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1、Collective Forest Tenure Reform in China:Outcomes and Analysis of Performance集体林权改革：结果和绩效分析,Jintao XuDepartment of Environmental ManagementPeking UniversityApril 15,2010,Grey Tower,General Overview,Part I,Forest Distribution in China,Main Forest Regions,中国林业部门特点Forest Sector in China,政府干预程度高Forest s
2、ector remains highly regulated在森林资源采运，林地利用方式等方面控制很严Control in logging,shipping,land use,etc.目前在国有林区实施天保工程（禁伐和限伐）Logging ban and大量的政府投资林业项目Lots of government programsAnd.,林权制度 Forest Tenure in China,两种所有制Two ownership types国有 State42%forest area and 68%volume;Managed by state forest enterprises and f
3、arms集体 Collective 58%area and 32%volumeGrowing share of timber productionDiversified management schemes,集体林权改革历史History of Tenure Reform,第一次 First Round:1981-1986政策反复A fluctuating process地区间差异大Different level of progresses among provinces长期争论不休 Tenure remains controversial Issue第二次 Second Round:2000
4、-,截止2007年底，14个省参加By 2007,14 provinces announced new reform policy2008年6月，中共中央国务院文件出台In July 2008,Central Government Reform Policy was declared,conclusion of the policy change process promoting collective forest tenure reform,本次改革特点 Whats New?,福建 Fujian joining the mainstream of forest individualizat
5、ion是国家近年来加强农民土地权益努力的一个组成部分Continuation of efforts to expand and strengthen forest tenure rights for farmers村级民主决策Village representative committee as decision maker on land redistribution plan合同期延长Longer term contracts(30,50,70)权利内容增加New rights:transfer,inheritance,collateral,etc.统一的林权证的发放Renewal of
6、forest certificates(uniformed,GIS,etc.),基本评价 So What?,是进步还是倒退？Is this socially optimal?评判标准？What will be the impacts on 森林资源经营管理的变化forest resources林农收入farmer income?可持续性 Sustainability?社会稳定 Social stability?,调查工作回顾The Survey commissioned by SFA,Recent Tenure Reform Participation by Village,集体林经营权类型C
7、ategorizing Forest Tenure,家庭个体经营 Individual Household Management（Small Private Plots,Responsibility Hilly Land,Contracted,Rented,Planted and Occupied)合伙经营 Partnership村民小组，自然村 Villager Cluster,Natural Village林地流转 Outsider Contract集体经营 Collective Management生态公益林 Ecological Reserve,集体经营比例变化（各省村级数据）Shar
8、e Change:Collective Management 2000-2005(2006),家庭个体经营比例变化Share Change:Individual Household 2000-2005(2006),合伙经营比例变化Share Change:Partnership 2000-2005(2006),村民小组经营比例变化Share Change:Villager Cluster 2000-2005(2006),林地流转比例变化Share Change:Outsider Contract 2000-2005(2006),各省变化总体情况The Change of Area Share
9、by Tenure Type,2000-2005(6),Forest Area by Tenure Type(ha.Village Average),Forest Area by tenure type(ha.Household average),Contract Length by Tenure Type,Type1:Individual HH Type2:Villager cluster Type3:Partner Type4:Outsider contract,Knowledge of Tenure Rights by Household,结果一，木材采伐量变化Results 1：Tim
10、ber Harvest Before and After by Village,结果二，造林面积变化Result 2：Afforestation Before and After by Village,Distribution of log forestation in each year造林面积分布图,Econometric Estimation of Afforestation Effect,Central finding is that the reform causes the villages to increase forestation by 262 mu,which is a
11、150%increase from no reform to reform.核心发现：改革使村均年造林面积增加262亩，相比未改革村造林面积增加150%；Plan to study long-run effect as more data become available.对改革对造林结构的影响、以及长期影响有待进一步分析,结果三，林农家庭收入结构变化Result 3：Change in Household Income Structure,初步评判Preliminary Observations,在本次改革力度大的地方，采伐量大幅度上升Harvest increased a lot造林面积大
12、幅度上升So was afforestation林农林业收入比例提高And farmer income from forests出现了可持续经营的迹象Signs of sustainability仍然遗留很多分配不公现象，是社会不稳定的隐患Social stability a concern due to equity in the reform process,对林业管理体制的影响Induced Changes,采伐限额制度 Relaxation of Logging Quota ControlTo be replaced by management plan林地流转 Increase la
13、nd transactionIf there is scale economyEmpirically testable劳动力转移 Implication on labor reallocationThe safety net hypothesis under economic depressionEmpirically testable林业管理体制的适应性变化 Governance structure changesRe-allocation of forest management staffService oriented agencyIncreased role of eco-compe
