《How to deal with North Korea.doc》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《How to deal with North Korea.doc（13页珍藏版）》请在三一办公上搜索。
1、Title:How to Deal With North Korea.Authors:Laney, James T.Shaplen, Jason T.Source:Foreign Affairs; Mar/Apr2003, Vol. 82 Issue 2, p16, 15pAbstract:Opinion. Progress in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula has reached a dangerous impasse. To understand the status quo, it is necessary to first und
2、erstand the origins and motivation behind North Koreas highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) program and its decision to restart its plutonium program. There are two plausible explanations for why the North revealed its HEU program in October 2002. Many pundits and policymakers in the United States argue th
3、at revelations about the Norths HEU program prove that President Bill Clintons policy of engaging the North was a mistake, but this analysis is too simple. The timing of the steps now taken to resolve the current crisis will be crucial to their success. It is now time to move beyond the Bush adminis
4、trations narrow agenda to a policy of resolution-one that addresses all concerns on the Korean Peninsula. Such a shift is particularly important given the very serious rupture that has opened between Washington and Seoul.How to Deal With North Korea MIXED MESSAGES Progress in reducing tensions on th
5、e Korean peninsula, never easy, has reached a dangerous impasse. The last six months have witnessed an extraordinary series of events in the region that have profound implications for security and stability throughout Northeast Asia, a region that is home to 100,000 U.S. troops and three of the worl
6、ds 12 largest economies.Perhaps the most dramatic of these events was North Koreas December decision to restart its frozen plutonium-based nuclear program at Yongbyon - including a reprocessing facility that separates plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent reactor fuel. Just as disturbing was the
7、Norths stunning public admission two months earlier that it had begun building a new, highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) nuclear program. And then came yet another unsettling development: a growing, sharp division emerged between the United States and the new South Korean government over how to respond.B
8、ut recent events have not been entirely negative. In the two months prior to the October HEU revelation, North Korea had, with remarkable speed, undertaken an important series of positive initiatives that seemed the polar opposite of its posturing on the nuclear issue. These included initiating an u
9、nscheduled meeting between its foreign minister, Paek Nam Sun, and Secretary of State Colin Powell in July - the highest-level contact between the two nations since the Bush administration took office; inviting a U.S. delegation for talks in Pyongyang; proposing the highest-level talks with South Ko
10、rea in a year; agreeing to re-establish road and rail links with the South and starting work on the project almost immediately; demining portions of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and wide corridors on the east and west coasts surrounding the rail links; sending more than 600 athletes and representati
11、ves to join the Asian Games in Pusan, South Korea (marking the Norths first-ever participation in an international sporting event in the South); enacting a series of economic and market reforms (including increasing wages, allowing the price of staples to float freely, and inaugurating a special eco
12、nomic zone similar to those in China); restarting the highest-level talks with Japan in two years; holding a subsequent summit with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, during which Pyongyang admitted abducting Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s; and finally, allowing the surviving abduc
13、tees to visit Japan.Viewed individually, let alone together, North Koreas initiatives represented the most promising signs of change on the peninsula in decades. Whether by desire or by necessity, the North finally appeared to be responding to the long-standing concerns of the United States, South K
14、orea, and Japan. Equally important, Pyongyang seemed to have abandoned its policy of playing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo off one another by addressing the concerns of one while ignoring those of the other two. For the first time, the North was actively (even aggressively) engaging all three capital
15、s simultaneously.Until October, that is, when North Korea acknowledged the existence of its clandestine HEU program - ending the diplomatic progress instantly. Once the news broke, Pyongyang quickly offered to halt the HEU program in exchange for a nonaggression pact with the United States. But Wash
16、ington, unwilling to reward bad behavior, initially refused to open a dialogue unless the North first abandoned its HEU effort. In November, the United States went a step further: saying that Pyongyang had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and several other nuclear nonproliferation pacts, Washingto
