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1、1,SFAR 88/Related Operating RulesSpecial Maintenance Requirements&Compliance Planning Briefing,Operators,FAA Inspectors and EngineersNovember 7,2002Presented by:Mario L.Giordano,FAA Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Division,Senior Advisor,AFS-303 Michael Zielinski,FAA Transport Airplane Director
2、ate,AFS Liaison Program Manager,ANM-105,2,Service History Summary,Since 1959 there have been 17 fuel tank ignition events,resulting in:542 fatalities,11 hull losses3 others with substantial damageCauses:3 unknown 4 caused by external wing fires4 electrostatics 2 lightning 2 pumps or wiring suspected
3、1 by small bomb1 maintenance action.,3,Chronology of Ignition Events Since 1959,4,Historical review,MILITARY-12 hull loss accidents on military version of B-707 and B52 airplanesAll tanks fueled with higher volatility JP-4 fuel Military has converted to low volatility JP-810 of 12 occurred in body o
4、r center wing tanks7 occurred on ground during refueling or maintenance5 in flight-specific cause not identified in many incidents-pumps and fuel quantity indicating system(FQIS)wiring suspectedMilitary has imposed new dry run requirements on pumps,5,KEY COMMERCIAL ACCIDENT SPECIFICS,1963-B-707 Elkt
5、on Maryland3 year old airplane Empty wing tank explosion JP-4 fuel,approx.95 degree F ambient temp.81 fatalitiesLightning strike during decent1970-DC-8 Toronto CanadaLess than 5 year old airplaneJP-4 fuel106 fatalitiesExternal fuel fire caused tank explosion,6,KEY COMMERCIAL ACCIDENT SPECIFICS,1974-
6、B-747-100 Spain-Iranian Air Force3 year old airplane Empty wing tank explosion Lightning strike during decent 8 fatalities JP-4 fuel,approx.95 degree F ambient temp.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED-Three airworthiness directives(AD)issued1989-B-727-Bogata ColumbiaEmpty CWT explosion during climbSmall b
7、omb placed in carry on in passenger cabin causes tank explosion107 fatalities Jet-A fuel,approx.95 degree F ambient temp.,7,KEY COMMERCIAL ACCIDENT SPECIFICS,1990-B-737-300 Manila,PhilippineAlmost new airplane Empty CWT explosion during pushback from gateCWT pumps operating at time of explosion8 fat
8、alities Jet-A fuel,approx.95 degree F ambient temp.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED1996-B-747,TWA 800,JFK25 year old airplane Empty CWT explosion during climb 230 fatalities Jet-A fuel,approx.120 degree F tank temp.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED however,the NTSB believes the likely energy source was a s
9、hort circuit outside of the CWT the allowed excessive voltage to enter the CWT through the FQIS wiring.Also the NTSB believes that a contributing factor may have been a heat source from the air conditioning systems located below the CWT.,8,KEY COMMERCIAL ACCIDENT SPECIFICS,2001-B-737-400 Bangkok Tha
10、iland10 year old airplane Empty CWT explosion minutes after refuelingCWT pumps operating at time of explosion1 fatality Jet-A1 fuel,approx.97 degree F ambient temp.NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED,9,SFAR Alone(Highest Effectiveness),10,Fuel System Safety Compliance Data,Phase OneSFAR RuleImplementation
11、,Phase TwoFAR RuleImplementation,June 6,2001FAR Parts 25,91,121,125,129amended to require instructions formaint.and inspection of the fuel tanksystem be incorporated into the operators Maint.Program and be FAA approvedby June 7,2004,June 6,2001SFAR 88 Rule becameeffective.ApplicableTC,STC holdershav
12、e compliance date ofDecember 6,2002,11,PART 21-”Certification Procedures for Products and Parts”Summary,Part 21-Certification ProceduresNew Special Federal Aviation Regulation(SFAR)Applies to“the holders of type certificates,and STCs that may affect the fuel tank system of turbine powered transport
13、category airplanes”30 passengers or more or7500 lbs payload or more,certified after 1/1/58Requires fleet review of fuel tank system designsAddresses lessons learnedDemonstrate design precludes ignition sourcesDevelop all design changes necessary to meet requirementsDevelop all necessary maintenance
14、and inspection instructionsSubmit a report to ACO Compliance time is 18 months after the effective date of the final ruleFor existing certification projects,18 months after certification date or 18 months after SFAR effective date,whichever is later,12,SOME AFFECTED MODELS,13,Part 25-Airworthiness S
15、tandardsAmendment 25-102,Amended 25.981 Ignition Prevention RequirementsNew 25.981(a)&(b)apply to SFAR 88Maintains existing Autoignition RequirementsAdds explicit requirements for analysis to demonstrate the design precludes failures that can cause ignition sourcesIncludes a design review(system saf
16、ety analysis)requirementMaintains powerplant regulation philosophy of considering latent failuresRequirement for Instructions for Continued Airworthiness,14,Amendment 25-102(Continued),New 25.981(c)Flammability Requirement Minimize development of flammable vapors,ORMitigate effects of ignition of fl
