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1、巴菲特致伯克希尔公司股东的信 Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairmans Letter注：以下表格出现在伯克希尔印刷年度报告中董事长致股东的信的封面上。Berkshires Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500伯克希尔公司与标准普尔500指数业绩比较 Annual Percentage Change年度变化百分比(1)in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire in (2)S
2、&P 500 with Dividends Included (1)-(2)Relative ResultsYear (1) (2) (1)-(2)1965 . 23.8 10.0 13.81966 . 20.3 (11.7) 32.01967 . 11.0 30.9 (19.9)1968 . 19.0 11.0 8.01969 . 16.2 (8.4) 24.61970 . 12.0 3.9 8.11971 . 16.4 14.6 1.81972 . 21.7 18.9 2.81973 . 4.7 (14.8) 19.51974 . 5.5 (26.4) 31.91975 . 21.9 37
3、.2 (15.3)1976 . 59.3 23.6 35.71977 . 31.9 (7.4) 39.31978 . 24.0 6.4 17.61979 . 35.7 18.2 17.51980 . 19.3 32.3 (13.0)1981 . 31.4 (5.0) 36.41982 . 40.0 21.4 18.61983 . 32.3 22.4 9.91984 . 13.6 6.1 7.51985 . 48.2 31.6 16.61986 . 26.1 18.6 7.51987 . 19.5 5.1 14.41988 . 20.1 16.6 3.51989 . 44.4 31.7 12.7
4、1990 . 7.4 (3.1) 10.51991 . 39.6 30.5 9.11992 . 20.3 7.6 12.71993 . 14.3 10.1 4.21994 . 13.9 1.3 12.61995 . 43.1 37.6 5.51996 . 31.8 23.0 8.81997 . 34.1 33.4 0 .71998 . 48.3 28.6 19.71999 . 0.5 21.0 (20.5)2000 . 6.5 (9.1) 15.62001 . (6.2) (11.9) 5.72002 . 10.0 (22.1) 32.12003 . 21.0 28.7 (7.7)2004 .
5、 10.5 10.9 (0.4)2005 . 6.4 4.9 1.5Average Annual Gain 1965-2005 21.5 10.3 11.2Overall Gain 1964-2005 305,134 5,583年份 年度变化百分比 伯克希尔每股净资产(1) 包括红利在内的标准普尔500指数(2) 相对业绩(1)-(2) 1965 23.80 10.00 13.80 1966 20.30 -11.70 32.00 1967 11.00 30.90 -19.90 1968 19.00 11.00 8.00 1969 16.20 -8.40 24.60 1970 12.00 3.9
6、0 8.10 1971 16.40 14.60 1.80 1972 21.70 18.90 2.80 1973 4.70 -14.80 19.50 1974 5.50 -26.40 31.90 1975 21.90 37.20 -15.30 1976 59.30 23.60 35.70 1977 31.90 -7.40 39.30 1978 24.00 6.40 17.60 1979 35.70 18.20 17.50 1980 19.30 32.30 -13.00 1981 31.40 -5.00 36.40 1982 40.00 21.40 18.60 1983 32.30 22.40 9
7、.90 1984 13.60 6.10 7.50 1985 48.20 31.60 16.60 1986 26.10 18.60 7.50 1987 19.50 5.10 14.40 1988 20.10 16.60 3.50 1989 44.40 31.70 12.70 1990 7.40 -3.10 10.50 1991 39.60 30.50 9.10 1992 20.30 7.60 12.70 1993 14.30 10.10 4.20 1994 13.90 1.30 12.60 1995 43.10 37.60 5.50 1996 31.80 23.00 8.80 1997 34.1
8、0 33.40 0.70 1998 48.30 28.60 19.70 1999 0.50 21.00 -20.50 2000 6.50 -9.10 15.60 2001 -6.20 -11.90 5.70 2002 10.00 -22.10 32.10 2003 21.00 28.70 -7.70 2004 10.50 10.90 -0.40 2005 6.40 4.90 1.50 1965-2005年均收益率 21.50 10.30 11.20 1965-2005总收益率 305134 5583 Notes: 注：Data are for calendar years with these
9、 exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.日期为公历年份，其中例外如下：1965和1966年会计年度结束于9月30日。1967年包括15个月份，会计年度结束于12月31日。Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, whi
10、ch was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshires results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.从1979年开始，会计规则要求保险公司按照市价对所持有的权益类证券投资进行计价，而不是根据以前所要求的成本与市价孰低进行计价。在这张表中，伯克希尔1978年
11、的业绩已经根据变化后的规则重新编报。在所有其它方面，业绩根据最初报告的数据进行计算。The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500in years when that index showed
12、a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.标准普尔500指数的数据为税前收益，而伯克希尔的数据为税后收益。如果类似于伯克希尔的一家公司只是简单地持有标准普尔500指数，并相应计算应付税款，如果指数呈现正的收益那么这家公司数年之后的业绩将会落后于标准普尔500指数。
13、如果指数呈现负的收益那么这家公司数年之后的业绩将会领先于标准普尔500指数。经过数年之后，纳税成本将会导致公司的业绩显著落后于如果指数呈现正的收益那么这家公司数年之后的业绩将会落后于标准普尔500指数。 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our
14、Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.*12005年伯克希尔公司的净利润为56亿美元，每股A种股票和B股股票账面价值增长了6.4%。在过去的41年间，也就是说从目前的管理层接手以来，每股账面价值从19美元增长到59377美元，年复合增长率为21.5%。Berkshire h
15、ad a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss
16、from Katrina at $2.5 billion and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.2005年伯克希尔表现得相当不错。我们发起了5起并购，其中2起并购已经完成，而且我们下属的大多数业务经营良好。尽管卡特里娜飓风(Hurricane Katrina)让伯克希尔公司和整个保险行业遭受了创记录的巨大损失。我们估计卡特里娜飓风给我们造成的损失高达25亿美元，她的那些同样可恶的两个妹妹丽塔(Rita )和威尔玛( Wilma)飓风又让我们进一步损失了9亿美元。Credit GEICO a
