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1、Hinrich-IMDSUSTAINAB1.ETRADEINDEX2023DEEPDIVEhinrichfoundationNdVanUlngcuctainabglobaltradTheDeglobalizationMyth:HowAsiassupplychainsarechangingBYTHANGNGUYEN-QUOCOXFORDECONOMICSaOXFORDECONOMICSContentsEXECUTIVESUMMARY3INTRODUCTION5METHODO1.OGY6G1.OBA1.SUPP1.YCHAINSCONTINUETHEIREXPANSIONZlGlobalIGtra
2、dehasrisendespiteadifficultperiod7UNear-shoringhasnotmaterializedatthegloballevel8ASIA,SSUPP1.YCHAINSAREUNDERGOINGMAJORCHANGES3.1Chinaisdecoupling-butonlyfromtheUSandJapan1132Newsupplychain“hotspots“areemerginginAsia13MU1.TIP1.EPATHWAYSTOSUPP1.YCHAINRESI1.IENCE16CONC1.USION19ABBREVIATIONS20ENDNOTES2
3、1ABOUTOXFORDECONOMICS22ExecutivesummaryGlobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand,despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring.Regionalsourcinghasfallenacrossmostmajorworldregions,suggestingnearshoringmaynotyetbeaprevalentstrategy.Sincetheearly2010szrisinglaborcostsinChinahavecausedmanyenterprisestoexplo
4、realternativemanufacturingbasesandsourcingstrategiestomaintaintheircompetitiveness.MorerecentdisruptionssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,Covid-19pandemic,andsanctionsonRussiahavefurtherpromptedbusinessestore-evaluatetheresilienceoftheirsupplychains.NotonlydotheydriveupthecostOftradingduetohighertariffsands
5、anctions,theyalsoaddedpolicyuncertaintiesthathinderthesmoothandefficientoperationofglobalproductionnetworks.Thesedevelopmentshaveledtovariousclaimsaboutthedemiseofglobalization,theriseofnear-shoring,andthedecouplingofChinafromthesupplychainsofWesterncompanies.Thisreportpresentsanup-to-dateoverviewof
6、globalandAsiansupplychainsandassessesthesedifferentclaimsbyfocusingondataforbilateralcross-bordertradeofIntermediateGoods(IG)zagranularclassofproductsthatmoreaccuratelyrepresentssupplychaincomponentrythanthefinalgoodsusedinmostotheranalyses.Despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring,thisstudyfindsth
7、atglobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand.Wefindthatglobalsupplychainshavecontinuedtoexpand,despitetalkofdeglobalizationandnearshoring.Intra-regionalsourcing,measuredbytheshareofIGimportsoriginatingfromcountrieswithinthesameregion,hasfallenacrossmostmajorworldregions,suggestingnearshoringmaynotyetbe
8、aprevalentstrategyatthegloballevel.TradedecouplingremainslargelyaUS-Chinaphenomenon.China,sshareofIGimportsintotheUSdroppingfrom18.5%in2018to14.1%in2022.Ontheotherhand,wefindevidencethatdecouplinghasmaterializedforChinastradewiththeUSandJapan-ChinazsshareofIGimportsintotheUSfellfrom18.5%in2018to14.1
9、%in2022.Thissharedroppedto11.4%inthefirsthalfof2023.Incontrast,ChinahasgainedimportanceasasourceofinputsshippedtoseveralGroupofSeven(G7)developedeconomies.Forexample,between2018and2022,China,sshareoftotalIGimportsincreasedfrom11.1%to15.9%inGermany,andfrom10.3%to15.1%intheUnitedKingdom.WhileChinarema
10、insthecenterofFactoryAsia,theAsia-PacificsIGtradehasbeendiversifying.AfewAsianeconomiesareemergingas“hotspots“ofIGtradegrowthinthisvolatileandincreasinglytensegeopoliticalglobalenvironment.Inparticular,VietnamandIndonesiaregistereddouble-digitgrowthinannualIGexportsduringthisperiod.High-levelcompara
11、tiveanalysisofthese“hotspot“economiesrevealsmarkedlydifferenteconomicstructuresandgeopoliticalorientations.Forexample,VietnamhasmadestridesinbecomingmoreimportantforinternationalsourcingforboththeUSandChina.ThisreflectsnotonlytheneedsofWesternmultinationalsbutalsoChineseenterpriseslookingtoexpandpro
12、ductionbaseabroad.FDIinflowsfromChinatoVietnamhavesurgedin2023andarenowthelargestofanycountrytoVietnam.Incontrast,IndiahasbecomemoreimportantforUSsupplychains,butlessimportantforChina,ssupplychains.Despiteescalatinggeopoliticaltensions,ChinahasbecomeincreasinglyreliantonTaiwanforitsinputs.Taiwanssha
