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1、Contents11ntroduction22 COVID-1922.1 Timelineofeconomiceffects32.2 Pricevolatilityandshortages62.3 Policyresponsesandtheaftermath73 TheRussianinvasionofUkraine83.1 Energyshock83.2 Agriculture123.3 Inperspective:theshockandtheresponse174 TheChina-UStradewar184.1 TheTrump-Bidentradewars184.2 ThechipWa
2、rS194.3 Theimpact205 Policylessonsfromadecadeoftradeshocks22References2311ntroductionAfterdecadesofrapidexpansionofglobalsupplychains,thelastdecadehasseenaseriesofmajorshocksthatdisruptedtheirfunctioning.TheChina-UStradewar,COVID-19andtheRussianinvasionofUkrainehavealldisruptedflowsofgoodsacrossbord
3、ers,leadingbusinessleadersandpolicymakerstoquestionthewisdomofrelyingontheglobalnetworkofsupplychains.Asaresult,variouspolicieshavebeenenactedwiththeexplicitgoalofreshapingvaluechains,diversifyingoroutrightreshoringsupplychains.However,fundamentalquestionsaboutthenatureoftheseshocksremain.Thispaperr
4、evisitstheeffectsofthreeshocksonthefunctioningofglobalsupplychains.WefirstlookatthedisruptionoftheCOVID-19pandemic,theninvestigatetheimpactoftheRussianinvasionofUkraine,beforediscussingtheUS-Chinatradedisputeandtheensuingtechnologicalcoldwar,.Theaimistoidentifylessonsabouthowpoliciescanadapttopreven
5、tdisruptionandtomitigatetheeffectoffutureshocks.Weareinterestedbothinthemagnitudeofshocksaswellastheirlastingeffects.InthecasesofthepandemicandtheRussianinvasionofUkraine,themagnitudeoftheshockwasveryhigh,butdissipatedrelativelyquickly.Ontheotherhand,theUS-Chinatradewarhasbeenaprotractedshiftingloba
6、ltrade,withenormousramificationsfors叩Plychainsandcitizens.Whilethelengthofashockdetermineswhethertheeconomicdamageisenduring,evenashortshockcancreatesignificantpolitical-economyproblems.Thismeans,thateveniflong-termgrowthtrendsarenotdisruptedforextendedperiods,theupheavalcausedbysuddenlargeshockmigh
7、tstillwarrantthecostsofmitigationmeasures.Meanwhile,themechanismsthroughwhichmarketsreactedwerequitedifferentacrosssectors.Boththepandemicandthewarincreasedscarcityinmanymarkets.Whilethiswasoftendescribedasshortages,itwasnotalwaysashortageinthenarroweconomicdefinition.Economistsonlydescribesomething
8、asashortageifthepricemechanismbreaksdownandagoodbecomesunavailable,evenforthosewillingtopayahighprice.Highpricesreflectingscarcityleadtoeconomicallyeffcientallocationofresourcesandsetincentivesfornewproducerstoentermarkets.Butthismechanismcanalsohavepoliticallyandeconomicallyundesirableeffects.Forin
9、stance,agovernmentmightwanttoprotectconsumersfrompricespikesinheatingcoststhatcouldpriceoutvulnerableconsumers.Meanwhile,businessesthatfacehighpricevolatilitycouldstruggletofulfilcontractswithfixedpricesandriskreputationaldamageiftheytransmitpricespikestoconsumers.ThispaperispartoftheReThinkGSCproje
10、ct,whichstudieshowsupplychainsareadaptingtoaneweraofmorecontentiousglobalpolitics,climatechangeandthegrowingimportanceofservicesfortrade.2COVID-19TheCOVID-19pandemicwasamajorshocktotheworldeconomy.Inresponsetotheoutbreakofthepandemic,countriesclosedtheirborders,andgovernmentsforcedfactoriesandperson
11、al-servicesproviderstoceaseoperation,andimposedlockdownsontheirpopulations.Amidlargeuncertainty,companiesad叩tedtheirsupplystrategiesandconsumersshiftedconsumptionpatterns.Meanwhile,governmentsinadvancedeconomiesenactedmajoreconomicstimulusprogrammestosupporttheireconomiesandmitigatetheeconomicimpact
12、ofthepandemic.Thiscocktailofeconomicshiftshadmajorglobalimplicationsandcreatedunexpectedcircumstancesforcompaniesengagedinglobalvaluechains.Oncethepandemiceased,therewasamajordiscussiononwhethersupplychainshavebecometoofragile.WearguethatS叩PIychainsprovedremarkablyresilientinthefaceofashockofsuchmag
