to start him off-and nothing on earth can stop him-until the “record” has run out! The same thi
38、ng is true of opinions and beliefs of all kinds of. After they have been held a certain length of time, they become, as it were, so stamped in by continual use that it is almost impossible now to change them. While we are young, we are continually taking in new ideas, altering our thought-patterns,
39、“making up our minds” afresh. As we grow older, we become less and less able to accept any new idea which will not fit in with our existing thought-pattern. Thus we become, in Jamess term, Old Fogeys. Sometimes our thought-patterns set while we are still quite young. In a few rare cases they remain
40、open or alterable even into old age. An old fogey may have become such at seventeen-or seventy. “I am almost afraid to say so (says James), but I believe that in the majority of human beings Old Fogeyism begins at about the age of twenty-five.” Yet when full allowance has been made for all these non-rational factors in the determination of opinion, there remains-not in all minds, not in most minds, but in some-a desire to discover the facts; to think things out in a clear and rational way; to get at the truth at all costs, whatever it may turn out to be! For such minds this is written.