13、reinChinasIGimportsincreasedfrom12.2%to14%between2018and2022,partlydrivenbyhigherdemandforadvancedsemiconductorproductsduringthepandemicthatdroveuppricesfortheseproducts.Taiwanproducesmorethan60%oftheworldssemiconductorsandmorethan90%ofthemostadvancedones.ThediversityofeconomicstructuresandUS-Chinao
14、rientationsacrossthese“hotspot“economiessuggeststhatthereismorethanonewinningstrategytonavigatethechanginglandscapeofglobalsupplychains.IntroductionCompaniesareseekingtoreduceriskintheirsupplychainconfigurationbydiversifyingtheirsupplierbases,establishingmoreefficientsupplychainfootprints,exploringa
15、lternativeproductionhubstoenhancesupplychainvisibilityandagility.Theshiftingdynamicsofsupplychains,especiallyinAsia,areanimportantandtopicalissuefortheglobaleconomy.Companysourcingstrategieshavefar-reachingimplications,impactingnotonlytheefficiencyofbusinessesbutalsoinfluencingtradedynamics,economic
16、growth,andcompetitivenesstrendsonaglobalscale.Duringthe1990s,whentheprocessOfglobalizationacceleratedandproductionprocessesbecameincreasinglyfragmentedacrosscountries,ChinasriseasthezFactoryoftheWorldzwassupportedbyitscheapandplentifulsupplyoflabor.Aswageshaveincreasedinrecentyears,however,Chinesefi
17、rmshaveincreasinglyfocusedonhighervalue-addedactivitiesthroughacombinationofupgradedfactories,technologyadoption,andworkforceskillenhancements.Inturn,supplychainsinAsiaadaptedtotheseshiftingdynamics,withmanymultinationalsexploringalternativesourcingapproaches-forexample,theso-called“ChinaPlusOnewstr
18、ategy,wherebycompaniesdiversifiedoperationsbyexpandingoutsideofChinawhilestillmaintainingapresenceinthecountry.MorerecentdisruptionssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,theCOVID-19pandemic,andRussiansanctionshavefurtherpromptedbusinessestore-evaluatetheresilienceoftheirsupplychains.Inadditiontotherisingcostoft
19、radeduetohighertariffsandsanctions,thesetensionsalsocreatepolicyuncertaintiesforbusinesses-whicharedetrimentaltothesmoothandefficientoperationofglobalproductionnetworks.Companiesareseekingtoreduceriskintheirsupplychainconfigurationbydiversifyingtheirsupplierbases,establishingmoreefficientsupplychain
20、footprints,exploringalternativeproductionhubstosupportchangingdemandpatterns,andembracingdigitaltechnologiestoenhancesupplychainvisibilityandagility.Inthiscontext,ourstudyseekstoprovidenewinsightsintotheevolutionofsupplychainsinAsiaandgloballyoverthe2018-22period,andthefirsthalfof2023whereapplicable
21、.Specifically,itexaminesofficialbilateraltradedataforIGtotracecross-borderflowsofrawmaterialsandintermediateinputs.Collectedbyofficialcustomsagencies,dataonIGtradeoffersup-to-date,comprehensive,andinternationallycomparablestatisticstoanalyzeglobalproductionnetworks.Box1furtherdescribesthemethodology
22、usedforthisanalysis.TheanalysisprovidesacomplementaryanddeeperdiveintothecriticaldimensionsoftheHinrich-IMDSustainableTradeIndex(STI).Firstzithighlightstheevolutionoftradeconcentration;inthisregard,itextendsourrecentworkfortheHinrichFoundationonthediversificationofglobaltradebyanalyzingshiftsintheco
23、untryoforiginforinputswithinthesupplychainbeyondChinaandassessingrecentclaimsregardingnear-shoringtrends.1Second,weidentifyanumberoftradegrowthhotspotcountriesinAsiaandfindthattheytendtocombineanumberofdifferentsuccessfactorsidentifiedbytheindex,suchasFDIattractivenessandtechnologicalcapabilities.Th
24、ediversityofthesecountriesunderlinestheneedtoadoptamulti-dimensionalframeworktoassessingtraderegimesacrosscountries,inlinewiththefindingsoftheSTI.MethodologyIGisdefinedasinputsusedtoproduceafinalproduct,excludingprimaryfuelsandlubricants.Theyrangefromcropsusedinfoodproductiontotextiles,metals,andcom
25、puterchipsneededtomanufacturegoods.InternationaltradeintheseproductsisidentifiedandaggregatedbyofficialcustomsagenciesaccordingtotheUnitedNationsBroadEconomicClassification(BEC)zversion4.FocusingontradeinIGoffersanumberofadvantagesoverothermethodologiesinstudyingglobalsupplychains.Inparticular,manye