17、ammable vapors Based on ARAC recommendationApplies to new designs changes Does NOT apply to SFAR 88 design reviewsNote:SFAR 88 amendment issued Sept.10,2002 allows equivalent safety provisions for fuel tank system fault tolerance evaluations.If an aircraft were equipped with a fuel tank“inerting”sys
18、tem,it could mitigate some of the ignition prevention requirements of SFAR88.,15,Amendment 25-102(Continued),Part 25,Appendix H(H25.4)Airworthiness Limitations section.Requires including fuel tank safety limitations in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.Revised Appendix H applies to new ty
19、pe design changes through the existing 21.50,“Instructions for continued airworthiness and manufacturers maintenance manuals having airworthiness limitations sections.”,16,ICAs,Revised Appendix H to Part 25-Instructions for Continued Airworthiness(a)The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must
20、contain a section titled Airworthiness Limitations that is segregated and clearly distinguishable from the rest of the document.This section must set forth-(1)Each mandatory replacement time,structural inspection interval,and related structural inspection procedures approved under Sec.25.571;and(2)E
21、ach mandatory replacement time,inspection interval,related inspection procedure,and all critical design configuration control limitations approved under Sec.25.981 for the fuel tank system.,17,ICAs contd,Not CMRsThe concept of this rule goes beyond the current CMR process.CMRs only address mandatory
22、 maintenance that is applied to the airplane at the time of original certification.The requirement of this rule for configuration design control limitations will address not only MANDATORY maintenance actions,but also design features that cannot be ALTERED except in accordance with the Instructions
23、for Continued Airworthiness(ICA).,18,Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations(CDCCL),Defined by design approval applicants subject to SFAR 88 Features of an airplane design,such as wire separation,explosion proof features of a fuel pump,maintenance intervals for transient suppression device
24、s,minimum bonding jumper resistance levels,etc.,where any maintenance actions or subsequent changes to the product made by operators or the manufacturer MUST NOT DEGRADE the level of safety of the original type design.Note:The definition of critical design configuration control limitations does not
25、include all of the features inherent in the design;it only includes information that is necessary to ensure safety of fuel tank systems.,19,20,Fuel System Limitations(FSLs),Industry established the FSL term for clarity/segregation.All FSLs are Airworthiness Limitations Items derived from safety revi
26、ew:contains the instructions for maintenance and inspection of the fuel tank SYSTEM,including initial and repetitive inspection frequencies,required instruments,pass/fail criteria,etc.andany applicable critical design configuration control limitationsOperators FSLs for a specific aircraft model will
27、 include:OEM/STC FSLs(where applicable)Major alteration,field approval,etc.FSLs(where applicable)All affected OEM FSLs will be clearly identified and listed in an applicable manufacturers Maintenance Program Document,such as the Boeing MPD,Section 9.,21,FSLs-contd,Affected operators submit FSLs thro
28、ugh the Principal Inspectors prior to submittal to FAA Aircraft Certification for review and approval.The Operators Maintenance Program must identify FAA Aircraft Certification approved FSL applicability for EACH specific aircraft contained in the Operators Aircraft Listing(D085).All FAA Aircraft Ce
29、rtification approved FSLs must have operator work instructions(Job Cards,Task Cards,Aircraft Maintenance Manual(AMM)procedures)completed and submitted to the Principal Inspectors for review PRIOR to Operations Specifications approval by June 7,2004.,22,FSLs-contd,All operators must have tooling/trai
30、ning requirements completed prior to actual accomplishment of FSLs.Note:In addition to new maintenance and inspection tasks,it is likely that some of the present fuel tank system zonal inspection items using the General Visual Inspection(GVI)technique will become FSLs requiring Detailed Visual Inspe
31、ctions(DVIs).Some DVIs may require a one time fleetwide conformity inspection and/or accelerated inspection frequencies.,Related Guidance Information,ACs available on the webhttp:/www.faa.gov/avr/air/acs/achome.htmAC 25.981-1c:Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention GuidelinesAcceptable method for demo
32、nstrating compliance with ignition prevention requirementsIncluding demonstrating compliance with the SFAR design reviewIncludes a listing of lessons learnedAC 25.981-2:Fuel Tank Flammability MinimizationAcceptable method for the demonstrating compliance with fuel tank flammability requirementsFAA d
33、rafting guidance on expected content of FSLs and the roles and responsibilities of the ACOs,AEGs and Flight Standards principal inspectors.,23,24,Special Maintenance Program Requirements,Rules Amended91.410(b),121.370(b),125.248(b)and 129.32(b)Applicabilityturbine-powered transport category airplane
