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1、International Bachelor of Economics and Business Economics (IBEB)Bachelor ThesisAn Analysis of the IMF Response to the 1997 Financial Crisis in ThailandRobert-Jan RuitingaStudent number: 287757Email: rj_ruitingaDate: 4th July 2007AbstractThe IMF blamed weak fundamentals for the onset of the Financia
2、l Crisis in Thailand and based its policy decisions on this view. The aid package sent to Thailand implicitly confined the Thai policy response to what the IMF had laid out. The IMFs strategy to rapid recovery did not meet its aims, instead prolonging and deepening the recession in Thailand. The fai
3、lure of the aid package can largely be attributed to misguided policies by the IMF, but the Royal Thai Government can be blamed for failing to pass adequate laws that were required to reform the economy. Table of ContentsGeneral Introduction 1Chapter 1 Origins of the Crisis2Section 1.1 Weak Fundamen
4、tals2Section 1.2 Reversal of Capital Flows and Panic4Section 1.3 Problems with the Fixed Exchange Rate6Section 1.4 The Crisis6Section 1.5 Crisis Models7Section 1.5.1 First Generation Model8Section 1.5.2 Second Generation Model8Section 1.5.3 Third Generation Model9Chapter 2 IMF Package Description11S
5、ection 2.1 Aims11Section 2.2 Strategy11Section 2.3 Proposed Implementation of the Strategy12Section 2.3.1 Structural Reforms12Section 2.3.2 Adjusting Macro-economic Policy14Section 2.3.3 Financial Aid15Section 2.3.4 Phase 2: Policy Alterations15Chapter 3 Impact of the Package16Section 3.1 The Impact
6、 of Restructuring the Financial Sector16Section 3.1.1 Recapitalising Banks16Section 3.1.2 Closing Weak Banks17Section 3.2 Impact of the Tight Monetary Policy19Section 3.2.1 Proponents of a High Interest Rate Policy20Section 3.2.2 Critics of a High Interest Rate Policy21Section 3.3 Impact of Fiscal P
7、olicy23Chapter 4 Were the Aims Met?26Chapter 5 Why did the Package Fail?28Section 5.1 Where the IMF is to Blame28Section 5.2 Where the Thai Government is to Blame30Section 5.3 Where the IMF and the Thai Government are to Blame32General Conclusion33Appendix34Bibliography37General IntroductionThailand
8、 had been growing at an average rate of eight percent per annum for three decades, with relatively low inflation, high saving rates and strong investment figures. As a result, the origins of the financial crisis that hit in July 1997 baffled many economists and are still subject to debate today. The
9、 crisis caused economic turmoil, with billions of dollars fleeing the country, bank lending grinding to a halt and firms going bankrupt as they were unable to repay the debts that they had accumulated in the years preceding the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), set up at Bretton Woods i
10、n 1944, stepped up to aid Thailand in its bid for a rapid recovery from the devastating impact of the events following the devaluation of the Thai Baht on July 2nd, 1997. The IMF believed that weak fundamentals lay at the heart of the problem and so their strategy aimed to reform these. Yet their ef
11、forts to restructure the financial sector and stabilise the volatile exchange rate were criticised as they seemed to make matters worse, rather than improve the situation. In the following five chapters, this paper makes an analysis of the success of the IMF response to the financial crisis that hit
12、 Thailand in 1997. Chapter 1 lays out various views on how the crisis originated. This helps the reader to understand why certain policies chosen by the IMF may have succeeded or failed. Chapter 2 describes the IMF aid package by summarising its aims and the strategy chosen to achieve these. A criti
13、cal analysis of the impact of this strategy is provided in Chapter 3. This chapter takes a look at the consequences of the chosen policies. Chapter 4 summarises whether the aims of the package, laid out in Chapter 2, were met. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at whether the packages failure was due to mista
14、kes made by the IMF, the Royal Thai government (RTG), or both.The paper concludes that the IMF implemented many misguided policies and to a large extent, the failure to meet the aims is down to such erroneous policy decisions. However, some blame must be attributed to the RTG, who failed to strength
15、en the necessary institutions which would have facilitated the implementation of the IMFs aid package. Chapter 1 Causes of the CrisisHow can a country that has grown strongly for decades suddenly be faced with one of the greatest financial crises to date? There are three main headings under which th
16、e origins of the crisis will be described in this chapter. These are: 1. Weak fundamentals2. Reversal of capital flows and panic3. Problems with the fixed exchange rateFollowing the exposition of the problems, three different models will be presented and applied to the crisis in Thailand to derive w
