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1、NBERWORKINGPAPERSERIESMOBI1.EMONEY,INTEROPERABI1.ITY,ANDFINANCIA1.INC1.USIONMarkusK.BrunnermeierNicola1.imodio1.orenzoSpadavecchiaWorkingPaper31696NATIONA1.BUREAUOFECONOMICRESEARCH1050MassachusettsAvenueCambridge,MA02138September2023ThispaperhasbenefittedfromdiscussionswithandthesuggestionsofJosephA
2、badi,JennyAker,FrancisAnnan,AndrewAtkeson,TaniaBabina,OrianaBandiera,Jean-PierreBenoit,MiloBianchi,MatthieuBouvard,EmilyBreza,KonradBurchardi,DanielTimothyChen,JonathandeQuidt,MitchellDowney,JoshuaGans,AlessandroGavazza,Jean-Pierre1.andau,RoccoMacchiavello,CesaireMeh,NikitaMelnikov,SteliosMichalopou
3、los,DonNoh,EliasPapaioannou,PaoloPinotti,HeleneRey,EmmaRiley,NicolasSerrano-Velarde,TavneetSuri,TommasoVallettiandseminarparticipantsatBocconiUniversity,CornellUniversity-CharlesH.DysonSchool,HalleInstituteforEconomicResearch,InstituteforInternationalEconomicStudies,1.ondonBusinessSchool,OxfordUnive
4、rsity-SaidBusinessSchool,NBERSI2023DigitalEconomicsandAI,2ndWEFIDEVCEPRWorkshopinFinanceandDevelopment,46thBREAD&MITConferenceandotherconferences,seminarsandworkshops.EdoardoCattaneo,CamillaCherubini,IlariaDalBarco,DanieleGoffi,FalilouKebe,HannahMorenoandBeatriceRomagnoloprovidedexcellentresearchass
5、istance.Allerrorsareourown.TheviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch.Atleastoneco-authorhasdisclosedadditionalrelationshipsofpotentialrelevanceforthisresearch.FurtherinformationisavailableonlineatNBERworkingpapersarecirculatedf
6、ordiscussionandcommentpurposes.Theyhavenotbeenpeer-reviewedorbeensubjecttothereviewbytheNBERBoardofDirectorsthataccompaniesofficialNBERpublications.2023byMarkusK.Brunnermeier,Nicola1.imodio,and1.orenzoSpadavecchia.Allrightsreserved.Shortsectionsoftext,nottoexceedtwoparagraphs,maybequotedwithoutexpli
7、citpermissionprovidedthatfullcredit,includingnotice,isgiventothesource.MobileMoney,Interoperability,andFinancialInclusionMarkusK.Brunnermeier,Nicola1.imodio,and1.orenzoSpadavecchiaNBERWorkingPaperNo.31696September2023JE1.No.E4,016,030ABSTRACTThispaperinvestigatesthetradeoffbetweencompetitionandfinan
8、cialinclusionresultingfromtheverticalintegrationbetweenmobilenetworkandmoneyoperators.JoiningnewlyassembleddataonmobilemoneyfeesthroughtheWayBackmachine,withsourcesonnetworkcoverageandfinancials,weexaminethestaggeringacrossAfricanoperatorsandcountriesofplatforminteroperability-apolicythatpromotestra
9、nsactionsandcompetitionacrossmobilemoneyoperators.Ourresultsshowthatinteroperabilitybenefitsusersbyloweringmobilemoneyfeesandtheirdispersionacrossoperators.However,thesepositiveeffectsareoffsetbyadecreaseinmobiletowersandnetworkcoverage,especiallyinruralandpoordistricts,which,inturn,leadstoalowerfin
10、ancialinclusion.Wenotethatcombininginteroperabilitywithsubsidiesforruraltelecommunicationsdeliverslowerfeeswithouthurtingcoverage.1.orenzoSpadavecchiaBocconiUniversityVialeBligny,12Milan20139Italylorenzo.spadavecchiaunibocconi.itMarkusK.BrunnenneierPrincetonUniversityDepartmentofEconomicsBendheimCen
11、terforFinancePrinceton,NJ08544andCEPRandalsoNBERmarkusprinceton.eduNicola1.imodioBocconiUniversityViaRoentgen,1Milan20136Italynicola.limodio1 IntroductionMobilemoneyhasemergedasoneofthemostwidespreaddigitalpaymentsystems(Demirguc-Kuntetal.,2018).Itsdiffusionresultedintangiblechangesinvariouseconomic
12、andfinancialindicatorslikerisk-sharing(JackandSuri(2011);Blumenstocketal.(2016),remittances(Riley(2018);Akeretal.(2020),lending(Surietal.,2021)andsavings(Brezaetal.,2022),amongothers.Despitethesesignificantdevelopments,researchonthefunctioningandregulationofthecorrespondingfinancialinstitution,themo