14、nsation scheme国有林区改革 State Forest Reform,Thank You!,Empirical Analysis IVillage Tenure Choice,Part II,林权模式形成的决定因素分析Tenure Choice:Motivating Empirical Analysis,林权改革的方向仍存争议Strong disbelief still exists toward promises of forest tenure reform(foresters,social elites,etc.)中国改革与世界其他发展中国家林权变化的异同In literat
15、ure,“community forestry”seems to be the solution for developing countries以墨西哥、印度和许多非洲国家为代表，社区林业是改革目标模式Outstanding examples:Mexico,India,AfricaChina is moving toward individualized tenure system in all land.(ag,forest,grassland,even sea shore).Can this be successful?中国走向个体经营为主的经营体制的驱动因素是什么？And Why?,S
16、ome Explanations,Historical BackgroundPrivate ownership 50 years agoSimilar to East European CountriesHuman Capital:Farmer Individual entrepreneurshipWhile most developing countries are with history of colonial regime.State-ownership was dominant in natural resource sector and devolving down to comm
17、unity is already a big and difficult stepInstitutional Learning:success of agricultural reformEquity issue:agricultural land tenureEfficiency issue:failure of collective managementIneffectiveness of Income generation and forest conservationPolitical-economic factors:declining share of forestry in re
18、gional economy,改革原因的思考Speculating on Reform Rationale,集体土地所有制下，普通农民是名义所有人，集体经济组织的领导人行使实际所有者的权力In a collective system,land is so called“collective owned”.Ordinary farmers are de jure owner,but the leaders of the collective(administrative village)practice de facto decision making power.集体经济组织的领导人受私利驱动
19、，在经营集体林地过程中各种行为偏离集体利益最大化的目标，导致经营效率低下，林份质量下降，最终“两危”的局面The leaders are self interested.Without sufficient monitoring and sanctioning mechanism,the collective leaders will function in a way far from maximizing collective interests.,集体经营林地的问题Failure of Collective Forest Management,经营规模偏大，在疏于管理的情形下，形同产生公
20、地悲剧的制度框架The size is too large,if no management,easily tragedy of commons problem集体森林资源规模越大，普通林农的声音越小，其利益诉求越不容易得到反映When managed by village leaders,the voice of individual farmers gets smaller once the scale of collective operations gets larger.存在集体经济组织成员和领导阶层信息不对称Information asymmetry between farmers
21、 and leaders,lack of accountability腐败现象普遍发生Widespread corruption由于上级政府的影响，村集体领导阶层的权利缺乏监督而后制约Lack of check and balance because village leaders are backed by upper level government管理效率下降，收益下降Management efficiency is low and declining,so is the rent社会矛盾日增Rising social conflict and farmer resentment森林资源
22、保护的成本增加Rising cost of forest protection,改革的预期效果Potential Benefit of Reform,克服公地悲剧问题Hopefully,individualization solves the tragedy of commons problem(NTFP for example)减少腐败空间It reduces room for corruption提高农民投资造林和再造林的积极性（效率改进1）It provides incentives for individual farmers to invest in forest planting
23、and re-planting-efficiency gain(1)诱致林地市场形成和林地流转，产生规模效益（效率改进2）It creates forestland market so that scale economy might be achieved-efficiency gain(2)林农可以使用林权证抵押贷款，提高融资和投资能力（效率改进3）Farmers can use forest certificate as collateral,therefore their ability to invest increases-efficiency gain(3)也是公平性的改进And
24、 it is more equitable a system than the previous one(revenue distribution,bargaining power for farmers,safety net,etc.)增强森林经营的可持续性Better prospect of sustainable development局部最优Local Optimum,可能产生的问题Points of Concern,林地细碎化，导致经营效率损失（1）Forestland fragmentation,at least in near termsome efficiency loss(1
25、)缺乏金融系统支持，经营者融资能力降低（2）Credit market not developed so well,therefore lack of funding for investmentdelayed efficiency gain(2)在改革过程中，有权势者获得大量林地（公平问题1）Social elites capture large area of forests-equity issue(1)对弱势农民群体失地大担心（潜在的社会不稳定因素，公平问题2）Concerns about weak farmers losing land quicklysocial stability
26、 and equity issues(2)大量小农经营面对市场波动，会否产生大量毁林？（可持续性问题）Market volatility leading to deforestation,concerns about sustainability,理论框架Theoretical Framework,两种理论 Two lines of literature土地租佃理论 Land Tenancy Theory(Otsuka 等)假定村领导阶层是地主，村民或村民小集体是佃农，双方的能力差异决定合同的特征 Contract types reflect relative ability风险的影响，Nat
