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1、INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDIMFCountryReportNo.24/16THEGAMBIASelectedissuesJanuary2024ThispaperonTheGambiawaspreparedbyastaffteamoftheInternationalMonetaryFundasbackgrounddocumentationfortheperiodicconsultationwiththemembercountry.ItisbasedontheinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonDecember18,2
2、023.CopiesofthisreportareavailabletothepublicfromInternationalMonetaryFundPublicationServicesPOBox92780Washington,D.C.20090Telephone:(202)623-7430Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:Dublicationsimf.orgWeb:Price:$18.00perprintedcopyInternationalMonetaryFundWashington,D.C.2024InternationalMonetaryFundDecember18,2
3、023INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDTHEGAMBIASE1.ECTEDISSUESApprovedByAfricanDepartmentPreparedbytheIMFGambiaTeamCONTENTSTHEGAMBIA:DOMES11CANDEXTERNA1.DRIVERSOFINF1.ABON3A. 1.iteratureReview3B. StylizedFacts4C. EmpiricalAnalysis6HGURES1. HeadlineInflationandDrivers52. InflationandMonetaryPolicyRates63. Exc
4、hangeRatePass-ThroughtoInflation9TAB1.ES1. O1.SRegressionsofInflationandItsDeterminants92. ADFUnitRootTests103. BoundsTestforCointegrationinNon-1.inearSpecification104. NARD1.EstimationResultsforthe1.ong-RunCointegratingVector115. NARD1.EstimationResultsfortheParsimoniousModel11References12THEGAMBIA
5、:C1.IMATECHANGEVU1.NERABI1.ITIESANDSTRATEGIES14A. VulnerabilitiestoClimateHazards14B. ClimateStrategyandPlanning16C. EmissionsandMitigation18D. Adaptation19E. ClimateFinancing21F. PublicFinanceManagement22G. Conclusion23FIGURES1. TotalNumberofNaturalDisasters142. Economic1.ossinTheGambiaAfterNatural
6、Disasters,1990-2023153. AgricultureandFoodVulnerabilityIndicators164. CerealYield165. GHGEmission:TotalBaselineandMitigationScenario2010-2030176. KayaIdentityinTheGambia187. GHGEmissionsbySectorinTheGambia188. Accessto日ectricityandCleanFuels199. AirPollution:WelfareCostsofPrematureMortalitiesfromExp
7、osuretoAmbientPM2.5,GDPEquivalent1910. Adaptation,SDGandAgriculture2111. FertilizerConsumption2112. InvestmentinAdaptationtoClimateChangeNeedsandAidFlows21TAB1.E1.SelectedClimateFinancingAnnouncedin2022-202322References24THEGAMBIA:MACROECONOMICANDDISTRIBUTIONA1.IMP1.ICATIONSOFGENDERGAPS25A. Backgrou
8、nd25B. ModelingandEmpiricalAnalysis28C. ConclusionsandPolicyRecommendations30FIGURES1. GenderInequaIityIndicators,2021262. ImpactofHigherCostofFood283. GainsfromtheSimulations304. WomenEmploymentStatus325. FinancialAccessStrandbyGender326. PerceptionofWomenOwnershipandGovernance32TAB1.ES1.ImpactofHi
9、gherCostofFood282.DeterminantsofPovertyandConsumption33References34THEGAMBIA:DOMESTICANDEXTERNA1.DRIVERSOFINF1.ATIONPreparedbyJean-ClaudeNachegazGlenKwende,1.aurentKemoe,andFidelMarquezBarroeta.TheauthorswouldliketothankAndreaManeraforhelpfulcommentsanddiscussions.ThispaperinvestigatesthedriversOfhe
10、adlineinflationandthedegreeofexchangeratepassthrough(ERPT)inTheGambiaovertheperiod2014-2023.Theanalysishighlightsthedecisivelong-termrolesofglobalpricesofcommodities(food,oilandfertilizer),theexchangerate,andthedomesticoutputgap.Theshort-rundynamicsofinflationpointstotherolesofglobalfoodpriceandthes
11、econd-roundeffectsofchangesinfoodpricesandtheoutputgap.Monetarypolicyhasthepotentialtotameinflationintheshortrunprovidedthemonetarypolicyrateisadjustedrapidlyandboldly.1.astly,thereisevidenceofanasymmetricERPTtodomesticprices,andthesizeOfcurrencydepreciationmattersforinflationdynamics.A. 1.iterature
12、Review1. Thereisawealthoftheoreticalandempiricalliteratureonthesourcesofinflationindevelopingcountries.Demand-pullfactors,externalfactors,and/orcost-push/inertialfactorshavereceivedmoreattentioninexplainingthedynamicsofinflationinspecificcountriesorgroupsofcountries.Demand-pullfactorshavebeenemphasi
