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1、宁波大红鹰学院毕业论文外文翻译所在学院： 专 业： 班 级： 08财管/国贸x班 学 号： 姓 名： 指导教师： 2014 年 11 月 3 日译文：题目： 上市公司股权激励问题研究 一、股权激励概述(一)股权激励的定义股权激励是通过经营者获得公司股权形式给予企业经营者一定的经济权利，使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策承担风险、分享利润，从而勤勉尽责地为公司长期发展服务的一种激励方法。(二)股权激励的作用1.激励作用使被激励者拥有企业的部份股权，用股权这个纽带将被激励者的利益与企业的利益紧紧绑在一起，实现对经营者的长期激励，使其能积极、自觉地按照实现企业既定目标的要求，为了实现企业利益和股东利
2、益的最大化而努力工作，释放出其人力资本的潜在价值，提高资本运营效率，提高生产率，增强企业凝聚力，并最大限度地降低监督成本。2.约束效应约束作用主要表现在两方面，一是因为被激励者与所有者已经形成了“一荣俱荣、一损俱损”的利益共同体，如果经营者因不努力工作或其它原因导致企业利益受损，比如出现亏损，则经营者会同其他股东一样分担企业的损失；二是通过一些限制条件(比如限制性股票) 使被激励者不能轻意离职若被激励者在合同期满前离职，则会损失一笔不小的既得经济利益。3.稳定与共赢由于股权激励工具都对激励对象行权条件中都附带有服务期的限制，使其不能轻易离职。特别是对于高管和技术骨干、销售骨干等“关键员工”，股
3、权激励的力度往往较大，所以股权激励对于稳定“关键员工”的作用也比较明显。实现了企业与员工长期稳定合作，结合利益共同体就形成个人与企业的共赢。二、上市公司实施股权激励的问题及成因分析(一)上市公司实施股权激励存在的问题1.股权激励实施受限从 2007 年 12 月 20 日启动的第二批股权激励，共有 26 家上市公司公布了股权激励计划，截止 2008 年底所有 26 家公司股价跌破行权价。但不同于2008 年，2009 年只有两家公司取消和否定了股权激励计划。2008年间高比例的公司提出了终止股权激励计划导致实施受限，从另一个侧面影射出股权激励实施过程中必然存在一些问题。2.股权激励对象考核方法
4、单一从下表中发现，目前对绝大多数上市公司的激励对象的考核是以会计指标为基础，且大部分公司采用了 2 到 3 个财务指标，即主要以净利润增长率、净资产收益率为主要指标。激励对象存在辞职套现行为。伴随着上市公司高管股权激励热潮的是大批高管辞职套现。三花股份披露的2007年年报表明，2006年3月份辞职的该公司1名原副总裁、2名董事，2007年分别减持了所持有的全部三花股份 88.83 万股和 50.10 万股；该公司原董事长张亚波于2007年4月辞去董事长及董事职务，其以“高管股份”形式锁定的565万的股份在2007年11月9日也已自动解除锁定，获得上市流通权。虽然还不能断言上市公司高管辞职的主要
5、原因就是为了套现，但是拥有大量上市公司股份却又不具有控股权的高管所表现出的强烈减持套现的动机值得警醒。(二)上市公司股权激励问题成因分析1.股票期权行权价设定不当影响激励效果股票期权计划能否对经营者实现激励以及激励程度的大小取决于行权价的制定，而行权价又以股权激励行权时公司股票价格为依据。市场有效时，经营者通过努力工作使企业业绩提升，股票价格能及时反映该变化，经营者通过行权就能获利，股票期权因此就能实现激励功能。若市场无效，股票价格对经营者的经营业绩和企业价值不敏感甚至负向反映，股价的变动不仅取决于经理人本身努力，宏观经济、行业发展等因素对股票价格影响都非常大，这就有可能在制定行权价时出现极大
6、的偏差，还可能在经营者通过努力经营，提高公司业绩，企业价值上升后，而股票价格却没有完全反映出，这样就会损害经营者的期权利益，挫伤其积极性。因此在设定股票期权价格时应剔除系统因素的影响，在整体经济波动时进行动态行权价格的确定，增强股票期权激励的有效性。2.企业的业绩评价体系不完善目前推出的股权激励方案中，经营者绩效评价考虑的因素不全面，主要侧重评价财务绩效(仅运用了财务指标)，指标比较单一，几乎均以ROE 和净利润增长率为评价指标。财务评价指标只反映结果，不反映过程，会造成企业管理层过分注重历史，而缺少对未来业绩的预测，片面追求暂时的盈利能力取得和维持短期的财务成果，助长其急功近利和短期投机的行
7、为。使投资者不能全面了解企业的经营状况，不利于资本的优化配置，一定程度上导致了企业过度注重财务绩效，而忽视了影响企业长远发展的有关事项。因此，在对激励对象评价考核时还应加入非财务指标。3.股权激励约束机制不健全上市公司内部治理结构比较混乱，所有权缺位导致产权制度混乱，有很多上市公司有执行董事参与薪酬委员会决策，薪酬委员会主席由公司董事长或母公司领导兼任，就是说制定经理层激励计划的“薪酬委员会”成员与享受激励的高管层重叠，实质上变成了自己给自己制定激励标准。股权激励计划的制定者与激励对象没有分离，加上缺乏股东的有效监督，导致股权激励门槛较低，高管普遍均享受到股权激励，股权激励变相的变成了一种股权
8、分红。在退出机制及相关限制条件的设计上较为宽松，股权激励的有效期限也较短，高管在短期内就能通过行权获得大量收益，这种现象与股权激励机制的长期性相违背，因此上市公司对股权激励计划的内部约束形同虚设。三、解决上市公司股权激励问题的对策(一)完善公司治理结构公司治理不完善，在“内部人控制”的情况下引入股权激励，必然出现经营者为自己定薪定股，损害公司和股东利益的情况。健全的公司治理结构是上市公司健康运行的重要制度基础，也是股权激励机制发挥作用的必要条件，设立独立董事制度，监督董事会对人事、薪酬、战略等重大问题的决策的合法性、公正性、独立性；设立监事会制度，保证公司内部治理层面董事会相关决策有益于公司的
9、整体利益，同时也确保监督管理层执行董事会决策更具有效性；建立内控制度，对企业内部各项业务活动进行有效控制；建立审计委员会制度，对企业内部财务运行机制有效地进行监管。为了避免监事会人员和董事会人员由于长期“磨合”，使约束失效，监事会人员应采用轮换制，每3 年或 5 年进行一次人员调整。(二)健全独立董事制度上市公司基本均聘任了独立董事，对上市公司的内部业务起到一定的监督作用，但是引入独立董事制度的时间较短，各种配套制度和外部环境还不完善，在一定程度上制约了其的充分发挥。很多公司都是由大股东或管理层向董事会提出独立董事人选，再以董事会的名义提名，这样的提名机制难以保障独立董事独立于大股东和管理层，
10、独立董事个体独立性与整体独立性则受到影响，导致董事会控制力弱化。还有不少独立董事缺乏企业管理的经验，对企业的运作不熟悉，难以担负起监督公司规范运作的重任，同时上市公司还会出于各种考虑，尽量不提供或少提供不利于公司的资料，甚至有意不通知独立董事参加董事会会议，造成独立董事无法获取充足的信息，致使独立董事的知情权很难得到保证，难以发挥其作用。(三)实施企业文化理念激励1.塑造企业文化进行精神激励企业文化是企业的精神文化、制度文化和物质文化的总和，是企业长期经营发展过程中逐渐形成的适合本组织特点的经营理念，由于优秀的企业能带给员工强烈的归属感、荣誉感及积极的精神状态，因此企业文化的塑造已成为当代企业
11、精神激励的重要手段。在员工进入企业后，定期对员工进行企业价值、理念的培训，并经常组织企业内部团队活动，增强企业荣誉感，使员工切实体会到个人与集体形成的共同体，这样员工才有动力尽心尽力为企业贡献自己的能力。2.运用企业贡献值法增强员工归属感增强企业归属感可以通过建立员工企业累计贡献值档案的方式，每一名进入企业的员工都会设置自己的企业贡献值档案，由人事部统一管理。企业必须有完整的评判系统，基本思路是员工对企业的贡献值通过累计贡献值分体现，每 1分为一个贡献值。在评分体系中设立团队加分和个人加分体系，二者不冲突，可以重复累加。每个车间或部门都可成为一个团队，企业对每个团队都有相对应的考核指标，每个月
12、对每个团队都有最低分 10 分，即整体旷工率在正常范围内即可获得；业绩方面，若团队能完成每月任务可加分 50，高出目标的百分点也会体现在加分上，例如，若本月生产车间目标生产100件产品并且次品率在 2%以内，实际完成200 件产品且次品率均在 2%以内，则本月团队中每个人会加分50+50(200- 100)/100=100。每年年末人事部门对每个人和各部门当年企业贡献值进行核算，同时算出累计贡献值，根据当年企业贡献值高低确定评出一定数量的年度优秀员工和优秀团队，每个部门由于工作性质、员工人数等因素不同所分到得优秀员工比例也不同，需要人事部门认真权衡。对于优秀员工和优秀团队每年中会有贡献值奖励分
