《补贴的竞争—毕业论文外文翻译.doc》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《补贴的竞争—毕业论文外文翻译.doc（9页珍藏版）》请在三一办公上搜索。
1、外文翻译原文：Private Provision of Rural Infrastructure Services:Competing for SubsidiesBy Bjrn Wellenius, Vivien Foster, and Christina Malmberg-CalvoThree billion people live in rural areas worldwide and many lack communication, electricity, water, sanitation, and transportation services that are deemed e
2、ssential for economic development and directly impact the quality of life. Monopoly provision ,inmost countries by the public sector, often leads to high investment and running costs,weak operation and maintenance,and limited responsiveness to local needs.Marketdistortions,government intervention,an
3、d hidden subsidies fail to promote efficient use ofresources to meet social objectives,effectively target the poor,account for costs andbenefits,or reduce dependence on subsidies.Market-oriented economic reforms have opened the way to more effective solutions forinfrastructure services based on priv
4、ate sector provision,cost recovery through tariffs,increasingly competitive markets,and regulation where sufficient competition does notmaterialize.These reforms aim at accelerating service growth and innovation,makingproduction more efficient,and increasing responsiveness to differing user needs an
5、d payment capabilities.Gaps typically remain,however,between what service providers are prepared to dosolely on commercial grounds and what governments consider necessary from broaderdevelopment perspectives.Many rural areas and,to a lesser extent,low-income urbanareas,continue to be excluded.Subsid
6、ies may be justified to narrow these gaps.Loosely speaking,a subsidy exists whenthe costs incurred in supplying a service are not fully recovered from the revenues raisedby selling this service,the difference being met by other customers in the same or relatedindustries or by governments(Waddams Pri
7、ce 2000).The economic rationale forsubsidy is based on the existence of consumption and production externalities,networkexternalities,and scale economies.Also,access to these services at affordable prices isconsidered essential to enable the rural population to participate equitably and effectivelyi
8、n a modern society(Serra 2000).Rural subsidy practicesIn the context of market-oriented economic policies, subsidies for rural infrastructureservices aim at developing sustainable markets for the private provision of these services.Subsidies are designed to turn socially desirable investments that a
9、re not profitable bythemselves into commercially viable undertakings. Projects that are not demonstrablygood for society at large or are unlikely to ever stand on their own do not justify subsidysupport and are seldom undertaken.Good subsidy practice commits all participants to contribute to financi
10、ng the provision of services:Service providers invest and risk their own resources to set up the facilities andprovide the services during a given time under specified conditions.Government subsidies help service providers meet some investment and start-upcosts. Subsidies are designed to reduce acce
11、ss barriers to which low-income groupsare especially sensitive, such as initial connection, equipment, or installation charges.Customers pay for the use of services at least as much as is needed to meet operatingand maintenance costs. Where domestic installations are involved, customers are alsorequ
12、ired to pay part of the investment cost, as a confirmation of economic demand forservice and commitment to pay for service use. Consumption is subsidized onlyexceptionally and limited to small amounts of service regarded as essential.The design of subsidies is closely tied to the available service d
13、elivery mechanisms.Subsidies are channeled through the service supply chain in ways that aim at beingneutral with respect to competition among service providers, service alternatives, and technologies.Water supplyPotable water and, to a lesser extent, sanitation services, are often a priority for ru