13、bilemoneycompany,remainslimited.Thispaperinvestigatestheroleofcompetitiononthebehaviourofmobilemoneycompaniesanditscorrespondingeffectsonfinancialinclusion.Specifically,Weexaminetheeffectsofacompetition-promotingpolicy,platforminteroperability,whichfacilitatestransactionsbetweenusersofdifferentmobil
14、emoneyoperators.Bymitigatingthebarrierstoexchangepayments,thisregulatoryinterventioncanimpacttheprofitmarginsofmobilemoneyoperatorsandinfluencetheirpricing,network,andinfrastructureinvestment.Ourpaperproposesconceptuallyandexploresempiricallyanoveltradeoffbetweencompetitionandfinancialinclusioninthe
15、contextofmobilemoney.Itiscrucialfirsttointroducethetypicalstructureofthismarket,whichcomprisestwomainplayers:mobilenetworkcompaniesthatofferphoneandinternetservices;andmobilemoneycompaniesthatfocusonpaymentexchanges.Typically,thesetwoactorsareverticallyintegratedasdiscussedbyBourreauandValletti(2015
16、),whichcreatesalimitedcompetitiveenvironment(Williamson(1979);GrossmanandHart(1986);Hartetal.(1990)andresultsinhigherfeeschargedtomobilemoneyusers.Atthesametime,thislackofcompetitionmayalsoprovideincentivesformobilenetworkcompaniestoextendtheirreachtounderservedlocations,enhancingfinancialinclusion.
17、Consequently,lowlevelsofcompetitionmayincreasethesizeofthemobilenetwork,whichmaybelabelledastheextensivemarginoffinancialinclusion.Nonetheless,thisscenariomayharmthepoorestuserswithincoveredareasduetohightransactionfees,whichweakenstheintensivemarginofinclusion.Toguideourempiricalanalysis,webuildaco
18、mpacttheoreticalframeworkinspiredbytheworkof1.affontetal.(1997)andBianchietal.(2022).Thesepapersexaminerespectivelytheroleofcompetitioninthetelecommunicationmarketandthemechanicsofinteroperabilityinmobilemoney.Ourcontributionliesinintroducingthemarginofinfrastructureviatowerinstallation.Weshowthatin
19、teroperabilitybreaksthepossibilityforplatformstoexercisemonopolypowerbyinducingcompetitiononfees.Atthesametime,thisreductionintheprofitmarginofthemobilempanyleadstoadeclineintowerinstallationandnetworkprovision.Onecentralaspectofthispaperistheroleofmobilenetworktowers.Wemodelthisviathetowerinfrastru
20、cturethatmoveswitheconomicincentivesandisnotnecessarilyfixedandunresponsivetotheunderlyingeconomiccharacteristics.Thisassumption,whichwevalidateempirically,isinspiredbythemarketstructureofmobiletowersinAfrica,whichWedescribeindetailinSection2.3.Inshort,mobiletowersinAfricapresenthighvariablecostsgiv
21、enthatmostaredisconnectedfromelectricityandpoweredthroughexpensivepower-generatingcommodities,suchasdieselfuel.Thiscoststructureimpliesthatcompaniesrespondbyreducingtheirtowernetworkinresponsetoanegativeshocktomobilerevenue,sincetowersinthissettingarenotasunkcost.Theempiricalchallengeistoidentifyaso
22、urceofquasi-experimentalvariation,whichincreasesthecompetitionbetweenmobilemoneycompaniesandaffectstheextentofthemoney-phoneintegration.Todothis,weexploitauniquenaturalexperimenttakingplaceinAfrica:thestaggeredintroductionofinteroperabilityacrossoperatorsandcountriesthathasbeentakingplacebetween2010
23、and2020.Inthiscontext,interoperabilityisapolicythatinducesmobilemoneycompaniestopermitandfacilitatetheexchangeofpaymentswithmobilemoneyusersthatoperateonadifferentplatform.Theintroductionofinteroperabilitydoesnotappeartoberelatedtospecificconditionsofthemobilemoneyindustry.Itisinsteadareforminitiate
24、dbythecentralbank,whichexpandsthecountryinfrastructureofpaymentsystemsinvolvingbanks,merchantsandcorrespondinglymobileoperators.ThisfactisdocumentedinthepaperappendixandvalidatedbythepresenceOfbalancedeconomiccharacteristicsinourcountrysampleandparalleltrendsinthepre-periodacrossourempiricalspecific
25、ations.Wecombinethissourceofvariationwithnumerousnoveldatasets.Ourinnovativecontributionintermsofdataistoconstructapaneldatasetonmobilemoneyfeespercompany,whichcovers129operatorsacross42countriesinAfricafrom2010onward.Buildingthisdatawasparticularlychallenging,sincethisinformationisnotpubliclyavaila