13、nitude.WhiletheoverlappingofthepandemicandtheRussianinvasionofUkrainemakeafinalassessmentdiffcult,thesupply-chainrelatedeffectsofthepandemicseemtohavedissipatedwithinonlyafewyears.Whilethemagnitudeoftheshockwaslarge,itwasrelativelyshort-lived.2.1 TimelineofeconomiceffectsInJanuaryandFebruary2020,cou
14、ntriesclosedtheirborderstoforeigntravellersinresponsetotheoutbreakofthepandemicinChinaandtheglobalspreadthatfollowed.Asdomesticcasesgrewexponentiallyregardless,countriesimposeddomesticlockdowns.BytheendofMarch2020over100countrieshadresortedtolockdownmeasuresSeeBBC,Coronavirus:Theworldinlockdowninmap
15、sandcharts,BBCNews,6April2020,availableat,significantlyimpactingtheabilityofthelocaleconomytofunction.Evenwheremovementwasnotentirelycurtailed,householdsrestrictedtheirmovementsandbusinessesresortedtoworkingfromhomeThiswasdocumentedforalargenumberofcountriesbytheGoogleMobilityReports,whichusedsmartp
16、honedatatomeasurewherepeoplespendtheirtimeduringthepandemic.Availableat.Theensuingsupply-chaindisruptionsandnegativedemandshockmanifesteddifferentlyacrosssectors.IntheEU,sectorsrequiringphysicalproximity,suchasthecreativeandhospitalityindustries,wereimpactedseverely,whereasthepharmaceuticalanddigita
17、lsectorssawrelativelysmallcontractions(DeVetetal,2021).Butoverall,thefirstwavesawsignificantincreasesinunemploymentandreductionsinoutputfromimportantindustriesForasummaryontheEUduringtheearlypandemic,seeMarcusetal(2021).Governmentsinadvancedeconomiesenactedhugestimulusprogrammestosupporthouseholdsan
18、dindustry.Thesecameindifferentvarieties.IntheEU,manygovernmentsfocusedonsustainingexistingworkrelationshipsbyimplementingjob-retentionschemes(ArnoldandKammer,2021).EUcountriesalsodisbursedstateaidtocompaniesofvariouskindstohelpthemsurvivetheeconomicdownturn.TheUS,ontopofothermeasures,disbursed$293bi
19、llionincashhandoutstotaxpayersaspartofthe$2.3trillionCARESActIMFCOVID-19policytracker,availableat.IntheEU,additionalspendingbymemberstatesin2020wasestimatedat3.3percentofGDPSeeEuropeanCommissionmemoof3March2021,Questionsandanswers:Communicationonfiscalpolicyresponsetocoronaviruspandemic*,.Ineconomic
20、terms,thepandemicmeantasimultaneoussupplyandademandshock.Demanddecreasedbecauseofuncertaintyamongstconsumersandbusinesses,whichledtodecreasedinvestmentandconsumptionexpenditureoverall.However,thepicturewasmixed.Thesimpleinabilitytoacquirecertainin-personservicesdestroyedcertaintypesofconsumption,whe
21、reastheshifttoremoteworkboosteddemandforICTgoodsthatenabledthedigitalisationofworkprocesses.Paralleltothenegativedemandshock,thecombinationofhighlevelsofuncertaintyregardingfutureincome,thesuppressionofconsumerspendingopportunitiesandincomeoremploymentsupportprovidedbygovernmentsledtoanaccumulationo
22、flargesavings(Figure1)(Attinasietal,2021).Intheeuroarea,highersavingsweremostlydrivenbylowerconsumption(Dosscheet/,2021).Figure1:Pandemic-periodhouseholdsavingsrate(%)305eaIBBlllll00800006666OOOO1.1.1.1.ZZZZEEC1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ1.oooooooooooooooooooooocEuropeanUnion-27countries(from2020)
23、Euroarea-20countries(from2023)Source:BruegelbasedonEurostatdatasetnasq_10_ki.Thesupplyshockresultedfromdiffcultyinproducinggoodsariginsfromfactoryclosuresandlogisticalhurdlesinshippinggoodsacrossborders.Certaingoodsbecamediffculttoprocure,asdemandforthemsurgedorbecausecrucialstepsoftheS叩PIychainbeca
24、medisrupted.Theinabilitytoacquirepersonalservicesledtoashiftofconsumptioninfavourofgoods.Figure2ashowsthelargedropinconsumptionofboth(non-food)goodsandservicesresultingfromdomesticandforeigndisruption.Italsoshowsthequickrecoverymadebygoodsrelativetoservices.（八）Retailsaleofnon-fdproducts(exceptfuel)1