13、zedbytwotheoriesofinflation.First,fiscal-monetarydoctrinesofinflation,alsoknownasthewfiscalviewofinflation,stressthatinflationiscausedbyfiscalimbalances.Persistentfiscaldeficitsandhighpublicdebtleadtohighinflationbytriggeringexcessaggregatedemand,directlyorultimately,througheitherhighermoneygrowth(a
14、sinSargentandWallace(1981),s,fiscaldominancewhypothesisofmonetarypolicy)orperceivedwealtheffectsandlackofconfidencebythepublicinfiscalsolvency(asinthel,fiscaltheoryofthepricelevel0;see1.eeper,1991;Woodford,1995;andSims,1994).Underthefiscaltheoryofpricelevel,higherbond-financeddeficitsleadtohigherequ
15、ilibriumpricelevelthroughtheireffectsonprivatesectorwealthandaggregatedemand,whereasmoneyplaysno(oralesser)role.Second,theoutputgapmodel,alsoknownasthePhilippscurveframework(Philips,1958;SamuelsonandSolow,1960),istheotherdemand-pulltheoryofinflation.Positive(negative)outputgaps,i.e.,thedifferencesbe
16、tweenactualandpotentialoutput,reflectanexcess(deficient)levelofeconomicactivityoverpotentialoutput,i.e.,anoverheated(underheated)economy,andhencerising(falling)inflation.2. Externalfactorsincludemovementsinexchangerates,thepricesofimportedfoodandenergyproducts,theglobaloutputgap,andremittanceinflows
17、.The/,balanceofpaymentsview“emphasizestheinflationaryroleofcurrencydepreciationincountriessubjecttolargeexternalshocks(Montiel1989).Currencydeprecationaffectsdomesticinflationdirectlybychangingthepriceofimportsindomesticcurrency(first-roundeffect)andindirectly(dependingonhowthisinitialshockistransmi
18、ttedtoothersectors)throughchangesincostsandinflationexpectations(second-roundeffects).IncreasesininternationaloilpricescausejumpsintheCP1.directlythroughthepresenceofoilproductsintheconsumerbasketandindirectlythroughtheeffectsonthemarginalcostsofproductionofdomesticfirms.Ifexchangeratesareflexible,t
19、herewillbeacurrencydepreciation(giventhehigheroilimportbill),whichwillfeedbackintotheCPI.Astoglobalfoodprices,theyaremorecloselycorrelated(thanoilprices)withheadlineCPIinEMDEsgiventhelargeweightoffoodinhouseholds,consumption(CataoandChang,2015).Foranetfoodimporter,higherglobalfoodpricesleadtonominal
20、currencydepreciation(giventhehigherimportbill)andsecond-roundeffectsonwagesandpricesofothergoods.1.astly,remittancesareanimportantexternalfactorwithpotentialaggregatedemandandinflationaryeffectsinEMDEs;see,forinstance,Chamiandothers(2006)andBall,1.opez,andReyes(2013).3. Cost-pushandinertialfactorsin
21、cludeexogenousdomesticfoodpriceandwageshocks,andbackward-lookingindexationmechanisms.Exogenousdomesticfoodpriceandwageshocksleadtoinflationifmonetarypolicyisaccommodative.1.ikewise,backward-lookingindexationmechanisms,wherebycurrentwagesareadjustedtolaggedinflation,mayrenderinflationstronglypersiste
22、ntandincreasethecostofdisinflation(DornbuschandFischer,1993;BlanchardandGalir2007).4. EmpiricalresearchconfirmstheroleofbothdomesticandexternalfactorsforinflationdynamicsinEMDEs.See,forinstance,CoeandMcDermott(1997),1.ounganiandSwagel(2001),BarnichonandPeiris(2008),Nguyenetal.(2017),andBaldiniandPop
23、lawski-Ribeiro(2011)forstudiesfocusingon1.ICsandAfrica.ArecentcomprehensivestudybyHa,Ivanova,MontielzandPedroni(2019)highlightsthesizableroleglobalfactorsplayindrivinginflationin1.ICs.Theirmainfindingsareasfollows.First,althoughUCinflationhasdeclinedsharplysincethemid-1990s,thelevelandvolatilityofhe
24、adlineinflationhaveremainedabovethoseinAEs.Second,coreinflationin1.ICswasmoresusceptibletoexternalshocksinparticular,toglobalcore,food,andenergypricesthanintheothercountrygroups.Aroundofthevariationindomesticcoreinflationratesamong1.ICswasaccountedforbyexternalinflationshocks,andverylittlebyshocksto
