电气类外文翻译基于继电保护的电力系统监控设备.doc

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1、 Power System Monitoring and Control Facilities on Protective Relays Abstract: It is now possible to consider integrating the functions of the power system protection systems with those of the local and remote data collection and control systems. A structured approach to this integration is necessar

2、y. However, if the full benefits are to be realized. A solution which will solve many of the problems previously associated with this integration is presented together with an example of how it might in future be applied in a typical substation. Keywords: Digital communications, Integration 1. Intro

3、duction The current practice in power system transmission and distribution environments is to separate the functions of the local control, protection and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. One reason for this has been the technical constraint that has limited the amount of int

4、egration which can be reliably achieved. Local control facilities have consisted of hardwired panels taking up much control room space. Control logic has been provided by hardwired contacts or programmable logic controllers. Until recently much of the protection equipment has consisted of analogue d

5、evices, again taking up much space. Most modern protection devices using electronic and microprocessor technologies have so far concentrated on reducing the space taken to implement traditional protection functions. Generally, SCADA systems have been added more recently and have supplied their own t

6、ransducers, interface units and wiring. These have grown up in parallel with the local control and protection systems despite the fact that this often resulted in much functional duplication. Where information concerning the protection operation has been required by the SCADA system this has been de

7、rived in a secondary fashion, for example, feeding the protection outputs back into SCADA digital input units. Recent technology advances have led to the realization that this degree of duplication is becoming less and less necessary. Given infinite computing power it could be argued that the inform

8、ation necessary to perform protection functions is all available or can be made available on the SCADA network. It is conceivable then that the SCADA system could perform its own protection algorithms and issue its own trip signals through its control network. In practice reliability requirements an

9、d the need for rapid fault clearances have limited this approach to a few specialized instances such as long time thermal overload protection. A far more viable approach is to make the information and control facilities within the relay available to the SCADA network. If this is done many of the cos

10、ts associated with the SCADA analogue and digital I/O systems can be reduced. Additionally, if control facilities provided within the protection equipment are utilized, a central substation computer can also be used to replace much of the local control system. One reason for the failure of systems t

11、o integrate protection functions within an overall control package is the sheer amount of processing required. Modern digital protection relays use state of the art microprocessors to provide complex protection functions. When many of these are spread around a substation it is clear that the process

12、ing power required to absorb their functions at a central point is formidable. On the other hand the analogue and digital transducers used by the SCADA system are relatively simple devices as are the digital output units. Their equivalents already exist within the protection and making them availabl

13、e to the SCADA system often requires little more than the addition of communications facilities. The ability of the protection equipment to replace much of the local control and SCADA I/O systems hinges on the ability of the protection equipment to communicate in a structured and deterministic way.

14、It is essential that the protection performance is not compromised whilst at the same time the requirements of the local control and the SCADA systems are still met. From the local control and SCADA point of view the principal requirements are for analogue inputs for measurement and data logging, di

15、gital input data for annunciators and alarms, and digital outputs for controlling plant. Most measurement data is used for general indication purposes where an accuracy off 5% is sufficient. Analogue and digital data used for visual indications and data logging require scan rates of around once a se

16、cond. Where sequence of event recording is required relative accuracy across the system is more important than absolute accuracy. Generally a resolution of 1ms should be aimed for. Control response times should be around 200ms. 2. Protective Relay Communications 2.1 Communications Philosophy The pro

17、tective relays prime function remains the protection of the power system. It is essential therefore that the relays protection performance is not compromised by the requirements of data monitoring and control. For this reason it is considered necessary to provide monitoring and control communication

18、s separate from any communications requirements of the protection. Thus in a blocking scheme for example, blocking signals would be transmitted over their own protection signaling link e.g. pilot wires, and not over the monitoring and control communications link. In this way the deterministic behavi

19、or of the protection is maintained. Also, there remains those users who do not yet need some or all of the features available .It is important for these users that the operation of the relay does not depend on the monitoring and control communications link and that the full protection capabilities c

20、an still be realized when such links have not been installed. The full benefits of relay communications will only be achieved if they can be installed at all the relevant points on a utilitys power system. This will not happen overnight and it is therefore very important that any chosen system can b

21、e installed on a piecemeal basis across a system as it becomes required. One of the major factors influencing the take up of relay communications will be the cost to the user. This cost consists not just of the additional cost of the hardware on the relay but also wiring costs, set-up and configurat

22、ion costs and on-going operational costs. It is important therefore that steps are taken to control all of these cost areas. Set against these costs should be the savings on the SCADA system and the operational savings which result from the increase in system data available. 2.2 Communications Topol

23、ogy It is possible to connect the SCADA system and the protective relays using a number of different communications topologies. The choice of topology is important as it has a direct bearing on the communications efficiency of the system. Figure 1: Simple Protection/SCADA Topology A simple form of c

24、onnection is to connect each relay separately to remote terminal units (RTUs) fitted with digital communications facilities. These RTUs in turn connect to the SCADA network -see Figure 1. These RTUs act as network switches, the main SCADA system being responsible for the actual polling of informatio

25、n. In this topology the protective relays have effectively become intelligent transducers. There is a saving for the SCADA system in terms of the transducers that have been replaced but this may be offset by the more complex RTUs. Even at this simple level however, there are benefits to the SCADA sy

26、stem in the amount of additional data that is available from the relays. Unfortunately it is this same increased amount of data which ultimately limits the performance of such systems. Figure 2: Use of Multidrop Connections An improved communications topology is illustrated in Figure 2. Several rela

27、ys are connected to a single RTU on a single communications spur. This relies on the protective relays being fitted with a communications link capable of multidrop connection. In this scheme the RTU is now responsible for the polling of all units attached. In this way information can be pre-processe

28、d and overall data rates can be reduced. This requires a more complex RTU, however a single RTU can handle more relays so fewer may be required and wiring complexity reduced. In theory this principle could be extended to the entire substation, using just one RTU to communicate with all protective re

29、lays. In practice this is not possible due to data rate considerations and is also undesirable from a reliability point of view. The number of devices which can be continuously monitored/controlled on a single channel is dependent on both the baud rate used and the amount of data to be transferred.