26、bleandretrospectivesurveysaskingusersforfeestendtobeinaccurate.Toaddressthesegaps,weusedthewWaybackMachine：anonlinearchivethatroutinelyscansmostwebsitesandtakesscreenshotsoftheirpages.Wedigitizedthisinformationandcreatedthepanel,whichrevealssomeoriginaldescriptivefindingsonthefunctioningofthismarket
27、.MobilemoneyfeesinAfricaarehighandpenalizesmalltransactions,whicharegenerallyusedmoreextensivelybypoorerpeople(Yaoetal.,2022).Theaveragecostofsendingatransfertoanotheruseronthesamemobilemoneycompanyaccountsforanaverageof4%ofthetotal,iftheuserhasadifferentcompanythisfeelevitatesat10%.Aspresentedinthe
28、paper,smallpaymentsareparticularlyhitbyhighfees,whichexceed30%ofthetransferredamountforamountsplacedinthesmallestbrackets.Beyondtheirlevel,feesarealsohighlydispersedacrossoperators,withsmallpaymentsexhibitingthemostintensevariation.,Inevaluatingfees,werefertothenominalcostofatransaction,whichinthiss
29、ettingtranscendsfromTojoinameasureofpriceswithquantitiesandnetwork,WepartneredwiththeGSMAssociation(GSMA),theleadingorganisationgroupingmobiletelecommunicationsoperatorstoaccessvariousdatasetsonmobilenetworkcompanies.First,weemploydataonthesecond-generationcellularnetworktechnology(alsoreferredtoas2
30、G)usedformobilemoneytransactionsacrosstheentireAfricancontinentthroughrastersof250250meters,containinginformationonthepresenceofmobilesignalandnumberofcompaniesoperating.ThisinformationisthenaggregatedatthedistrictlevelforallcountriesinAfrica,usingmapsfromtheDatabaseofGlobalAdministrativeAreas(GADM)
31、.Second,wereceivedaccesstoasourceofoperator-specificinformationonfinancialsaswellasotherstatistics(towers,marketpenetration,priceforotherservices).Inaddition,weusetheWorldBankGlobalFindexSurveyandIMFFinancialAccessSurveytoshedadditionallightontheeffectsofinteroperabilityonfinancialinclusion.Ourresul
32、tsvalidatetheexistenceofatradeoffbetweenfinancialinclusionandcompetition.Intermsofprices,aneventstudysettingshowsthatthefeesofcompaniesoperatingindifferentcountrieslieonparalleltrendspriortotheintroductionofinteroperabilityandsharplyfallthereafter.Adifference-in-differencespecificationquantifiesthed
33、eclineinfeesafterinteroperabilitytobeat0.3percentagepointsforon-networktransactions,whicharetransactionsbetweenusersonthesamenetwork(20%ofthemean)andat1.3percentagepointscross-networktransactions,whicharetransactionsbetweenusersacrossthedifferentnetworks(35%ofthemean).Thisdeclineisalmostentirelyduet
34、osmallpaymentsthatbecomesubstantiallycheaper,withfeesfallingby20%foron-networktransactionsandmorethan45%forcross-networkones.Atthesametime,Weshowthatthedispersionofmobilemoneyfeesdropsbymorethan50%withtheintroductionofinteroperability,withsmallpaymentspresentingthestrongestdecline.Weexploitthegranul
35、arityofourdataandtheabilitytomeasurethenetworkcoverageforeachoperatoracrossmultipledistrictstostudytheimpactofinteroperabilityattheoperator-districtlevel.Wedocumentthatinteroperabilityinducesanoveralldeclineincoverageandprobabilitythatadistrictiscoveredbyacompany.Theseresultsareconfirmedbyadifferent
36、datasetonoperatorsandtheiryearlyfinancials.Companiesoperatingincountrieswhereinteroperabilitywasimplementedexperiencedadeclineof18%inshareofpopulationcovered,22%inmarketpenetration,29%inrevenueand12%inthenumberoftowers.Theprofitsofmobilenetworkcompaniesseemtobenegativelyaffectedaswell,thoughtheestim
37、atesareimprecise.Inadditiontothisevidenceattheoperator-districtlevel,wealsopresentresultsregardingnetworkavailabilitywithindistrictstounderstandtheoveralleffectsofthispolicy.Wefindthatthearrivalofinteroperabilitylowersvariousmeasuresofnetworkcoverage.Inallcases,wepresenteventstudyspecificationsshowi