34、s type certificate issued after January 1,1958,either a maximum type certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more,or a maximum type certificated payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more,Sec.121.370 Special maintenance program requirements.(b)After June 7,2004,no certificate holder may operate a tur
35、bine-powered transport category airplane.,unless instructions for maintenance and inspection of the fuel tank system are incorporated in its maintenance program.These instructions must address the actual configuration of the fuel tank systems of each affected airplane and must be approved by the FAA
36、 Aircraft Certification Office(ACO/TAD).Operators must submit their request through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector,who may add comments and then send it to the manager of the appropriate office.Thereafter,the approved instructions can be revised only with the approval of the FAA
37、Aircraft Certification Office(ACO/TAD).Operators must submit their requests for revisions through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector,who may add.,25,26,Special Maintenance Requirements,Instructions for maintenance and inspection(a.k.a.instructions for continued airworthiness(ICA)of t
38、he fuel tank system are required to be incorporated in the operators maintenance program by June 7,2004.ICA determination based on design review of the fuel tank systemICAs approved by ACOPossible design changesMandatory inspection/maintenance tasksNote:The system may include items pertaining to oth
39、er areas such as pneumatics and air conditioning.,27,Special Maintenance Requirements Driven by the Design Review,The design review is a failure modes and effects analysis that considers“multiple failures”Excerpt from 25.981 Fuel tank ignition prevention Amendment 102Demonstrating that an ignition s
40、ource could not result from each single failure,from each single failure in combination with each latent failure condition not shown to be extremely remote,and from all combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable.MRB use of MSG-3Considers only hidden plus oneMRB use of MSG-2Conside
41、rs only single failuresNot 25.1309,Vs.,28,Special Maintenance Requirements ACO Approved,Why?Because of the required design review FAA engineering expertise required to review and approve acceptability of analysisType Certificate(TC)and Supplemental Type Certificate Holders(STC)Holders Interaction of
42、 Multiple Configurations 35 transport category models affected 600 plus STCs highly likely to be impacted(Category 1)(see website http:/www.faa.gov/certification/aircraft/SFAR88/stc-list.cfm)20,000 plus STCs less likely to be impacted(Category 2)Operator and/or Airplane specific“actual configuration
43、”,29,Design Review,The level of evaluation that is intended depends upon the basic design and type of modification.In most cases a simple QUALITATIVE evaluation of the design/modification in relation to fuel tank system safety,and a statement to the cognizant ACO that the change has no effect on the
44、 fuel tank system safety,would be all that is necessary.In other cases where the initial qualitative assessment shows that there may be an affect on fuel tank system safety,A MORE DETAILED DESIGN review would be required to substantiate that the airplane fuel tank system design/modifications,includi
45、ng all necessary design changes,meets the requirements of 25.901 and 25.981(a)and(b).,30,Analysis Considerations,QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS-Analytical processes that assess system and airplane safety in a subjective non-numerical manner,e.g.,development of flightcrew procedures to mitigate inflight failur
46、e conditionsQUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS-Analytical processes that apply mathematical methods to assess system and airplane safety,e.g.,using failure rate probabilities to determine safety risk,31,32,33,Compliance Planning,TC and STC Holders ResponsibilitiesOperators Responsibilities Principal Inspectors O
47、verview and Responsibilities,34,Compliance Planning TC/STC Holders,Provide design review report by 12/6/2002 to ACO that includes:Design changes NECESSARY to comply with SFAR Identification of safety CRITICAL fuel tank system design features.Identification of the appropriate marking for those featur
48、es so future maintenance actions do not DEGRADE the intended level of safety.ALL maintenance and inspection instructions necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tank system throughout the operational life of th
49、e airplaneCOMPARABILITY of design review required inspection and maintenance COMMUNICATE with operators regarding progress of the design review and probable outcomes,35,STC holders may not have access to information from respective OEMsBasic OEM system descriptions,wiring diagrams and/or the OEMs li
50、mitationsLacking this information,STC holders may not be able to determine what are the OEMs critical systemsSTC holders may therefore be unable to compile a complete SSA for their installation.,STC Holders Dependency on OEM,36,Completing STC Reviews,For Example:STC holders conducting a SSA concerni