13、，同时配以物质激励(如现金激励、股权激励等)。原文：Listed Companies Incentive Research1、Overview of equity incentive 1.1 The definition of equity incentive Equity incentive is obtained in the form of company shares by operators to give business owners a certain economic rights, enabling them to participate in corporate deci
14、sion-making capacity as shareholders risk, profit-sharing, so that due diligence services for the companys long-term development of an incentive method . 1.2 The role of incentive stock options 1.2.1 The incentives So be excited owned a minority share of enterprises with equity this link will be exc
15、ited with the interests of those companies closely tied together, to achieve long-term incentive for operators to enable them to actively and consciously in accordance with established enterprise requires that the target in order to achieve corporate interests and maximize the interests of sharehold
16、ers and work hard, releasing the potential value of their human capital, improve capital operational efficiency, increase productivity, enhance cohesion and minimize monitoring costs. 1.2.2 Confinement effect Constraints role is mainly manifested in two aspects, one is excited because the owner has
17、been formed by a prosperity, a loss for both sides, the interests of the community, if the operators do not work hard or because of other reasons, to the detriment of the interests of enterprises, such as the emergence losses, the operators jointly with other shareholders share the same loss of busi
18、ness; the second is through a number of constraints (such as restricted stock) so that those who can not lightly be excited to leave - if they are excited by leaving before the contract expires, it will lost a small fortune vested economic interests. 3. Stability and win Since the equity incentive t
19、ools for incentive target vesting conditions are included with limited service period, it can not easily leave. Especially for executives and technology backbone, the backbone of sales and other key employees equity incentive efforts tend to be larger, so the equity incentive for stability key emplo
20、yees role is relatively obvious. Enterprises and employees to achieve a long-term stable cooperation, combining to form a community of interests and win-win for individuals and businesses. 2、The problem and cause analysis of listed companies equity incentive 2.1 A listed company equity incentive Pro
21、blems 2.1.1 The implementation of restricted stock incentive From December 20, 2007 start of the second batch of incentive, a total of 26 listed companies announced equity incentive plan, as of the end of 2008 all 26 companys share price fell below the exercise price. But unlike 2008, in 2009 only t
22、wo companies to cancel and deny the equity incentive plan. 2008 between a high proportion of the company proposed a termination causes the implementation of restricted stock incentive plan, mapping out from the other side, there are some issues of equity incentive implementation process inevitable.
23、2.1.2 Assessment of equity incentive target single Found from the table below, the vast majority of listed companies is currently the object of the assessment is based on incentive-based accounting indicators, and most of the company adopted the 2-3 financial indicators, ie mainly in the net profit
24、growth, return on net assets was the main indicators. Presence resign cash incentive target behavior. Along with executives of listed companies is a large number of equity incentive boom executives to resign cash. 2007 Annual Report of the shares of three flowers disclosures show that in March 2006