17、hich best suits the situation. These are the first, second and third generation models. Section 1.1 Weak FundamentalsThe International Monetary Fund believes that the root of the problem in Thailand was the presence of weak fundamentals, mainly an under regulated banking sector. These problems are n
18、ot directly visible through macro-economic data. Capital market liberalisation outpaced the implementation of adequate monitoring and supervision in the sector, leaving a weakened banking system. In addition, government guarantees on all bank liabilities created a moral hazard problem. Macro-economi
19、c indicators painted a misleading picture of the situation. In the years leading up to the crisis, economic figures presented a bright future for the Thai economy, leading to predictions that it would continue on its high growth path. Table 1 (see appendix) shows the economic outlook in the years be
20、fore the crisis and one year after. The table suggests that the Thai economy is healthy in the years leading up to the crisis. For example, an inflation rate of 5.9 percent is not high for a developing country. The government budget in 1996 is running a small surplus and foreign debt is negligible.
21、At first sight, the economy does not seem to be heading towards crisis. Capital markets had liberalised too quickly, resulting in unrestricted lending and a misallocation of capital. The Bank of Thailand had launched its Financial System Development Plans between 1990 and 1995, which included liftin
22、g the ceiling set for interest rates Medhi (1999) p396. Limits for borrowing funds to invest in real estate were also removed. These had been intended to protect the banks as the real estate market follows boom-bust cycles and may leave the banking sector exposed Stiglitz (2002) p101. As a result of
23、 these two changes, lending became unrestricted. A third factor fuelling the lending boom was weak corporate governance. Many banks or firms were family owned, resulting in demands for expansion for the sake of prestige. The strong relationship between owners of the bigger firms and top bank officia
24、ls also led to preferential treatment in the making of loans, another example of the misallocation of capital. Mishkin (1999) further explains how unrestricted lending led to a lending boom and excessive risk taking, observing that lending increased at such a rate that banks lacked the staff and exp
25、ertise to assess all the risks attached. Many believed that in an economy that had been growing at 10 percent for over a decade, it was difficult to make a bad loan. Flatters (1999) p3 Many loans were given out without checking the history of a customer. This led to a great potential for Non-Perform
26、ing Loans, which would eventually play a role in impeding the effectiveness of the banking sector. Second, if risks are not appraised properly, bad investments will be made. But such excessive risk taking leads to a misallocation of capital. Radelet and Sachs (1999) explain that due to the inadequat
27、e supervision and regulation, which had been unable to keep pace with the rapid capital market liberalisation, banks were taking too much risk, endangering their own position and thereby the position of the entire economy. The unrestricted lending also led to a booming real estate market, where many
28、 manufacturers redirected the funds from bank loans away from the production sector to invest in real estate Medhi (1999) p405. Investing in a non-productive sector weakens the potential for economic growth. A bubble soon formed in the real estate market which would have devastating effects when it
29、collapsed. The presence of moral hazard problems stimulated overinvestment and further misallocation of capital. The Thai government made claims that it would back all the banks financially. Radelet and Sachs (1999) believe that there was little question that many banks and firms expected government
30、 support. Flatters (1999) even provides evidence that this was the case, describing how the Financial Institute Development Fund (FIDF) was used to bail out financial institutions. By August 1996, only 9 billion Thai Baht had been issued to support two institutions. By December 1996, the FIDF had be
31、en called into action seven times, with a total spending of 27.5 billion Baht and by February 1997, a further eight interventions had warranted an additional 26.3 billion Baht bail out. In his paper What Happened to Asia? Krugman explains how these government guarantees, which he labels “crony capit
32、alism”, lead to over investment to the point where the marginal product of capital in the best state of the world falls to the world interest rate. As long as the taxpayers keep paying the bill, there is no limit to the situation. Krugman summarises the situation by presenting it as a game of “heads
