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1、,第 17 章,信息不对称的市场,Chapter 1,Slide 2,本章要讨论的问题,质量不确定性与柠檬市场市场信号道德风险委托代理问题,Chapter 1,Slide 3,本章要讨论的问题,一体化企业的管理激励问题劳动力市场的信息不对称:效率工资理论,Chapter 1,Slide 4,引言,我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制所产生的影响。,Chapter 1,Slide 5,质量不确定与柠檬市场,在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；,Chapter 1,Slide 6,二手车市场假定买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车；将会出现两个市场；,质量不确
2、定与柠檬市场,柠檬问题,PH,PL,QH,QL,Chapter 1,Slide 8,The Market for Used CarsWith asymmetric information:Low quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market.The market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade.Too many low and too few high quality cars are on the market.Adverse selection occurs;
3、the only cars on the market will be low quality cars.,Quality Uncertaintyand the Market for Lemons,Chapter 1,Slide 9,Implications of Asymmetric Information,Medical InsuranceQuestionIs it possible for insurance companies to separate high and low risk policy holders?If not,only high risk people will p
4、urchase insurance.Adverse selection would make medical insurance unprofitable.,The Market for Insurance,Chapter 1,Slide 10,Implications of Asymmetric Information,Automobile InsuranceQuestionsWhat impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of aut
5、omobile accident insurance?How can the government reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industry?,The Market for Insurance,Chapter 1,Slide 11,Implications of Asymmetric Information,The Market for CreditAsymmetric information creates the potential that only high risk borrowers will
6、seek loans.QuestionHow can credit histories help make this market more efficient and reduce the cost of credit?,Chapter 1,Slide 12,Implications of Asymmetric Information,The Importance of Reputation and StandardizationAsymmetric Information and Daily Market DecisionsRetail salesAntiques,art,rare coi
7、nsHome repairsRestaurants,Chapter 1,Slide 13,Implications of Asymmetric Information,QuestionHow can these producers provide high-quality goods when asymmetric information will drive out high-quality goods through adverse selection.AnswerReputation,Chapter 1,Slide 14,Implications of Asymmetric Inform
8、ation,QuestionWhy do you look forward to a Big Mac when traveling even though you would never consider buying one at home.Holiday Inn once advertised“No Surprises”to address the issue of adverse selection.,Chapter 1,Slide 15,Lemons in Major League Baseball,Asymmetric information and the market for f
9、ree agentsIf a lemons market exists,free agents should be less reliable(disabled)than renewed contracts.,Chapter 1,Slide 16,Player Disability,All Players4.7312.55165.4Renewed players4.769.68103.4Free agents4.6717.23268.9,Chapter 1,Slide 17,FindingsDays on the disabled list increase for both free age
10、nts and renewed players.Free agents have a significantly higher disability rate than renewed players.This indicates a lemons market.,Lemons in Major League Baseball,Chapter 1,Slide 18,QuestionIf you are a team owner,what steps would you take to reduce the asymmetric information for free agents?,Lemo
11、ns in Major League Baseball,Chapter 1,Slide 19,Market Signaling,The process of sellers using signals to convey information to buyers about the products quality helps buyers and sellers deal with asymmetric information.,Chapter 1,Slide 20,Market Signaling,Strong SignalTo be effective,a signal must be
12、 easier for high quality sellers to give than low quality sellers.ExampleHighly productive workers signal with educational attainment level.,Chapter 1,Slide 21,Market Signaling,A Simple Model of Job Market SignalingAssumeTwo groups of workersGroup I:Low productivity-AP&MP=1Group II:High productivity
13、-AP&MP=2The workers are equally divided between Group I and Group II-AP for all workers=1.5,Chapter 1,Slide 22,Market Signaling,A Simple Model of Job Market SignalingAssumeCompetitive Product MarketP=$10,000Employees average 10 years of employmentGroup I Revenue=$100,000(10,000/yr.x 10)Group II Reve
14、nue=$200,000(20,000/yr.X 10),Chapter 1,Slide 23,Market Signaling,With Complete Informationw=MRPGroup I wage=$10,000/yr.Group II wage=$20,000/yr.With Asymmetric Informationw=average productivityGroup I&II wage=$15,000,Chapter 1,Slide 24,Market Signaling,Signaling With Education to Reduce Asymmetric I
15、nformationy=education index(years of higher education)C=cost of attaining educational level yGroup I-CI(y)=$40,000yGroup II-CII(y)=$20,000y,Chapter 1,Slide 25,Market Signaling,Signaling With Education to Reduce Asymmetric InformationAssume education does not increase productivityDecision Rule:y*sign
16、als GII and wage=$20,000Below y*signals GI and wage=$10,000,Signaling,Years ofCollege,Value ofCollegeEduc.,0,$100K,Value ofCollegeEduc.,Years ofCollege,1,2,3,4,5,6,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,$200K,$100K,$200K,Group I,Group II,How much educationshould a person obtain?,The education decisionis based on benefits/co