17、n engineered the suspension of deliveries of the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil sent to the North each year under the 1994 accord. The Agreed Framework had frozen the Norths plutonium program - a program that had included a five-megawatt experimental reactor, two larger reactors under construction,
18、and the reprocessing facility - narrowly averting a catastrophic war on the Korean Peninsula.In the weeks following the suspension of fuel shipments, the United States hardened its stance against dialogue with the North - despite the fact that most U.S. allies were encouraging a diplomatic solution
19、to the situation. North Korea responded by announcing plans to reopen its Yongbyon facilities. It immediately removed the seals and monitoring cameras from its frozen nuclear labs and reactors and, a few days later, began to move its dangerous spent fuel rods out of storage. Pyongyang subsequently a
20、nnounced its intention to reopen the critical reprocessing plant in February 2003. On December 31, it expelled the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). And on January 9, it announced its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.Although Washington, strongly urged b
21、y Seoul and Tokyo, ultimately agreed to talks, the situation appeared to be worsening almost daily. Depending on how it is resolved, the standoff could still prove a positive turning point in resolving one the worlds most dangerous flash points. But it could also lead to an even worse crisis than in
22、 1994. The proper approach, therefore, is to now re-engage with North Korea without rewarding it for bad behavior. Working together, the major external interested parties (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) should jointly and officially guarantee the security of the entire Korean Peninsula
23、. But the outside powers should also insist that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear weapons program before offering it any enticements. Only when security has been established (and verified by intrusive, regular inspections) should a prearranged comprehensive deal be implemented - one that involves exten
24、sive reforms in the North, an increase in aid and investment, and, eventually, a Korean federation.THE NORTH GOES NUCLEAR To understand how the most promising signs of progress in decades quickly deteriorated into nuclear brinkmanship, it is necessary to first understand the origins and motivation b
25、ehind the Norths HEU program and Pyongyangs subsequent decision to restart its plutonium program. Even before North Korea admitted that it was building a new HEU program, the United States had long suspected the country of violating its relevant international commitments. Three years ago, such conce
26、rns had led to U.S. inspections of suspicious underground facilities in Kumchang-ni. Although those inspections did not reveal any actual treaty violations - in part because Pyongyang had ample time to remove evidence before the inspectors arrived - suspicions lingered. These doubts proved justified
27、 in July 2002, when the United States conclusively confirmed the existence of the Norths HEU program.It now seems likely that Pyongyang actually started its HEU program in 1997 or 1998. Although Kim Jong Ils motives for doing so will probably never be clear (his regime has a record of confounding ob
28、servers), there are two plausible explanations. The first focuses on fear: namely, North Koreas fear that, having frozen its plutonium-based nuclear program in 1994, it would receive nothing in return. Such a suspicion seems unreasonable on its face, since, under the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated
29、 with Washington, Pyongyang was to be compensated in various ways for abandoning its nuclear ambitions. But from the perspective of a paranoid, isolated regime such as North Koreas, this concern was not without justification. Almost from its inception, the provisions of the 1994 accord fell substant
30、ially behind schedule - most notably in the construction of proliferation-resistant light-water reactors in the North and improved relations with the United States.1 North Korea may thus have started its HEU program as a hedge against the possibility that it had been duped, or, more likely, that new
31、 U.S., South Korean, or Japanese administrations would be less willing to proceed with the politically controversial program than were their predecessors.A second, darker, and more likely explanation for Pyongyangs decision to start the HEU program holds that the North never really intended to give
32、up its nuclear ambitions. Whether motivated by fear, honor, or aggression (the determination to stage a preemptive strike if threatened), Pyongyang views a nuclear program as its sovereign right - and a necessity.Whichever of these theories is true, the North seems to have undertaken its HEU program
33、 slowly at first, ramping it up only in late 2000 or 2001. And it was able to hide the program until July 2002, when U.S. intelligence proved its existence. Although Bush administration officials insist otherwise, it is possible, as North Korean officials have suggested, that Pyongyang decided to st