27、ure of risk(political vs.natural)激励理论 Incentive Theory(Lafont,Acemoglu,etc.)假定村集体领导层是政府，农民是私人部门，研究政府在什么情况下决定私有化，选择何种合同形式In collectives,there is a government and a private sectorGovernment with private agenda寻租的动机和提高效率的动机的互相替代Rent-seeking efficiency trade-off,村集体林权改革模式选择的计量分析Empirical Analysis of Far
28、mer Collectives Choice,改革的基本原则是村集体决策制，便于检验村级特征（特别是村级民主发育水平）对产权体系形成的影响The principle of reform(VRC,VA)allows testing the impacts of the following factors:村级民主发育程度 Quality of Village Democracy有私利的政府Non-Benevolent Village Government精英掠夺 Elite Capture(outsider contract)村级政府不独立Non-Independent Village Gove
29、rnment(government interference)寻阻与效率的替代 Rent Seeking-Efficiency Trade-off Low efficiency of collective management leading to wide spread financial deficitIn Fujian,most of the village council improved their financial situation after reform,by collecting fees and charging prices on forest landOpportu
30、nity cost of reform for village management important factor,其它因素 Empirical Analysis(contd),体制风险 Institutional Risk(-household)产权稳定性 Tenure insecurity政府干预程度 Government Intervention采伐限额 Logging quota生态公益林圈地 Eco-reserve社会资本 Social Capital(+community)市场发育 Market Development(+household)替代收入 Alternative I
31、ncome(-household demand)一般村级特征 General Village Characteristics,计量模型 Econometric Model,产权选择的联立方程组分析经营权类型的比例变化的驱动因素Estimation of a system of tenure share changeType(i,2005)-Type(i,2000)=f(6 categories of determinants,2000)i=1,2,5.The Sample:Fujian and Jiangxi90 villages,Tenure Change:Impacts of Drivin
32、g Factors(2 Provs),初步分析结论 Conclusion,替代收入降低农民个体对林地需求Higher alternative incomes reduce individual demand for forestland;社会资本好的地方，社区经营多Good social capital is conducive to community management(village cluster)政府干预、产权不稳定减少个体经营需求，增加集体经营比例（风险分担机制）Government interference,tenure insecurity,tend to induce in
33、crease in group management(risk sharing),but reduce demand for individual tenure村级政府的质量有影响The quality of village government matters寻租-效率替代关系存在Rent Seeking-Efficiency Trade-off Seems to Exist加速改革须补偿既得利益者的机会成本 Compensation for opportunity cost of collective leadership will reduce collective management
34、 and increase new tenure types.,Thank You!,Empirical Analysis IIPerformance analysis,Part III,47,The Effect of the Collective Forest Tenure Reform in China on Forestation,Lunyu Xie(UC Berkeley)Peter Berck(UC Berkeley)Jintao Xu(Beijing University),48,Collective Forest Tenure Reform Individualize coll
35、ective-owned forestsPolicy delivery process:State,Province,County,Township and VillageVillage representative committees or village assemblies vote for or against the reformGoalsStimulate investment in forestsImprove forest conservationIncrease forest incomeForestationAfforestation and reforestationN
36、ewly planted forest land in a year,in unit of mu(1 mu=1/15 hectare),49,Research Questions,What is the effect of the reform on forestation?Whether forestation is increased by the reform significantly?If so,what is the magnitude of the effect?,50,Data,The data is from the surveys done by the Environme
37、ntal Science and Engineering unit of Beijing University,China.They surveyed 49 counties in 9 provinces.In each county,they conducted interviews randomly in 6 villages,and 10-20 households in each village.,Exposure to the policy and reform,The variations are due to the delivering process of the refor
38、m policy and the villages voting decisions.,51,52,Estimation,The estimating equation is,53,Self selection problem:It is up to the villages to decide whether to take the reform or not.IV:The exposure to the reform policy.First stage regression shows significant coefficient of exposure.IV justificatio
39、n,54,55,OLS and IV Regressions,56,Conclusion,Central finding is that the reform causes the villages to increase forestation by 262 mu,which is a 150%increase from no reform to reform.Plan to study long-run effect as more data become available.,Ongoing and Future Efforts,Impacts of Forest Tenure Reform on Labor MarketOn land marketForest investmentOn state forest reformFollow-up surveys and assessment needed to obtain understanding of full results of forest tenure reform,Thank You Again!,