25、the resignation of a former vice president of the company, two directors, 2007 were reduced holdings of shares held by all three spent 88.83 million shares and 50.10 million shares; the companys former chairmanin April 2007 resigned as chairman and director, 5,650,000 shares of its order, senior sha
26、res form has been automatically locked unlocked in the November 9, 2007, to obtain tradable. Although executives of listed companies can not assert that the main reason for the resignation is to cash in, but does have a large number of shares of a listed company but does not have a controlling inter
27、est motives executives exhibited strong cash holdings worth alert. 2.2 Equity Incentive Cause Analysis of Listed Companies 2.2.1 The stock option exercise price is set improperly influence the incentive effect Stock option plan can achieve the incentive for operators as well as the degree of excitat
28、ion depends on the development of the exercise price, the exercise price and the right line again equity incentive is based on the companys stock price. When the market effectively, operators work hard to enable enterprises to enhance the performance, stock prices can reflect this change, the operat
29、or will be able to profit through the exercise of stock options and therefore be able to achieve excitation function. If the market is not valid, the stock prices on the operators operating performance and business value is not sensitive to reflect or even negative changes in the stock price depends
30、 not only on factors that efforts managers themselves, macroeconomic, industry and other effects on stock prices are very large, which there may be significant variation in the development of the exercise price, the operator may operate through efforts to improve the performance of the company, afte
31、r rising corporate value, while the stock price has not fully reflected, which would harm the interests of the operators option dampen their enthusiasm. Therefore, the price should be set at Excluding the impact of stock option system factors, overall economic fluctuations during dynamic exercise pr
32、ice is determined, enhance the effectiveness of incentive stock options. 2.2.2. The enterprise performance evaluation system is imperfect Currently launched equity incentive program, the factors considered by the operator performance evaluation is not comprehensive, focused primarily on the evaluati
33、on of financial performance (using only the financial indicators), indicator is relatively simple, almost are ROE and net profit growth for the evaluation. Financial evaluation reflect only the results do not reflect the process will result in an excessive focus on the history of corporate managemen
34、t, and the lack of future performance prediction, one-sided pursuit of profitability temporarily obtain and maintain short-term financial results, contributing to its quick success and short-term speculative behavior . So that investors can not fully understand the business situation is not conduciv
35、e to optimal allocation of capital, partly the result of excessive focus on financial performance of the enterprise, while ignoring relevant matters affecting the long-term development of enterprises. Therefore, in the assessment and evaluation of incentive targets should also be added to the non-fi
36、nancial indicators. 2.2.3 Equity Incentive mechanism is not perfect Internal governance structure of listed companies is a bit confusing, ownership of the property rights system resulting in the absence of confusion, a lot of executive directors of listed companies to participate in the decision-mak
37、ing of the Remuneration Committee, the Chairman of the Remuneration Committee led by the chairman or part-time parent, that the development of Executive Incentive Plan members of the remuneration Committee overlap with senior executives enjoy incentives, in essence, become his own incentive to devel