33、 I win, tails taxpayer loses” Krugman (1998) p4. The government guarantees led to investments in projects with very low or even negative expected returns, a great misallocation of capital. The banking sector had other characteristics making it weak. Thai banks held a very low capital adequacy ratio,
34、 much lower than the eight percent required by the Basle Capital Accords. As a result, there were little reserves to protect depositors. In 1996 and 1997, Non-Performing Loan rates were rising, leaving depositors inadequately covered. The weak reserves position was amplified by the bad asset classif
35、ication system present, as many figures inflated or underreported. Very low levels of transparency in the sector were caused by unreliable, often delayed information on banking activities Flatters (1999) p18-20. This was eventually perceived by the market and led to a decrease in confidence in the b
36、anking sector. Section 1.2 Reversal of Capital Flows and PanicThe view that capital outflows and a self-fulfilling creditor panic were at the heart of the crisis is most often associated with those put forward by Radelet and Sachs in The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects (1
37、998). The authors argue that weak fundamentals are present, but these do not explain the abruptness and depth of the crisis. Therefore there must be something else at stake. The crisis occurs when the economy hits a bad equilibrium in a multiple equilibrium model, as further explained in later in th
38、is chapter in the Second Generation Model. A self-fulfilling panic leads to enormous capital outflows, as seen in Thailand, and can be caused when a substantial portion of capital is structured with very short term maturities. With a huge reversal in capital outflows, the exchange rate is placed und
39、er pressure and should it collapse, confidence in the economy may collapse alongside it. This section will look at how capital inflows were made possible before the crisis and how this contributed to the large reversal in capital flows. Following this, the amount of short term debt in Thailand and h
40、ow this led to a self-fulfilling panic will be discussed.The Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) played a large role in facilitating capital inflows, which were made attractive in part by the interest rate differential between Thailand and most western countries. This led to banks borrow
41、ing abroad and lending domestically. The BIBF, established in 1993 to help make Bangkok the financial centre of South East Asia, facilitated such borrowing agreements. Potential problems were arising as all the lending by the Bank of Thailand was done in foreign currency, often unhedged due to the f
42、ixed exchange rate. Exchange rate risk was, perhaps foolishly, assumed to be zero. When the Baht depreciated following its flotation, all firms who had borrowed in foreign currency suddenly faced enormous debts. Most went bankrupt as a result. According to Medhi (1999), the BIBF must shoulder part o
43、f the blame for facilitating the capital inflows in a way which helped create ills in the Thai economy. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) suggest that much of the capital inflows, especially short term debt, were a result of the artificially lowered price of short term borrowing from abroad, in which the B
44、IBF played a role. This view is supported by Alba, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999) which highlights the surge in short term debt, which was made possible by the BIBF. The role of this short term debt would prove pivotal in the onset of the crisis and initiating a self-fulfilling panic.If short term de
45、bt is invested into long term projects, a sudden recalling of loans could lead to major problems for the debtors. If investors and banks start to doubt whether or not loans are going to be repaid, they may recall these loans. When, indeed, these loans cannot be repaid, more doubts arise and more loa
46、ns will be recalled. The phenomenon of herding could then occur, leading to large capital outflows which have a crushing effect on the economy. Thailand was very vulnerable to such an event. Furman and Stiglitz (1999) explain how such vulnerability can be measured. They point to the importance of th
47、e Short-Term debt to Reserves ratio. This is not a good measure of solvency, but does measure liquidity. A high ratio may signal imprudent macro-economic policies, as short term debt is more risky to use and therefore may suggest that a government is in trouble. Mishkin (1999) explains that short te
48、rm debt increases the risk taken by a country, as such debts in foreign currency (as was the case in Thailand) would increase the debt burden in case of devaluation, resulting in a decline of the net worth of assets, thereby reducing the collateral held by borrowing firms. To summarise, the Short-Term debt to Reserves ratio can be used as an indicator of the vulnerability of a country to a