30、Figure 3: Use of Substation Central Computer A more sophisticated topology is shown in Figure 3. This topology utilizes an IBM PC compatible computer as a substation computer. Where reliability is thought to be a problem, a second slave computer is added in parallel with the first. The substation co

31、mputer replaces the RTUs described above and gives a number of advantages to the user. Firstly there is now a local control point within the substation in addition to the remote control facilities of the SCADA network. This can take the form of a mimic diagram program, complete with panel metering,

32、annunciators,.etc., freeing much of the local control system panel space if required. The substation computer is responsible for the continuous monitoring of all the connected devices and carries out substantial data pre- processing for the main SCADA system. In particular the PC performs local data

33、 logging to its own disk, relieving the SCADA system of a substantial processing burden, especially during and immediately following fault situations. This data is subsequently available both locally at the substation PC and remotely on the SCADA system, as required. The substation computer can also

34、 be used as a single access point to all relays at commissioning time. Separate communications spurs are likely to be taken to each substation section, each capable of supporting32 relays. Up to eight spurs can be provided by a single PC giving a theoretical capacity of 256 relays. On such a system

35、it is still possible for a modern PC to poll and extract data from each relay at a rate greater than once a second. In the unlikely event that this number of relays is insufficient further substation computers may be added. These may be independently connected into the SCADA system. Alternatively, a

36、n optional additional level of substation computer with the same control facilities, may be added, as in Figure 4. Note now that each substation computer may be physically remote. It is also worth noting that this final topology has in effect become a mini SCADA system in its own right. For many sma

37、ller utilities this solution may offer all the remote facilities required.Figure 4: Multi Level Topology 2.3 Communications Hardware Hardware for digital communications can take many forms, most of which are not suitable for use in power system environments. The first choice to be made is between pa

38、rallel and serial systems. Parallel systems involve the transmission of several bits of information concurrently over several separate wires (typically eight or sixteen). Such systems offer faster data transfer rates than serial systems but involve far higher wiring costs. For this reason they are n

39、ot suitable as a universal solution for power system monitoring and control. Serial communications involve the transmission of streams of data one bit at a time over a single pair of wires. Clearly wiring costs are reduced at the expense of overall data transmission rates which are proportionally lo

40、wer. For monitoring and control applications the slower data rates remain acceptable and serial type communications are used almost exclusively. The communications hardware most commonly used by protective relays at present conforms to the EIAs RS232 standard. This takes the form of the familiar 25

41、or 9 way D connector. This has usually been used to connect the relay to a personal computer (sometimes indirectly, via a modem) allowing the relay to be setup and allowing post fault information to be extracted. RS232 connections are convenient because of their almost universal availability. RS232

42、connections do have a number of limitations which make them less suitable in monitoring and control applications. The most serious of these is that RS232 is designed for point to point systems. A single device can only communicate with one other device over a given link.If communications with more d

43、evices are required, as they are for data monitoring and control within substations, separate links must be provided. Alternatively, multiplexers or code switches could be added though this would generally impose some sort of limitation on how the links are operated. RS232 also imposes a limit on th

44、e physical length of the communications link of just over 15, and a maximum data rate of 19.2kbaud. This can also be overcome but again requires additional equipment. Finally RS232 does not offer any significant level of isolation. Optically isolated RS232 ports can be created but these are expensiv

45、e. A more suitable communications standard is RS485. This allows for a multidrop system with up to 32 nodes on a single spur, sufficient to connect at least a single bay of relays. RS485 specifies a maximum transmission distance of 1200 metres and a maximum data rate over this distance of l00kbaud,

46、significantly further and faster than RS232. It uses a balanced driver and differential signaling which is less susceptible to interference than the unbalanced driver referenced to ground as used in RS232 systems. RS485 requires a single shielded twisted pair cable which is low cost and easy to term

47、inate. Within the electrical industry in general this has typically been terminated in either 25 or 9 way D connectors similar to those used by RS232. In a substation environment these connectors are not really suitable and a pair of conventional terminals is preferred. The use of optical fibres to

48、connect directly between relays remains expensive for most users, especially at distribution voltage levels. Fibres are however suitable for connecting the local network of relays to remote master stations where distances exceed 1200 metres or where the risk of interference is high. In such cases mo

49、dems are used to interface a group of relays to an optical fibre. As with electrical based communications, a number of different solutions are available. For distances of up to four or five kilometers, 850nm multimode fibres are quite adequate and offer relatively low complexity. For greater distances up to around 25 kilometres, 1300nm single mode fibres can be used. These require more complex transmitters and receivers, however their widespread use in the teleco

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