25、40Figure2:Pandemicretailturnoverofnon-foodproducts(exceptfuel)andservicesintheEU27AccommodationFoodandbeverageserviceactivities60,60Zzo,6ozNoooozZzozso,zozo9oz89oZ8olnozO,GOZ8msz80,ZZoZo,ZzOZ90,1.ZOZ二，oszSource:BruegelbasedonEurostatdatasetsSTS.TRTU.MandSTS.SETUM.Note:Index(2015=100),Monthlydata,cal
26、endarandseasonallyadjusted.Theincreaseindemandforgoodstogetherwithlogisticaldifftultiesledtoasurgeinratesforfreight(UNCTAD,2021).Forexample,in1.osAngeles,thesurgeindemandfortradedgoodstogetherwithhighnumbersofsickworkersduringthepandemicledtolongwaitingperiodsforshipsintheportAndrewORemy,Stalledship
27、s,stressedcrews:Covidbuyingboomoverwhelms1.Aports,TheGuardian,11March2021,Similarproblemswereexperiencedaroundtheworldandweredirectlyreflectedinthecostsofshipping.Figure3showsthefreightratesfortheshippingofastandard40-footcontainerfromShanghaitoRotterdamandto1.osAngeles.TheshippingratesfromChinatoEu
28、ropeincreasedfromaround$2000tomorethan$14000,aseven-foldincreaseinthecost.Figure3:Freightrates($)WCIShanghaitoRotterdamper40footbox(USD)WCIShanghaito1.osAngelesper40footbox(USD)Source:Bloomberg.2.2 PricevolatilityandshortagesTheincreaseinscarcityandhighercostsofgoodsproductionanddistributionweremani
29、festedinbothconsumerpricesandtheavailabilityofgoodstoconsumers.Aremarkableexampleofhowthesephenomenamaterialisedwasinthemarketsfornewandusedcars.Anticipatinglowerdemandandthediffcultyofprocuringparts,manymanufacturersdisinvestedtheirinventoriesandcancelledordersforinputssuchassemiconductors(Burkacky
30、etal,2022).Butincontrasttoexpectations,consumerdemandforcarssurgedandcarcompaniescouldnotkeepupwithdemand,resultinginanapparentshortageofchipsforcarmakers.Inthecaseofnewcars,thisledtolongwaitingperiodstoreceivenewcars,whilepricesremainedrelativelysimilar.Companiesdecidednottousemarketpricinginordert
31、omanagetheirinventories,andinsteadoptedtoincreasewaitingperiodsforconsumers.Meanwhile,thesecond-handcarmarketdidnothaveanysuchrestrictions.Inthismarket,pricessurgeduntilmarketscleared.Figure4showspriceindicesfornewandusedcars.Whiletherewasagradualincreaseinthepricesofnewcarsby19percent,pricesforused
32、carssurgedrapidlyby57percent.240Figure4:UsedversusnewcarsCPI,UnitedStates200080604022111crur-cctcEsz捷ooEZoZ/5oZZOH1.OZZOZ捷。二OZZoZ二O/1.O1.SZ、6O、O1.ZoZ滴O/1.o1./oosz6ooOzoz捷0二。OZOZ/3二O61.0Z6/1.o61.oZ/90/56SZ二0、580Z6ooH/1.o80Z/ooZ1.OZ/60/1.OH/5Z1.OZ/5/590Z、60二0-0/091.0Z/S/1.020Oo1Source:BruegelbasedonFR
33、ED.Thispointstoaninterestingdynamic,withsomemarketsabletoreacttosupplyordemandshocksthroughpricing,whileothersarelessflexible.Inmanycases,commoditypricessimplyincreased,leadingtopricevolatilitybutnotshortages.However,whentherearepre-negotiatedpricesincontractsorreputationalrisksassociatedwithmassive
34、priceincreases(asisthecaseforcarmanufacturers),anincreaseinscarcitycanleadtoactualshortagesandlongerwaittimesforthefulfilmentofcontracts.2.3 PolicyresponsesandtheaftermathPandemic-inducedpoliciesplayedamajorroleincreatingthemarketdistortionsexperiencedduringthepandemic.Closedbordercrossings,factoryc
35、losuresandfiscalstimulusplayedimportantrolesintheeconomicimpactofthepandemic,andtheimpactonsupplychainsspecifically.Therewasalsoanincreaseinexportrestrictions,inparticularformedicalgoods(Evenett,2022).Atthesametime,therewereeffectivepolicyinterventionstomitigatetheeffectsofthepandemiconconsumersandp
36、roducers.Afterthebriefimplementationofaninternalexportrestriction,EuropeanUnionpolicymakersshiftedquicklytocommonpolicieswhenitcametopandemic-relatedtrademeasures(Marcusetal,2021).IntheEU,*greenlaneswereestablishedthatenabledgoodstoflowacrossotherwiseclosedborders.Whiletheshockwashuge,thepandemicisy
37、ettoleavealastingmarkintheglobaltradeindicators.Tradeingoodsrevertedquicklytoitspre-pandemictrend,despitetheinitiallargedropinretailtradeandthepricespikesintheinternationalanddomesticcostsofshipping.Mostpandemic-inducedpricespikeshavecomedownandnormalised.Inflationhasnotreturnedtoitspre-pandemictren
