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1、Semi-presidentialism and Democratic PerformanceROBERT ELGIE AND IAIN McMENAMINSchool of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Irelandrobert.elgiedcu.ie and iain.mcmenamindcu.ieAbstractThere is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semi-presidentialism is bad for democratic pe
2、rformance. This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism. Examining countries that incompletely consolidated and yet not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments against semi
3、-presidentialism the strength of the presidency, cohabitation and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative consequences th
4、at the literature predicts.IntroductionIn Afghanistan in January 2004, members of the Constitutional Loya Jurga approved a new constitution. As late as September 2003 the draft constitution had included provision for a semi-presidential system with both a directly elected president and a prime minis
5、ter responsible to the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the Afghan National Assembly (Rubin 2004: 12). In the end, a pure presidential system was recommended. There were political interests at stake in the choice of the system (ibid.). However, there were concerns about problems supposedly inherent
6、in semi-presidentialism. One of the participants in the drafting procedure summed up the reasons why presidentialism was chosen ahead of semi-presidentialism: “There would be no uncertainty about who held executive power in Kabul, and Washington would retain the benefit of having a clearly identifia
7、ble Afghan partner ” (ibid.).The decision to reject semi-presidentialism in Afghanistan is symptomatic of the standard academic wisdom about the impact of this form of government on the process of democratisation: semi-presidentialism should be avoided at all costs. The direct election of the presid
8、ent can lead to a dangerous personalisation of the political process; the problem of dual legitimacy can be problematic when there is a divided executive, especially if the president and prime minister are from opposing forces; the absence of a majority in parliament can lead either the president or
9、 prime minister to ignore the rule of law in order to assert effective decision making. In the context of these criticisms, Timothy Colton and Cindy Skach have recently summed up the academic consensus about semi-presidentialism. They write that it is time for ”fragile democracies that suffer from t
10、he semi-presidential predicament to rethink their constitutional framework” (Skach 2005: 124-125).This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism. To date, there has been no rigorous test of these arguments. Instead, the evidence has re
11、mained largely qualitative. In this article, we examine whether semi-presidentialism has had a negative impact on democratic performance. We assume that semi-presidentialism is unlikely to have had such an effect in two situations when a country is completely consolidated and when a country is autoc
12、ratic. In these situations, we assume that other non-institutional factors cancel out any effects of semi-presidentialism on democratic performance. However, for countries that remain incompletely consolidated and yet not autocratic we might expect semi-presidential institutions to significantly aff
13、ect democracy. Focusing only on countries with semi-presidential constitutions and using Politys measures to identify the countries in this category that are incompletely consolidated and yet not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments aga
14、inst semi-presidentialism the strength of the presidency, cohabitation and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative conseq
15、uences that the literature predicts.The main finding of this article is important. It shows that some of the prevailing wisdom about semi-presidentialism is wrong. Specifically, there is no evidence to support two of the three main arguments against this form of government. By contrast, the findings
16、 do support one of the arguments against semi-presidentialism. Semi-presidential countries with strong presidents perform worse than those with weaker presidents. This finding is also significant. While this study does not allow us to draw any conclusions about the performance of semi-presidentialis
17、m relative to that of parliamentarism or presidentialism, it does suggest that if, for whatever reason, countries decide to adopt semi-presidentialism, they would be advised to adopt a form of semi-presidentialism where the president has very few powers. Thus, while Afghanistan may have been right t
18、o reject semi-presidentialism, in the context where countries wish to adopt this constitutional system or where they have no choice but to adopt it, then advice can still be given that can lessen the problems of semi-presidentialism.The problems of semi-presidentialismIn semi-presidential systems, t
19、he president is directly elected and serves for a fixed term, while the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the legislature. The academic consensus against semi-presidentialism is profound. For example, Linz states that: “In view of some of the experiences with this typ
20、e of system it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself semi-presidentialism can generate democratic stability” (ibid: 55). Valenzuela (2004: 17) argues that semi-presidentialism “may not solve some of the inherent problems of presidentialism, and indeed could make them worse by reifying the con
21、flict between two state powers and personalizing them in the figure of the president and the prime minister”. Stepan and Suleiman recommend against semi-presidentialism arguing that it “is a more risk-prone system than the modern parliamentarism that has evolved in Europe other than France after Wor
22、ld War II” (Stepan and Suleiman 1995: 412).In this article, there is no attempt to compare the performance of countries with semi-presidential constitutions relative to those with parliamentary and/or presidential constitutions. Thus, we do not aim to contribute to the more general debate as to whet
23、her parliamentarism should be chosen ahead of both semi-presidentialism and presidentialism as the standard wisdom suggests. However, we seek to contribute to the literature by assessing the extent to which the problems of semi-presidentialsim apply to different semi-presidential regimes. There are
24、three main arguments against semi-presidentialism.The problem of over-presidentialisation in semi-presidential countriesThe first argument against semi-presidentialism is similar to a criticism of presidentialism. The direct election of the president may encourage the personalisation of the politica
25、l process and it may encourage the president to disregard the rule of law because s/he feels above the normal political process. Presidents can claim to have a mandate from the people no matter how close their winning margin may have been. This mandate, they might argue, gives them the authority to