14、ralcommunities. Willingness to pay for improved services depends on the distance to, andquality of, existing sources of water and sanitation facilities, as well as the consumersperceptions of the health threats of unimproved services. Solutions to improved watersupplies in rural areas are almost alw
15、ays localized, the water supply (be it ground orsurface water) and its treatment and distribution being provided in each community as astand-alone system. Network solutions only make economic sense in areas where watersources are scarce or expensive, or where communities are close to one another. Fo
16、r eachwater technology there are also service level options, which can range from sharedfacilities (public stand posts or community hand pumps) to house connections (individualhand pump, yard tap, or in-house plumbing). For sanitation services the choice oftechnology and service level depends on pop
17、ulation size and concentration, water servicelevel and consumption rates, and soil permeability. For most rural areas in developingcountries, the appropriate solution will be an on-site sanitation system (latrine or septictank). Piped sewer and wastewater treatment systems are sometimes installed in
18、 largercommunities, but costs are high.After years of struggling to achieve sustainable rural water systems scattered incommunities across the rural landscape, most countries have now shifted from centralizedsupply-driven service provision models to decentralized demand-responsive ones. Ruralwater s
19、ystems are often financed and constructed through programs managed byspecialized national or regional agencies, and then handed over to be operated andmaintained by community-based organizations, such as water committees andcooperatives.14 Community-based organizations have done well managing the da
20、y-to-dayoperations of simple water and sanitation systems, although they often operate on verytenuous financial grounds and are unable to accumulate savings or develop the technicalcapacity to undertake major repairs or system expansions. Countries are now looking fornew models of sustainable rural
21、water systems, increasingly turning to the private sectorto help run existing services through management contracts, leases, and concessions.There are recent cases of applying competition among firms for subsidized concessionsto provide new connections and upgrade existing systems.In Paraguay the ta
22、rget is to provide piped water service to about 2.0 million people inrural areas, reaching 85 percent population coverage by 2010. During a pilot project, thenational agency responsible for service provision (SENASA) invited competitive bids fora 10-year exclusive concession to design, build, and op
23、erate water supply systems in foursmall towns with a combined population of about 12,000. The concessionaire receives aone-time subsidy of $150 per completed connection. Prior to bidding the tariff was fixedat $5.26 per month for unmetered connections and at $3.95 per month for the first 12 m3plus $
24、0.53 per additional m3 for metered connections, subject to periodic adjustmentsfollowing a formula. Design and service standards (water quality, continuity, pressure)were also set upfront. The concession was awarded to a consortium of constructioncontractors and a local water system operator that bi
25、d to charge the lowest connection feeto users ($62). Three bilateral contracts among SENASA, the communities, and thecontractor-operator tie all parties into the project.15 As of August 2003, two of the foursystems had been completed and were in operation.16 A second tender was underpreparation for
26、a larger, multi-community concession in Nanawa, Puerto Falcn, andBeteretecue near Asuncin, expected to serve 7,600 users. In this second pilot, the tariffand the connection charges have been agreed in advance with participating communities.The one-time subsidy required by bidders will be used as the