25、domesticcoreinflation.Globalfoodandenergypriceshocksaccountforanother13percentofcoreinflationvariationin1.ICs50percentmorethaninAEsand20percentmorethaninnon-1.ICEMDEs.Third,domesticcharacteristicsappeartomatterfordeterminingtheresponsivenessofinflationtoexternalshocks.Fourth,ERPTtocoreinflationin1.I
26、Csismuchlargerthanfortheothercountrygroups.B. StylizedFacts5. StylizedfactsandthelimitedstudiesonTheGambiapointtotheroleofbothdomesticandexternaldriversforinflationdynamics.Alagidede,Coleman,andCuestas(2012)findthatGambia,sinflationispersistentdespitebeingmeanreverting.Figure1suggestspotentiallinkso
27、fdomesticinflationwithglobalfoodandfertilizer(phosphate)prices,currencydepreciation,andthedomesticoutputgap.TheGambiaisindeedanetimporterofessentialfoodsandenergy.Theweightoffooditemsandnon-alcoholicbeveragesinTheGambiasCPIbasketisaround50percentexplainingtheco-movementbetweenglobalfoodinflationandh
28、eadlineinflationinTheGambia.Unlikeinternationalfoodprices,however,thetransmissionofmovementsininternationalenergypricesintodomesticpricesissomewhatcomplex,asthepricesoffuelproducts(andtransportservices)arehighlyadministeredinTheGambia.Theco-movementbetweencurrencydepreciationanddomesticinflation,whi
29、chisalsoimpactedbythehighdependenceonimports,appearsstrongeroverthemostrecentperiod.Finally,thereappearstobesomeco-movementbetweenheadlineinflationandthedomesticoutputgap,withthelatterabletocapturetheimpactoffiscalandmonetarypoliciesorremittances,akeydeterminantofprivateconsumptionandinvestmentinThe
30、Gambia.Figure1.HeadlineInflationandDriversfrcw，3.C2IZAON*s6hS.VDs.1.l1.QN5.ozs.uCNzzz，UerIEeWvofW6I,一nf8I,dsJZI,ON41，Uer-911.ewS工W7寸二nrml,das/?ON?Uer2015105O一Inflation(y-o-y;leftscale)-Currencydepreciation(y-o-y;rightscale)Inflation(leftscale)Phosphatefertilizerprice(rightscale)IZdOSTZ1.WOzdos6Ids2.
31、ufl2s.ufl9T，d电S9二eH.s.S.U6. Headlineinflationincreasedin2021-2022butmonetarypolicyhaslaggedtheriseindomesticinflation.AsshowninFigure2,inflationstartedtoriseinQl2021andaftertheeruptionoftheRussianwarinUkraineinMarch2022,inflationacceleratedinQ22022.However,monetarypolicywasslowtoreact,withtheCBGkeep
32、ingthepolicyrateat10percent-alevelreachedinMarch2020duringthedeflationaryshockoftheCOVID19pandemic-untilMay31,2022,whentheMonetaryPolicyCommitteeraisedthepolicyrateto11percent.Moreimportantly,themagnitudeofthatadjustmentinthepolicyrateandthosethatfollowedwerelimited,suchthatthepolicyrateinrealtermsf
33、ellintonegativeterritoryasofQ22022.FromJune2022toJune2023ztherealpolicyratewasonaveragenegative0.9percent.Figure2.InflationandMonetaryPolicyRates9rSl,ONSI1.ewn,fmON?ZlfII,ON8I,rSiozOZrIZON一Inflation(y-o-y)RealmonetarypolicyrateNominalmonetarypolicyrateSources:GambianauthoritiesandIMFstaffestimates.C
34、.EmpiricalAnalysis7. WeperformthreetypesofeconometricmodelingtostudythedriversanddynamicsofinflationinTheGambia.First,weperformordinaryleastsquares(O1.S)regressionsandquantileregressionsusingdataoninflationanditspotentialdomesticandexternaldriversovertheperiod2011-2023.Second,tofurtherinvestigatethe
35、long-andshort-termdeterminantsofinflation,weperformnon-linearcointegrationanalysisanderror-correctionmodellingusingthenon-linearautoregressivedistributedlag(NARD1.)boundstestingprocedure.Pesaran,Shin,andSmith(2001)andShin,YufandGreenwood-Nimmo(2014).Third,werunlocalprojectionmodels(Jorda,2005)undert
36、hreescenariostogeneratethedynamiccumulativeresponseofdomesticpricestoexchange-ratemovements.8. O1.SresultssuggestinflationinTheGambiaishighlypersistent,impactedSigrdficantlybycurrencydepreciation,aswellasglobalfoodandfertilizerinflation,butonlymarginallybythedomesticoutputgap(TableI).ThepreferredO1.