26、act in the best interests of the country, as they see it, and may encourage them to ignore any opposition. Linz expresses this concern when discussing semi-presidential systems in which the president has considerable powers. In this situation, he worries that semi-presidentialism can come to resembl
27、e “a constitutional dictatorship” (Linz 1994: 48). A further potential problem with direct election is that it may encourage political outsiders to seek election. If successful, such presidents tend to ignore political parties and personalise the presidential process. The survival of the regime beco
28、mes associated with the survival of the president in office. Opposition to the president becomes associated with opposition to the regime itself. Again, Linz worries about this problem of semi-presidentialism and states that “as much or more than a pure presidential system, a dual executive system d
29、epends on the personality and abilities of the president” (ibid: 52). For his part, Lijphart has argued that semi-presidential systems “actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful that in most pure presidential systems” (2004: 102). The combination of a president with strong
30、 constitutional powers backed by a loyal parliamentary majority and a submissive prime minister can mean that there will be few if any checks and balances within and between the executive and legislative branches of government. In this event, the president may exercise untrammelled power and in the
31、context of a nascent democracy such an extreme personalisation of the political process has the potential to be destabilising.The problem of a divided executive in semi-presidential countriesThe second argument against semi-presidentialism is also similar to a criticism of presidentialism, namely th
32、e problem of dual legitimacy, but it provides a distinct semi-presidential twist to this problem. In presidential systems, problems may arise when the majority in the assembly is opposed to the president. In this case, each institution is pitted against the other and deadlock ensues. When it does, t
33、he president may try to reassert decision-making authority by abusing the rule of law or the military may take it upon themselves to intervene. In semi-presidential systems, problems may also arise when the majority in the assembly is opposed to the president. In this case, though, there is deadlock
34、 between the president and the prime minister rather than between the president and the legislature. In semi-presidential systems, this problem of a divided executive is known as cohabitation. Linz and Stepan (1996: 286) identify the circumstances when the effects of cohabitation may be problematic:
35、When supporters of one or the other component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those q
36、uestioning one or the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail.In these circumstances, they argue that “policy conflicts often express themselves as a conflict between two branches of democracy” (ibid: 287). Each actor claims to be
37、the legitimate authority and tries to assume power at the expense of the other. Naturally enough, democracy as a whole can suffer.In fact, the problem of a divided executive under semi-presidentialism is compounded by the worry that intra-executive conflict may not be confined to periods of cohabita
38、tion. For Linz, semi-presidential systems are inherently problematic: “The result inevitably is a lot of politicking and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the struggle between the president and prime minister” (Linz 1994: 55). In this regard, Linz is
39、particularly concerned about the relationship between the executive and the military. In semi-presidential systems there may be three or even four major actors: the president, the prime minister, the minister for defence and the joint chief of staff of the armed forces. In this situation, he states:
40、 “The hierarchical line that is so central to military thinking acquires a new complexity” (ibid: 57). This complexity leaves room for “constitutional ambiguities regarding one of the central issues of many democracies: the subordination of the military to the democratically elected authorities and
41、hopefully to civilian supremacy” (ibid: 59). As we have seen, the absence of single point of contact is a reason why semi-presidentialism was rejected in Afghanistan.The problem of divided minority government in semi-presidential countriesThe third argument against semi-presidentialism is closer to
42、a problem usually associated with parliamentarism. In her work, Cindy Skach identifies this problem as divided minority government. She defines this situation as the case where “neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature
43、” (Skach 2005: 15). She says that this situation “can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other” (ibid: 17-18). In turn, the
44、situation can deteriorate: “The greater the legislative immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet reshuffling resulting from the minority position of the government, the more justified or pressured the president may feel to use their powers beyond their constitutional limit, for a prolonged
45、period of time” (ibid: 18). In other words, while the scenario is different from cohabitation, the result is the same. When the executive is weakened, in this case because of the absence of either a stable presidential or prime ministerial parliamentary majority, directly elected presidents feel the
46、 need to assert their control over the system and the process of democratisation suffers.Seemingly, therefore, there are good theoretical reasons to suggest that semi-presidentialism is problematic. To date, though, the arguments against semi-presidentialism remain largely untested. In the one stati
47、stical study of the performance of semi-presidentialism relative to that of parliamentarism and presidentialism, Moestrup (2007) has identified important regional differences. Specifically, she finds that while “semi-presidential regimes on average have performed worse than other regime types in the
48、 Americas and Asia, they appear to have performed better than parliamentary systems in Eastern Europe” (Moestrup 2007: 39). For the most part, though, evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism is largely qualitative. For example, Linz and Stepan argue that divided government was
49、 particularly difficult for Poland in the years immediately following democratisation. They state: “Because of party fragmentation and its dualistic deadlock, Polands efforts to advance toward a balanced budget and a mixed economy stalled” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 282). In her work, Skach has suggested that divided minority government contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar Germany and that it is one of the causes of the problems of democracy in contemporary Russia: “It was during the intense