26、conomicstudiesofsupplychainsoftenfocusonasinglesectororcountry,thusoccludingacomprehensiveviewofglobalsupplychains.Whilesomestudieshavemadeuseofglobalinputoutputtablestopresentamorecomprehensiveeconomy-wideview,theseanalysesarebasedonoutdatedinformation.Forexample,atthetimeofwritingthisreport(autumn
27、2023)ztheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)TradeinValueAddeddatabaseonlycontainsinformationupto2018.AlthoughdataonForeignDirectInvestmentsmaybemorefrequentlyupdated,theyoftenlackthebilateraldimensionoftheseflowsthatwouldenableananalysisoftheevolutionofproductionnetworks.Incontra
28、sttothesedatasources,customsdata(especiallyimports)offermorerecentandcomprehensivecoverageofformalcross-bordertrade,whichismoresuitedtoourresearchprioritiesforthisreport.Importdatatypicallyhasbetterqualitythanexportdataduetotheprevalenceofdutiesandtaxesonimports,whichnecessitatecustomsdeclarationsan
29、dtheformalrecordingoftheseflows.Withthisinmind,importdatawascollectedfrom91nationalcustomsagencies(coveringmorethan70%oftotalIGtradein2018-21).Exportflowswerethenanalyzedasthemirroroftheseimportflows.ThedatawassourcedfromtheUnitedNationsCommodityTradeStatisticsDatabase(UNCOMTRADE)andaccessedthrought
30、heWorldIntegratedTradeSolutions(WITS)portal.TounderstandthecompositionofIGimportsintotheUSuntilthefirsthalfof2023,wesourcedmonthlyUSimportdatafromUNCOMTRADE.WethenusedtheBECclassificationstoidentifyandselectonlytradeinIG.Weappliedfurthercleaningandtreatmentofthedataasnecessary,suchasaggregatingHongK
31、ongSARandMacautradeflowsintoChina.TaiwanwasidentifiedasOtherAsia,notelsewherespecified,*(code490)inUNCOMTRADE.FortheanalysisofspecifictopicssuchasUS-Chinadecoupling,wealsousedexportdatafromG7countriesandChinafromUNCOMTRADEtogainacomprehensiveviewoftheexportpatternsbythesekeycountries.Basedonthisdata
32、forIGtrade,wefirstdevelopedstatisticalindicatorstoevaluatetheevolutionofglobalandAsiansupplychaintrade,withaviewtotestingpopularnarrativessuchasdecoupling,near-shoringanddeglobalization.WethenidentifiedgrowthhotspotsinAsiaandanalyzedtheircompetitivepositioningusingtheHinrich-IMDSTI.Globalsupplychain
33、scontinuetheirexpansion2.1GlobalIGtradehasrisendespiteadifficultperiodOurdatarevealsthatglobalIGtradegrewatanaverageannualizedrateof6%overtheperiod2018-22.Thisrobustexpansionimpliesthatpopularnarrativesarounddeglobalizationandtherollingbackofinternationalsupplychainnetworksmaybepremature,attheleast.
34、Thatsaid,thetrajectoryofIGtradewasfarfromlinearoverthisperiod,reflectingtheimpactofmajorworldeventssuchastheUS-Chinatradewar,thepandemic,andtheRussia-Ukrainewar.Whencomparedtoaggregatetradeingoods,IGsaccountedforroughlyhalfoftotaltradeflows-asharethathasstayedbroadlystableoverthepastdecade.Wefindtha
35、tChinawasthelargestimporterandexporterofIGintheworldoverthe2018-22period(Figure2).UnderpinningthisdominanceisChinasongoingimportanceinthefinalassemblystagesofglobalproductionasthezFactoryoftheWorld*.Atthesametime,italsoatteststothemanufacturingcapabilityofChineseindustries,wherelocalproducersareupgr
36、adingverticallyacrossvaluechainstoproducemoresophisticatedandscale-sensitivecomponents.Forexample,Chinanowaccountsforatleasthalfofproductionofbatterycellsandmorethan70%insomerelatedcomponents.2Figure1-EvolutionofglobalIGtrade,2018-2022100=2018levelSource:OxfordEnomicsSource:OxfordEconomicsFigure2-IG
37、exportsbyeconomy,2018-2022average(inbillionUS$)22Near-shoringhasnotmaterializedatthegloballevelInmostregions,producersaresourcingagreatershareoftheirinternationalinputsfromoutsidetheirownregion.Intra-regionalsourcing,asmeasuredbytheshareofintra-regionaltradeineachregion,sIGimports,alsodeclinedinmost
38、regionsoverthesampleperiod.Thispatternholdsevenwhenexcludingprimaryproducts(typicallyunprocessednaturalresources).TheAsia-Pacificistheonlyexceptionwhereregionalsourcinghasincreasedbetween2018and2022,butthisshiftwasrelativelyminor-theintra-regionalshareofAsiasimportsmarginallyrosefrom59.7%in2018to60.