17、stcomparison.,Signaling,Years ofCollege,Value ofCollegeEduc.,0,$100K,Value ofCollegeEduc.,Years ofCollege,1,2,3,4,5,6,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,$200K,$100K,$200K,B(y),B(y),y*,y*,Benefits=$100,000CostCI(y)=40,000y$100,000 2.5Choose no education,Benefits=$100,000CostCII(yO)=20,000y$100,000$20,000y*y*5Choose y*,Ch
18、apter 1,Slide 28,Signaling,Cost/Benefit ComparisonDecision rule works if y*is between 2.5 and 5If y*=4Group I would choose no schoolGroup II would choose y*Rule discriminates correctly,Chapter 1,Slide 29,Signaling,Education does increase productivity and provides a useful signal about individual wor
19、k habits.,Chapter 1,Slide 30,Working into the Night,QuestionHow can you signal to your employer you are more productive?,Chapter 1,Slide 31,Market Signaling,Guarantees and WarrantiesSignaling to identify high quality and dependabilityEffective decision tool because the cost of warranties to low-qual
20、ity producers is too high,Chapter 1,Slide 32,Moral Hazard,Moral hazard occurs when the insured party whose actions are unobserved can affect the probability or magnitude of a payment associated with an event.,Chapter 1,Slide 33,Moral Hazard,Determining the Premium for Fire InsuranceWarehouse worth$1
21、00,000Probability of a fire:.005 with a$50 fire prevention program.01 without the program,Chapter 1,Slide 34,Moral Hazard,Determining the Premium for Fire InsuranceWith the program the premium is:.005 x$100,000=$500Once insured owners purchase the insurance,the owners no longer have an incentive to
22、run the program,therefore the probability of loss is.01$500 premium will lead to a loss because the expected loss is not$1,000(.01 x$100,000),Chapter 1,Slide 35,The Effects of Moral Hazard,Miles per Week,0,$0.50,50,100,140,CostperMile,$1.00,$1.50,$2.00,Chapter 1,Slide 36,Reducing Moral Hazard-Warran
23、ties of Animal Health,ScenarioLivestock buyers want disease free animals.Asymmetric information existsMany states require warrantiesBuyers and sellers no longer have an incentive to reduce disease(moral hazard).QuestionHow can this moral hazard be reduced?,Chapter 1,Slide 37,Crisis in the Savings an
24、d Loan Industry,QuestionHow many people know the financial strength of their bank?Why not?Deposit insurance,moral hazard,and failures in the S&L industry,Chapter 1,Slide 38,Cost of the S&L Bailout1,000+failed institutions$200 billion(1990)Texas alone-$42 billion(1990)Agency expenditures-$100 million
25、(1990)QuestionHow can this moral hazard be reduced?,Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry,Chapter 1,Slide 39,The Principal-Agent Problem,Agency Relationship One persons welfare depends on what another person doesAgentPerson who actsPrincipalPerson whom the action effects,Chapter 1,Slide 40,The Pri
26、ncipal-Agent Problem,Company owners are principals.Workers and managers are agents.Owners do not have complete knowledge.Employees may pursue their own goals and reduce profits.,Chapter 1,Slide 41,The Principal-Agent Problem,The Principal-Agent Problem in Private EnterprisesOnly 16 of 100 largest co
27、rporations have individual family or financial institution ownership exceeding 10%.Most large firms are controlled by management.Monitoring management is costly(asymmetric information).,Chapter 1,Slide 42,The Principal-Agent Problem,The Principal-Agent Problem in Private EnterprisesManagers may purs
28、ue their own objectives.GrowthUtility from job,Chapter 1,Slide 43,The Principal-Agent Problem,The Principal-Agent Problem in Private EnterprisesLimitations to managers ability to deviate from objective of ownersStockholders can oust managersTakeover attemptsMarket for managers who maximize profits,C
29、hapter 1,Slide 44,The Principal-Agent Problem,The Principal-Agent Problem in Public EnterprisesObservationsManagers goals may deviate from the agencies goal(size)Oversight is difficult(asymmetric information)Market forces are lacking,Chapter 1,Slide 45,The Principal-Agent Problem,The Principal-Agent
30、 Problem in Public EnterprisesLimitations to Management PowerManagers choose a public service positionManagerial job marketLegislative and agency oversight(GAO&OMB)Competition among agencies,Chapter 1,Slide 46,The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents,Are non profit organizations more or less ef
31、ficient that for-profit firms?725 hospitals from 14 hospital chainsReturn on investment(ROI)and average cost(AC)measured,Chapter 1,Slide 47,For-Profit11.6%12.7%Nonprofit8.8%7.4%,The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents,Chapter 1,Slide 48,After adjusting for differences in services:AC/patient da
32、y in nonprofits is 8%greater than profitsConclusionProfit incentive impacts performanceCost and benefits of subsidizing nonprofits must be considered.,The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents,Chapter 1,Slide 49,Incentives in the Principal-Agent FrameworkDesigning a reward system to align the pr