38、dineithertheEUortheUS,butthisispartlydrivenbytheeffectsofthewarinUkraine.However,thepandemichasledtoarethinkingamongpolicymakers.IntheEU,thesinglemarketemergencyinstrument(beingadoptedattimeofwritingastheInternalMarketEmergencyandResilienceAct,IMERASeeCounciloftheEUpressreleaseof1February2024,SMEI/I
39、MERA:CouncilandParliamentstrikeaprovisionaldealoncrisispreparedness*,inrtrument-coundl-and-Darliament-strikeaDrovisional-deal-on-crisis-Dre阿edness.)isintendedtoprovideasustainedlegalbasisforthetypeofmeasuresusedduringthepandemic.Itisintendedtomitigatetheimpactifanothershockofasimilarkindweretoappear
40、.Industrial-policyinitiativesliketheEuropeanChipsAct(Regulation(EU)2023/1781)aredirectlymotivatedbytheshortagesexperiencedduringthepandemic,andtheperceivedrisksoflongvaluechainshaveincreased.Thepandemicexperiencehasalsocontributedtothenewwaveofindustrial-policyinitiatives,asgovernmentshavebecomemore
41、worriedaboutsplychainsandtrytoreshoreproduction.1.awsincludingtheInflationReductionActintheUSandtheEuropeanreactiontoit(undertheTemporaryCrisisandTransitionFramework,seeTagliapietraet12023)attempttolocalisemanufacturingofgoodsconsideredcritical,whichispartiallyjustifiedbytheneedforeconomicresilience
42、.Suchpolicyshiftsasaresultofthepandemicwilllikelyleadtoalastingchangeinglobalsupplychains,especiallygiventhefurtherimpetustosuchpoliciesstemmingfromRussiasinvasionOfUkraine.3TheRussianinvasionofUkraineRussia,sfull-scaleinvasionofUkrainestartingon24February2022cameduringaperiodofelevatedcommoditypric
43、esandcausedrecordpricespikesincommoditymarketsforenergyandagriculturalgoods.However,theeconomicfallouthaduneveneffectsacrosscountries.ThosewithlargedependenciesonRussianorUkrainiancommoditiesandwithfewreadilyavailablesubstitutesexperiencedlargershocksthanthosewithmorediversifiedsupplychains.Thiswasp
44、articularlynotableforinfrastructurallyconcentratedsupplychains,suchaspipelinegastotheEU.Theinvasionexposedthesemajorsupplychainrisksandhasbeeninstrumentalincausingashiftoftoneinthepolicydebatearoundtheriskstoglobalsupplychains,compoundingsimilarbutnascentrhetoricduringthepandemic.Thisincludestrepida
45、tionaboutotherpotentialchokepointsinglobalSU叩Iychains,tradediversificationandinfrastructuralinvestment,andageneralflurryofdiscourseandpolicyrelatedtotheideaofstrategicautonomy.Inthissection,weexplorehowtheshockplayedoutinregionsthatwereexposedduetohigh-risksupplychains.Wearguethattheinvasionwasaloca
46、lshock,sinceshockswerenotsointenseinareaswithmorediversifiedsupplychains.Wealsoanalysetheensuingpolicyresponse.3.1 EnergyshockPriortotheinvasion,EuropewasdependentonRussiaforasignificantproportionofitsenergyneeds.In2021,importsofRussiangasaccountedforalmost40percentoftheEU,stotalgasconsumptionSeeIEA
47、pressreleaseof3March2022,iHowEuropecancutnaturalgasimportsfromRussiasignificantlywithinayear-News,InternationalEnergyAgency,Significantlwwithirbawear.AlmostalloftheEU,sgaswasdeliveredthroughonlyfourpipelinesfromRussia:NordStream,UkraineTransit,YamalandTurkstream(Zachmannetal,2024).Thisrepresentedasi
48、gnificantstakeintheEU,senergyinfrastructure,whichprovedtobeanmajorsystemicrisk.Priortotheinvasion,theEUwasalreadyexperiencinganenergycrisisinthesecondhalfof2021becauseofincreasedgasdemandfollowingthere-openingofeconomiespost-COVID-19SeeCounciloftheEU,Tnergypricesandsecurityofsupply*,andsecuritofsupD
49、ly/,.TheRussianaggressionseverelycompoundedthecrisis,causingrecordenergyprices.Naturalgaspricesreachedhistorichighs(Figure5)inthesummerof2022becauseofthereductioninsupplyfromRussia,fearsofshortages,generaluncertaintyandlowoutputfromhydroandnuclearelectricityoutputinthesummer(McWilliamsetal,2022;GilTertreetal,2023).Thisledtoincreasedwholesaleelect