37、Sregressionisasfollow:Inflation=constantterm+al*laggedinflation+a2*outputgap+a3*globalfoodinflation+a4*global(phosphate,potassium,andnitrogen)fertilizerinflation+aS*rateofchangeinthemonetarypolicyrate+a6*squaredrateofchangeinthemonetarypolicyrate+s11*currencydepreciation(y-o-y)+errorterm.First,infla
38、tionappearstobehighlypersistent,withthecoefficientsofthefirstandfourthlagsofinflationhighlysignificant,andtheirsumnotstatisticallydifferentfromunity.Thisresultissuggestiveoftheexistenceofinertialfactors.Second,thecoefficientofthedomesticoutputgapisnotsignificant;however,aquantileregression(withthequ
39、antilesetat80percent)ofourpreferredmodelshowsapositiveandstatisticallysignificantcoefficientofthedomesticoutputgapatthe10percentlevel,suggestingthattheoutputgapmattersathighlevelsofinflation.Third,currencydepreciationandpotassiumfertilizerpriceinflation(bothatlagone)aswellasphosphatefertilizerpricei
40、nflation(withlagtwo)impactinflationpositivelyandsignificantly.TheO1.Scoefficientofthefertilizernitrogeninflation(withlagone)issignificantbutwithanegativesign.However,underthequantileregression(withthequantilesetat80percent)ofourpreferredmodel,itisnolongerstatisticallysignificant.Also,thefertilizerph
41、osphateinflation(withlagtwo)isnotstatisticallyunderthequantileregression(withthentausetat80percent),suggestingthatinperiodsofhighinflation,onlythefertilizerpotassiuminflation(withlagone)mattersforinflationinTheGambia.Fourth,thecombinedeffectoftherateofchangeofthepolicyrateanditssquareisnegativeandst
42、atisticallysignificant,suggestingthatmonetarypolicyinTheGambia,withsufficientlymorerapidadjustmentsinthenominalpolicyrate,ispotentiallyeffectiveintaminghighinflation.9. Non-Iinearco-integrationanalysishighlightsthedecisivelong-termrolesofglobalfoodprices,theexchangerate,andthedomesticoutputgap.Based
43、onunitroottestresults(Table2)lheadlineinflation,globalfoodprices,thedalasiperUSdollarexchangerate,andthedomesticoutputgaparefirst-differencestationaryandthereforewecantestforco-integrationintheNARD1.framework.Non-Iinearcointegrationbetweeninflationanditsthreedeterminantsisconfirmedatthe1percentlevel
44、overtheperiod2014Q1-2023Q1(Table3).Inthelongrun,inflationisthereforemainlydrivenbyworldfoodprices,theexchangerate,andtheoutputgap,withsignificantasymmetricinflationaryeffectsforthelattertwovariables(Table4).WestartedwiththelinearARD1.modelbutfoundnoevidenceofcointegration,possiblyduetotheexistenceof
45、anon-linearrelationshipamongthevariables.Thenon-linearARD1.approachconfirmedcointegrationamonginflation,globalfoodprices,theexchangerate,andtheoutputgap(Table3).Thereappearednumericallysomeevidenceofasymmetricinflationaryeffectsfromallthreeregressors.(Thelong-runcoefficientsofpositiveandnegativechan
46、gesofthefoodpriceswere0.075(significantat1percentcriticallevel)and0.035(notsignificantatconventionalcriticallevels),respectively.Thus,a10percentincreaseinthefoodpriceindexcausesariseof0.75percentagepointsinthequarterlyrateofinflation,butadecreaseinthefoodpriceindexdoesnotnecessarilyinduceareductioni
47、ndomesticinflation.)Nonetheless,aformalsymmetrytestforthelong-runcoefficientsofpositiveandnegativechangesoffoodpriceswasnotstatisticallyrejected,butsymmetrywasrejectednotonlyforthepositiveandnegativecoefficientsoftheexchangeratebutalsoforthepositiveandnegativecoefficientsoftheoutputgap.Inotherwords,theasymmetricinflationaryeffectsoftheexchangerateandtheoutputgapwerestatisticallystronger.First,anincreaseinglobalfoodpricesof10percentleadstoanincreaseof0.8percentagepointsinthequarterlyrateofinflation.Thismagnitudeisreasonablesinceitsequivalenttoanincreaseof3.4percentagepointsintheannualize