38、ngtheexistenceofparalleltrendsmisconductsoffinancialintermediaries,whomayoverchargespecificdemographicsbeyondthenominalexpensesasnotedbyAnnan(2022).beforethetreatmentanduseadifference-in-differencespecificationtoquantifytheaverageeffects.Wefindthatdistrictsincountriesthatintroduceinteroperabilityexp
39、eriencea5%dropintheshareofthedistrictveredbymobilenetworkcoverage(almost8%ofthemean),a3.4%declineintheprobabilityofpresentinganycoverage(4%ofthemean)anda19%lowernumberofmobilenetworkcompaniesoperatinginthegeographicunit.Furthermore,districtsthatmaypresenthighex-antecostsoftowerinstallationandtherefo
40、rebemarginalformobilecompanies(rural,poorer)beforethepolicyaretheonespresentingthestrongesthit.Infact,therelativedeclineintheirtelecommunicationaccessisseverebothintermsofcoverageandthenumberofoperators.Thesefindingshighlightthatthelackofcompetitionanduntargetedregulationcanshapethegeographicaccesst
41、ogoodsandservices,bothfinancialandnon-financial,andpromotewithin-countryinequality(Alesinaetal.,2016).Toinvestigatetheeffectofinteroperabilityonfinancialinclusion,wetakeadvantageoftheGlobalFindexdatasetandfindthatindividualsincountriesintroducinginteroperabilityseeareductioninthelikelihoodofsendinga
42、ndreceivingremittances,andinthelikelihoodofsavingfortheirownbusinessactivity.Atthesametime,theIMFFASdatasetrevealsthatasinteroperabilityislaunched,countriesexperienceareductionintheaggregatenumberofmobilemoneytransactions,agentsandusers.Weshowthattheseeffectsaredrivenbythosecountrieswithastrongerpre
43、-existentmobilemoneynetwork:theseresultscanbeseenastheconsequencesofareductioninmobilenetworkcoveragebothattheextensivemargin(i.e.intermsofgeographicaloutreach)andtheintensivemargin(i.e.intermsofsignalquality)followingtheintroductionofinteroperability.WefurthervalidateourresultsusingalsodatafromtheD
44、HSsurveys.Intermsofpolicyimplications,ourstudyfocusesonasourceofmarketimperfectionbehindthecompetition-inclusiontradeoff:theprevalenceofuniformpricingacrossdifferentlocations.Asdiscussedby(DellaVignaandGentzkow,2019),itiscommonforbusinessestoapplyuniformornearly-uniformpricesacrossvariouslocations,r
45、egardlessofthelocaldemographiccharacteristicsandcompetitivelandscape.Whilesuchpricingschememaybegoodsinceitpotentiallyalleviateseconomicdifferencesbetweengroupscoexistinginthesamecountry(Alesinaetal.,2016),italsopresentssomesignificantsideeffects.Infact,ifmobilecompanieswereabletodiscriminatetheirfe
46、esbasedonthelocalstofprovidingconnectionservices,increasedcompetitionwouldreducemark-upswithoutaffectingserviceprovision.Althoughsuchmechanismsofpricediscriminationdonotexistintelecommunications,neitherinAfricanorelsewhere,wedrawacloseanalogyfromapolicythatcreatesdefactoheterogeneousfees:thepresence
47、ofsubsidiestopromoteruraltelecommunications.Thesepoliciesresultinpricediscriminationbetweenurbanandrurallocationsoncethesubsidyiscombinedwiththefee.Toinvestigatethisfurther,Wecollecteddataonpoliciesaimedatpromotingaccesstotelecommunicationservicesinremoteareasandnoteacrucialheterogeneityofourkeyfind
48、ingstothesepolicies.Ourempiricalresultsvalidatethatthecombinationofinteroperabilityandthesesubsidiespresentsapromisingopportunitytolowerfeesforuserswhilemaintainingthescaleofthemobilenetwork.Weconcludeourpaperwithasetoftherobustnesstestsofourresultsthroughdifferentapproaches.First,Weusethemethodsfor
49、dynamictreatmenteffectsineventstudiesWithheterogeneoustreatmenteffectsproposedbySunandAbraham(2021)andtheframeworkfordifference-in-differencesdesignswithstaggeredtreatmentadoptionandheterogeneouscausaleffectsproposedbyBorusyaketal.(2021).Second,wereplicateourmainresultsweightingforthedistrictpopulation,andalsousingalternativeclusteringmethodsforthestandarderrors.Inadditiontothis,Weexploreseveralothertests:forexample,weverifythattheintroductionofinteroperabilityd