39、6%in2022.TheseresultsrefutebroadassumptionsthatglobalMNEsarealreadybringingtheirinternationalsupplychainsclosertohome,withkeyexceptions.Theapparentabsenceoflarge-scalenearshoringmaystemfromthe“stickiness”andtime-consumingprocessofreconfiguringsupplychains.Thisreflectsanumberofissues: Supplychainsare
40、deeplyentrenchedandhaveevolvedoverdecades,withestablishedrelationships,contracts,andinfrastructureinplace.Disruptingtheseestablishedpatternsrequirescarefulplanningandnegotiation. Thesheerscaleofglobalsupplychains,oftenspanningmultiplecountriesandcontinents,introduceslogisticalchallengesthatcannotber
41、esolvedinshortorder. Reconfigurationentailssignificantcapitalinvestment,whichmanybusinessesneedtimetosecure. Regulatoryandcomplianceissuescanfurtherextendthetimelineforsupplychainreconfiguration. Supplychainadjustmentsalsoinvolveassessingandmitigatingpotentialrisks,suchaspoliticalinstabilityorshifts
42、inconsumerdemand,whichremainfluidandnecessitateagradualandstrategicapproachbybusinesses.Thesefactorsincreasetheset-upcostforcompanieswhenconsideringanyswitchesintheirsupplychains,increasingtheattractivenessofmaintainingtheirexistingsourcingstrategy.Furthermore,evenwhentheeconomicconditionsforthereal
43、locationofsupplychainsareripezthesefactorsmaycontributetodelaysinrealizingsuchdecisions.Therelativelyrecentpick-upinMexicosIGexportstotheUSpresentsanexampleofsuchalag.Mexicoiswidelyconsideredtobethebest-positionedemergingmarkettogainfromUSnear-shoringinvestment,givenitsproximity,well-developedmanufa
44、cturinginfrastructure,andestablishedtradeagreementssuchastheUnitedStates-Mexico-CanadaAgreement(USMCA).UsingUSmonthlyimportdata,wefindthatMexicosshareinUSIGimportsremainedrelativelystablebetween2018and2022(withtheexceptionofMarch-May2020duringtheearlyphaseofthepandemic).However,whenextendingthedatat
45、othefirsthalfof2023,wefindthatthepicturechangedsignificantly-sinceNovember2022,MexicohasovertakenChinaasthetopproviderOfinternationalinputsfortheUS.Itssharethereaftersteadilyincreasedfrom12.6%in2022to14.5%ofUStotalIGexportsbyJune2023.Figure4-ShareofUStotalIGimports(%)ChinaSource:OxfordEnomicsMexicoC
46、anadaAsiassupplychainsareundergoingmajorchangesTheUSandJapanhavestartedtodecouplefromChina.Incontrast,Chinasimportanceasanexporterofproductioninputshasincreasedinothermajorcountries.3.1Chinaisdecoupling-butonlyfromtheUSandJapanOuranalysisindicatesthattheUSandJapanhavestartedtodecouplefromChina.China
47、sshareofIGimportsintotheUSfellfrom18.5%in2018to14.1%in2022.Inthefirstof2023,thissharedroppedfurtherto11.4%.Thelargestdropoccurredin2018-19duringthetariffescalationsoftheTrumpadministration.China,simportanceforIGimportsalsodroppedinJapanduring2018-22,fallingfrom26.5%to24%.ThisshiftreflectsJapanscommi
48、tmentto”de-risking,exemplifiedbythepledgeofG7leadersinHiroshimainMay2023?Inparticular,JapansetupaUS$20billionfundtoattractinvestmentinthesemiconductorindustryaswellasrestrictexportsof23typesofsemiconductormanufacturingequipment-aligningitstechnologytradecontrolswithUSmeasures.4Incontrast,Chinasimportanceasanexporterofproductioninputshasincreasedinothermajorcountries.Between2018and2022,ChinasshareoftotalIGimportsincreasedfrom11.1%to15.9%inGermany,from22.2%to26.4%inBrazil,andfrom29.5%to33.1%inAustralia.Analysisofsectoraltradedatasuggeststhatthisgrowthw