27、 bidding variable (Dreesetal. 2001).In Colombia, construction companies are invited to bid for contracts to build and operatewater and sewerage systems for 10 to 15 years in about 25 small municipalities with lessthan 12,000 inhabitants. These contracts are awarded to the bidders that request thelow
28、est one-time subsidy for investment. Investments are expected to be in the range of$0.5-1.0 m per municipality. Subsidies cover about 70 percent of investment, averagingabout $300 per connection or $60 per person served. Only municipalities that agree totariffs meeting at least operating and mainten
29、ance costs are eligible to participate.Contracts are signed between the constructor-operator companies and the municipalities,13the latter being responsible for supervision (which may be subcontracted, for example toan external auditor) and enforcement. The proportion of households connected to pipe
30、dwater is expected to increase in 2 to 5 years (varying among municipalities) from lessthan 60 percent to over 90 percent, and the proportion connected to public seweragesystems from less than 30 percent to over 75 percent (World Bank 2001). A pilot projectin the town of Nataga achieved 100 percent
31、water coverage (up from 70 percent), 100percent sewerage coverage (up from 50 percent), and 24 hours/day continuity of watersupply (up from 2 hours/day) within two years of signing the contract.(over)Source:World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3365, August 2004译文：农村公共基础设施服务的私人供给：补贴的竞争 作者：比约韦勒纽斯，
32、福斯特，卡沃尔 世界上有多达30亿的人口住在农村地区，而大部分地区都缺少通讯，电力，饮水，卫生设备和交通等服务。这些都是经济发展所必不可少的，它们直接影响人们的生活质量。在很多国家这些供给都由公共部门垄断，这样的供给往往是高投资，低回报，运营水平低和维护不及时，并且对当地需求的变化反应也不及时。市场规避，政府介入，还有隐性的补贴，这些都难以对资源形成有效的利用，从而不能满足社会需求；不能对穷人进行专门补贴；不能说清成本与收益或者减低对补贴的依赖。 市场导向的经济改革已经向能够更加有效的供给基础设施服务的方案敞开大门。这些改革建立在竞争日渐激烈的市场和没有具体化的充分竞争的市场规章的基础上，通过
33、税收制度来回收成本。这些改革旨在加速服务增长和创新，使产品供给更加有效，提高对不同用户的需求和支付能力的反应速度。 但是，服务供给者只准备在商业范围内供给服务，这和政府扩大供给范围的愿景之间存在差距。很多农村地区，或者退一步讲，低收入的农村地区，仍然没被包括在内。. 补贴也许能被证明是缩小差距的正确手段。宽泛的讲，当供给服务的成本小于收入时，补贴就会发生。差额由政府或用户以及其他企业支付。补贴的经济学原理是建立在消费和产品外在性，网络外在性，和规模经济的基础上的。在可接受的价格范围内获得这些服务被认为是能够让农村地区人们公平有效的加入现代社会的必要条件。农村地区补贴实践： 在市场导向的经济政策
34、大背景下，对农村地区公共基础设施的补贴旨在发展私人供给服务的市场。补贴被设计成能够使在商业方面上的不盈利的投在转到社会需求投资上来。大致上不确定对社会有用或者很可能跟原来政策方向不一样的计划很难被继续实施： 1、好的补贴实践能让参与方都对服务供应商提供经济支持：服务提供者为自己的资金投资而承担风险，建立一些基本的设施，并在一定条件下在给定时间内提供服务。 2、政府帮助服务提供者具备充足的投资启动资金。补贴被用来减少低收入群体特别是敏感群体的进入壁垒，比如，初始连接，装备，设施收费。对顾客的收费能够至少弥补日常运营与维护成本。 3、与顾客关系密切的家庭设施，顾客需要支付一部分投资成本，弥补服务的
35、投入成本以及服务的使用成本。只对例外的和必要的小额消费进行补贴。 补贴的设置与可取的服务输送机制紧密联系在一起。补贴通过服务供应链流转。补贴会通过各种方式发放给服务供应商。饮水供给： 饮用水，或者退一步说，卫生系统服务，在农村地区经常是优先得到的。为改良的服务付费的意愿随服务距离和服务质量，水质，卫生设备，还有顾客的健康观念而定。农村地区改良用水的解决方案经常具有地方特色，水处理和输送服务常被作为是一个该地区的突出系统。在水资源稀缺或者社区相聚较近的地区，联网解决方案具有经济意义。不同的产水技术有与其相应的服务水平选项，这些选项范围从共用设施到家庭终端等。卫生系统的服务水平与技术选择则根据人口
36、规模与卫生要求程度，供水服务水平，消费税等而定。比较适合发展中国家大部分农村地区的解决方案是实地卫生系统。有时候在一些大型社区里面会装一些阴沟和污水处理系统，但是成本很高。 在经过为获得被分散在农村各个地区的合理的供水系统奋斗了数年后，很多国家现在把集中的供应驱动式的服务供给模式转变为分散的需求驱动式的供应模式。农村地区的供水系统一般由特定的国家机构或地方机构出资修建，然后交由非营利性公众组织运营管理，比如，供水合作委员会。公众组织在简单的供水与卫生系统上做的越来越好，虽然他们只是处理一些简单小额的项目而且还不能积累资金或者发展技术来升级完善系统完善。越来越多的国家正在寻找新的可持续的农村供水
37、系统模式，大部分倾向于通过管理合同，租赁合同或者特许权的形式来让私人部门运营现有服务系统。 最近有几个供应竞争的例子。有些企业为特定补贴而提供新终端并进行现有系统升级。 在巴拉圭，它的目标是在2010年前对多达2百万的农村人口提供自来水服务，使覆盖率达到85%。在一场小规模试验计划中，负责提供服务的国家机构争取了一个10年的独家特权用来设计，建造并运营供水系统，而这个系统覆盖4个小镇，12000人。特许权获得者将能得到每终端150美元的补贴。在投标前，为未计量的终端征收的税被定在5.26美元每月以及最初12立方米的每月3.95美元的税加上未计量过的终端的额外每立方米0.53美元的税，从而使服从
38、于原则上的周期性调整。设计和服务标准也在之前确立。特许权将被给向终端使用收费最低的地方供水系统和建筑承包商。双方合同将把SENASA，社区，还有承包商运营商全多联系到服务中去。截止2003年8月，四个系统中两个已经完成并投入运营。在波多黎各的纳纳瓦和靠近进亚松森的地区，第二个投标正在进行当中。它将拥有更大更多社区的特许权，并能满足7600人的使用。在第二次试验中，税和终端点收费已经实现与参加试验的社区谈妥。投标人所要求的一次性补贴将被作为招标变量使用。在哥伦比亚，建筑承包公司经常被邀请投标建立并运营水和污物处理系统10到25年。地区则一般是总人口小于12000的小自治区。这些合同一般会给投资补贴要求最低的竞标者。投资预计将在0.5到1.0美元每直辖市米。补贴将包含70%的投资，也就是300美元每终端点或者60美元每服务对象。只有同意支付至少涵盖运营与维护成本的费用的自治区才有资格参加。合同双方是承建运营商和自治区，后者将对监督和项目实施负责。家庭自来水用户预计将在未来2到5年内由不足60%提高到90%,而使用污水处理系统的比例由不足30%提高到超过70%。供水覆盖率在纳纳瓦镇达到了100%，而污水处理系统覆盖率也达到了同样的水平，在两年内达到24小时连续供水的合同也已经签署。出处：世界银行政策研究工作文件3365号。2004年8月。