38、op their own standards. Makers with the incentive target equity incentive plan no separation, coupled with the lack of effective supervision of shareholders, resulting in a lower equity incentive threshold, executives were generally enjoy the incentive, equity incentive becomes a disguised equity di
39、vidends. In the design of the exit mechanism and associated restrictions on the more relaxed, equity incentive shorter validity period, executives in the short term will be able to get a lot of benefits through exercise, a phenomenon with a long-term equity incentives contrary, so Chinas listed comp
40、anies equity incentive plan for internal constraints useless. 3、The shares of listed companies the incentive problem solving strategies 3.1 Improve the corporate governance structure Corporate governance is imperfect, the introduction of equity incentive under internal control, the operators set the
41、ir own salary for a given situation stocks, damage to the company and shareholders interests inevitable. Sound corporate governance structure of listed companies is an important basis for the healthy operation of the system, but also the role of equity incentives necessary condition for the establis
42、hment of an independent director system, supervisory board on major issues of personnel, payroll, and other strategic decisions of legality, impartiality, independence; set up a board system to ensure that the overall interests of the internal corporate governance-related decision-making level, the
43、Board of Directors for the company, but also to ensure the supervision of the management of the Executive Board of the effectiveness of decision-making and more; the establishment of internal control system, the business activities of the enterprise to effectively control ; set up an audit committee
44、 system of internal financial operation mechanism effectively regulated. In order to avoid the Supervisory Board and board personnel due to the long run so that constraint failure, the Board of Supervisors should adopt the rotation system, every three years or five years to conduct a personnel adjus
45、tments. 3.2 Improve the independent director system Chinas listed companies are hired basically independent directors of listed companys internal business play a supervisory role, but the time of the introduction of the independent director system is short, various ancillary systems and the external
46、 environment is not perfect, to a certain extent, restricted its full play. Many companies are major shareholders or management proposed by the independent director candidates to the Board, on behalf of the board of directors nominated again, this mechanism is difficult to guarantee the nomination o
47、f independent directors independent of the major shareholders and management, independent directors individual independence and the independence of the whole affected, resulting in weakening of the board control. There are a lot of independent directors lack experience in corporate management, are n
48、ot familiar with the operation of the enterprise, it is difficult to assume the important task of supervising the business operation, but also for a variety of considerations listed companies, try not to provide less detrimental to the companys offer information, even deliberately not notified of independent directors to attend board meetings, causing the independent directors can not get enough information, resulting in right of independent directors is difficult to be assured that it is difficult to play its role. 3.3 The implementation of