34、ep up its nuclear program in response to what it perceived as Washingtons increasingly hostile attitude - a hostility demonstrated to North Koreans by President Bushs decision to include them in the axis of evil and to set the bar for talks impossibly high. This perceived hostility was further encou
35、raged when the administration announced its new doctrine of preemptive defense. Notwithstanding the presidents remarks to the contrary, Pyongyang views the new defense doctrine as a direct threat. After all, if Washington is willing to attack Iraq, another isolated nation with a suspected nuclear pr
36、ogram, might it not also be willing, even likely, to do the same to North Korea?This fear helps explain why the North decided to restart its plutonium program. Many within the senior ranks of the North Korean military believe that if the United States attacks, Pyongyangs position will be strengthene
37、d immeasurably by the possession of several nuclear weapons. North Korean planners thus reason that they should develop such weapons as quickly as possible, prior to the American attack that may come once Washington has concluded its war with Iraq.HIGH-STAKES POKER There are again two plausible expl
38、anations for why the North revealed its HEU program in October 2002. Since its earliest days in office, the Bush administration has made clear that it favors a more hard-line approach to North Korea than did the Clinton team. Even prior to the Norths HEU admission, Bushs support for the 1994 Agreed
39、Framework was lukewarm at best. His administration considered the accord a form of blackmail signed by his predecessor - even though, after a long review of North Korea policy in 2001, the Bush administration found it could not justify abandoning the pact without having something better with which t
40、o replace it. In short, Washington grudgingly considered itself bound by a diplomatic process it viewed as distasteful - if not an outright scam.When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited North Korea in early October, he took with him undeniable evidence of the Norths HEU program. He
41、 also took with him very narrowly defined briefing papers, hard-line marching orders that reflected the influence of the Defense Department and the National Security Council.Anticipating isolation and a worsening of already strained relations in the face of Washingtons evidence, Pyongyang opted to p
42、lay one of its few remaining trump cards: open admission of its nuclear program. This openness, Kim may have hoped, would keep the Bush administration from disengaging entirely. By acknowledging its HEU effort, Pyongyang essentially sent Washington the following message: We understand that despite e
43、verything weve done over the past several months you want to isolate or disengage from us. Well, we admit we have a uranium-based nuclear program. You say you dont want to deal with us. Too bad - you cant ignore a potential nuclear power. Deal with us.Another hypothesis to explain the timing is that
44、 Pyongyang simply miscalculated. North Korea watchers learned long ago to expect the unexpected, but even the most jaded observers were surprised in September 2002 when Kim admitted to Koizumi that the North had abducted 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s to train its spies. Kim apologized for the a
45、bductions and, with remarkable speed, subsequently authorized a visit of five of the surviving abductees to Japan. In doing so, he removed a decades-old barrier to normalization of relations between the two nations (and to the payment of billions of dollars in hoped-for war reparations from Tokyo).K
46、ims gamble on coming clean about the abductions appeared at the time to have paid off. Notwithstanding the predicted public backlash in Japan, further talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang took place in October (after the HEU admission).2 Having experienced better-than-expected results in admitting to t
47、he abductions, Kim may have hoped for the same by confessing to his HEU program. His thinking may have been that, in view of Washingtons evidence, Pyongyang would eventually have had to come clean anyway. That being the case, it was better to do so sooner rather than later, thereby removing one of t
48、he primary obstacles to improved U.S.-North Korea relations. Kim may further have surmised that the timing of such a revelation in October was advantageous, given recent progress in talks with Japan and South Korea. He probably hoped that Tokyo and Seoul would pressure Washington to mitigate its res
49、ponse.In the weeks immediately following Kellys visit, Washington made it clear that it did not see a military solution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. This left isolation, containment, and negotiation as the only viable alternatives. A policy of isolation would seek the Norths collapse but would not address the HEU problem and would likely result in the Norths restarting its plutonium-based nuclear program. Containment, or economic pressure designed to squeeze the No