33、incipal and agents goals-an exampleWatch manufacturerUses labor and machineryOwners goal is to maximize profitMachine repairperson can influence reliability of machines and profits,The Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents,Chapter 1,Slide 50,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principa
34、l-Agent FrameworkDesigning a reward system to align the principal and agents goals-an exampleRevenue also depends,in part,on the quality of parts and the reliability of labor.High monitoring cost makes it difficult to assess the repair-persons work,Chapter 1,Slide 51,The Revenue from Making Watches,
35、Low effort(a=0)$10,000$20,000High effort(a=1)$20,000$40,000,Poor LuckGood Luck,Chapter 1,Slide 52,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principal-Agent FrameworkDesigning a reward system to align the principal and agents goals-an exampleRepairperson can work with either high or low effortRev
36、enues depend on effort relative to the other events(poor or good luck)Owners cannot determine a high or low effort when revenue=$20,000,Chapter 1,Slide 53,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principal-Agent FrameworkDesigning a reward system to align the principal and agents goals-an examp
37、leRepairpersons goal is to maximize wage net of costCost=0 for low effortCost=$10,000 for high effortw(R)=repairperson wage based only on output,Chapter 1,Slide 54,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principal-Agent FrameworkChoosing a Wagew=0;a=0;R=$15,000R=$10,000 or$20,000,w=0R=$40,000;
38、w=$24,000R=$30,000;Profit=$18,000Net wage=$2,000,Chapter 1,Slide 55,The Principal-Agent Problem,Incentives in the Principal-Agent FrameworkChoosing a Wagew=R-$18,000Net wage=$2,000High effort,Chapter 1,Slide 56,The Principal-Agent Problem,ConclusionIncentive structure that rewards the outcome of hig
39、h levels of effort can induce agents to aim for the goals set by the principals.,Chapter 1,Slide 57,The Principal-Agent Problem,Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the Integrated FirmIn integrated firms,division managers have better(asymmetric)information about production than central man
40、agement,Chapter 1,Slide 58,The Principal-Agent Problem,Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the Integrated FirmTwo IssuesHow can central management illicit accurate informationHow can central management achieve efficient divisional production,Chapter 1,Slide 59,The Principal-Agent Problem,
41、Possible Incentive PlansBonus based on output or profitWill this plan provide an incentive for accurate information?,Chapter 1,Slide 60,The Principal-Agent Problem,Possible Incentive PlansBonus based on how close the managers get to their forecasts of output and profitsQf=estimate of feasible produc
42、tion levelB=bonus in dollarsQ=actual outputB=10,000-.5(Qf-Q)Incentive to underestimate Qf,Chapter 1,Slide 61,The Principal-Agent Problem,Possible Incentive PlansBonus still tied to accuracy of forecastIf Q Qf;B=.3Qf+.2(Q-Qf)If Q Qf;B=.3Qf-.5(Qf-Q),Chapter 1,Slide 62,Incentive Design in an Integrated
43、 Firm,Output(units per year),2,000,4,000,6,000,10,000,0,10,000,20,000,30,000,40,000,Bonus($peryear),8,000,Chapter 1,Slide 63,Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets:Efficiency Wage Theory,In a competitive labor market,all who wish to work will find jobs for a wage equal to their marginal product.How
44、ever,most countries economies experience unemployment.,Chapter 1,Slide 64,The efficiency wage theory can explain the presence of unemployment and wage discrimination.In developing countries,productivity depends on the wage rate for nutritional reasons.,Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets:Efficie
45、ncy Wage Theory,Chapter 1,Slide 65,The shirking model can be better used to explain unemployment and wage discrimination in the United States.Assumes perfectly competitive marketsHowever,workers can work or shirk.Since performance information is limited,workers may not get fired.,Asymmetric Informat
46、ion in Labor Markets:Efficiency Wage Theory,Chapter 1,Slide 66,Unemployment in a Shirking Model,Quantity of Labor,Wage,Chapter 1,Slide 67,Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor Company,Labor turnover at Ford 1913:380%1914:1000%Average pay=$2-$3Ford increased pay to$5,Chapter 1,Slide 68,Efficiency Wages at F
47、ord Motor Company,ResultsProductivity increased 51%Absenteeism had been halvedProfitability rose from$30 million in 1914 to$60 million in 1916.,Chapter 1,Slide 69,Summary,Asymmetric information creates a market failure in which bad products tend to drive good products out of the market.Insurance mar
48、kets frequently involve asymmetric information because the insuring party has better information about the risk involved than the insurance company.,Chapter 1,Slide 70,Summary,Asymmetric information may make it costly for the owners of firms to monitor accurately the behavior of the firms manager.Asymmetric information can explain why labor markets have substantial unemployment when some workers are actively seeking work.,End of Chapter 17,Markets with Asymmetric Information,