17、nd its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely for our stellar insurance results in a disasterridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs
18、down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.在2005年这个巨灾之年我们的保险业务能够取得如此辉煌的业绩，应该归功GEICO及其杰出的首席执行官Tony N
19、icely。统计数据清楚地表明：在过去仅仅两年间，GEICO经营效率提高了32%。非常引人注目的是，保单数量增长了26%，收益大幅增长，而与此同时公司员工数量减少了4%。由于我们能够如此显著地降低单位成本，所以我们能为客户创造更多的价值。这样的结果如何呢？去年GEICO赢得了更多的市场份额，获得了令人称羡的盈利，并进一步提高了品牌的影响力。如果你2006年喜得龙子龙孙的话，建议你给他起名为Tony。* * * * * * * * * * * *My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to es
20、timate Berkshires intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an exp
21、lanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshires intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of
22、 most companies.我写这份报告的目的是为股东们估计伯克希尔的内在价值提供相应的信息。我之所以说是估计，是因为尽管计算内在价值在投资中为重中之重，但往往并不精确，且常常严重错误。公司业务的前景越是不确定，内在价值计算就越是可能谬之千里。(关于内在价值的有关解释，请参见公司年报的77-78页。)不过伯克希尔公司具有以下有利因素：种类众多的相对稳定的收入流，同时拥有巨大的流动性和很少的债务。这些因素使伯克希尔公司内在价值能够比其它绝大多数公司更为准确的进行估计。Yet if precision is aided by Berkshires financial characteristi
23、cs, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating an
24、d financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.尽管伯克希尔的财务特征有助于提高估值的准确程度，但计算内在价值的工作由于有如此之多的收入流而变得更加
25、复杂。早在1965年时，我们只有一个小小的纺织厂，估值不过是小菜一碟。如今我们拥有68种经营特性和财务特性相差很大的业务。这些各不相关的众多业务，加上我们巨大的投资规模，使你根本不可能简单地看看我们的合并报表就能对公司内在价值进行合理的估计。We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide
26、the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocatio
27、n improves or deteriorates when it is uder the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you wil
28、l have to answer for yourself. 为更好地解决这一难题，我们将我们的业务合理地分为四类，并在以下报告内容中详细分析每一类业务。在讨论中我们会提供每类业务及其主要企业的关键数据。当然，伯克希尔的总体价值可能会高于或低于四类业务价值之和。最终结果取决于两个因素，一是我们下属的众多部门作为一个更大企业的组成部分与母体相比运作得更好更是更差，二是在母公司的管理下资本配置进一步改善还是进一步恶化。简而言之，伯克希尔做为所有人为下属各个企业带来了什么好处，是不是伯克希尔公司的股东们直接持股而非通过伯克希尔间接持股能够更加有利？这是一个至关重要的问题，但各位股东必须自己寻找答案。
29、Before we look at our individual businesses, however, lets review two sets of figures that show where weve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments
30、held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:在我们讨论下属各个企业之前，让我们先看看两组数据，以弄清我们起点如何及现状如何。第一组数据是每股投资额(包括现金及现金等价物)。在进行计算时，我们将我们的金融企业持有的投资排除不计，因为这些投资大部分为债务所抵消。Year 年度 Per-Share Investments*每股投资额(美元)1965 . $ 41975 . 1591985 . 2,4071995 . 21,8172005 . $74,129Compound Growth Ra
31、te 1965-2005. 28.0%1965-2005复合增长率Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005. 13.0%1995-2005复合增长率*Net of minority interests(扣除少数股东权益)除了有价证券以外，除了我们下属保险企业持股少数例外，我们持有种类广泛的非保险企业。 以下是这些企业在扣除商誉摊销后的每股税前利润。In addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own
32、 a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:Year年度 Per-Share Earnings*每股利润1965 . $ 41975 . 41985 . 521995 . 1752005 . $2,441Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005. 17.2%1965-2005复合增长率Compou
33、nd Growth Rate 1995-2005.复合增长率. 30.2%1995-2005复合增长率*Pre-tax and net of minority interests税前且扣除少数股东权益When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will
34、be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.在讨论增长率时，你非常有必
35、要留心基期与终期年度的选择。开始与结束的年度二者只要有一个选择不当，那么无论如何计算出来的增长率都会被歪曲。尤其是当基期年度盈利很少时，计算出来的增长率会高得惊人却毫无实际意义。在上面这张表中，作为基期的1965年度的盈利却是异乎寻常地好，伯克希尔公司1965年的盈利高于此前10年中的9个年度盈利水平。As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshires two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result refle
36、cting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshires Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope metaphorically to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife stimulated by sof
