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1、非上市公司的融资结构外文翻译 外文翻译The financing structure of non-listed firms Material Source:google Author: Suzan Hol and Nico Van Der Wijst INTRODUCTION Only a very small minority of European ?rms is listed on a stock exchange. In Norway, for example, some 200-250 231 on July 6th, 2006 of the more than 100,000 l
2、imited liability ?rms are quoted on Oslo Stock Exchange. In spite of their overwhelming numerical majority, unlisted ?rms receive little attention in empirical studies of ?nancial structure. Since publication requirements for unlisted ?rms usually are minimal or absent, the non-availability of data
3、can partly explain this lack of attention. In Norway, however, all limited liability ?rms are required by law to deposit their annual ?nancial statements in a central register, which is open to researchers. Given the diversity within the business community and the variety of capital structure theori
4、es, analyzing the way ?rms are ?nanced can clearly bene?t from using a large database covering the entire population. Using this unique database, this paper studies the ?nancial structure of non-listed ?rms. This can be an important addition to the literature, since the empirical evidence on the det
5、erminants of ?nancing decisions predominantly refers to the single, albeit large, environment of American listed ?rms. Testing the empirical implications of capital structure theories on unlisted firms that operate in a different ?nancial environment contributes to the empirical evidence and may bro
6、aden insight into the capital structure choice. Few studies of the capital structure of European companies have been published e.g. Carlsen and Nilsen, 1993; Demirg?-Kunt and Maksimovic,1999; Ozkan, 2002 and even fewer of non-listed companies e.g. Scherr and Hul-burt, 2001. The scarcity of empirical
7、 evidence for non-listed ?rms is the motivation for this paper. More speci?cally, the objective of this paper is to supplement the existing literature with an analysis of the factors determining the ?nancial structure of non-listed ?rms in Norway. This is done by empirically testing theories of capi
8、tal structure and debt maturity using panel data for non-?nancial ?rms. A data set that includes all unlisted ?rms in Norway for 1995-2000 is used. Scherr and Hulburt 2001 who also analyzed unlisted ?rms used a much smaller selection for 1987 and 1993 in the United States. To our knowledge, the ?nan
9、cing decisions for non-listed ?rms has not been analyzed on such a large scale before. FINANCING DECISIONS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES Theories of capital structure and debt maturity The origins of capital structure theory lie in the models of optimal capital structure that were developed in the wake of t
10、he famous Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. These models later became know as the static trade-o? theory see e.g. Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963, Baxter 1967, Gor-don 1971, Kraus and Litzenberger 1973, Scott 1976, 1977, Kim 1978,Vinso 1979, and Scott 1981. In this theory, the combination of l
11、everage related costs associated with e.g. bankruptcy and agency relations and a tax advantage of debt produces an optimal capital structure at less than a 100% debt ?nancing, as the tax advantage is traded o? against the likelihood of incurring the costs. This theoretical result is now widely accep
12、ted in the profession. To a large extent, theories of debt maturity are based on the same market imperfections that are modelled in theories of optimal capital structure. Although the extension of capital structure models with di?erent debt categories seems obvious, the composition of corporate debt
13、 did not attract much academic interest until the 1980s. Since then, several di?erent theories of debt maturity choice have been formulated. These theories typically model the e?ect of the ?nancial environment on debt maturity, whereby the ?nancial environment is expressed in cash ?ow characteristic
14、s and the above mentioned market imperfections. Brick and Ravid 1985 show that taxes can also imply an optimal debt maturity structure. Depending on the term-structure of interest rates, long-term short-term debt is optimal, since it accelerates the tax bene?tof debt given an increasing decreasing t
15、erm structure. DeAngelo and Masulis 1980 argue that the expected tax advantage of debt is decreased by depreciation charges and other non-debt tax shields that are a substitute for the tax bene?ts of interest payments. The combined implication for debt maturity structure is that ?rms with large non-
16、debt tax shields have an incentive to take on more debt and lengthen the maturity of debt to make sure that the remaining tax advantage is not less than the costs of issuing new short-term debt. When ?rms cannot reveal the true quality of their cash ?ows, i.e. when information asymmetry exists, they
17、 can prevent or abate undervaluation by using a variety of signaling devices, such as debt leverage, dividend payments or the maturity structure of debt. In the presence of information asymmetry, ?rms have an incentive to signal their quality and credibility by taking on more debt and shortening the
18、ir debt maturity. A higher leverage, especially more short-term debt, signals favorable inside information to the market because it o?ers the possibility to renegotiate terms in the future, when more information has become available. Long-term debt entails larger information costs than short-term de
19、bt, because the market expects a higher deterioration of quality than insiders do. Firms with a low level of information asymmetry are therefore more likely to issue long-term debt Flannery, 1986. Information asymmetry is higher for ?rms with large R&D activities Alam and Walton, 1995. In addition,
20、a complex legal structure e.g. a holding company or large cross investments in daughter companies will make a ?rm less transparent and, thus, give rise to a higher level of information asymmetry. A rivaling capital structure theory is Myers pecking order theory. This theory is based on information a
21、symmetry which causes outside ?nancing to be more expensive than internal ?nancing. This information asymmetry is modelled by Myers 1984 and Myers and Majluf 1984. They argue that asymmetric information lowers the price that investors are willing to pay for issued shares. Therefore, ?rms prefer inte
22、rnal to external ?nancing to fund investments, and debt to equity if external ?nancing is used. If no, or not enough, retained earnings are available in the ?rm, debt will be issued. Debt is less mispriced than equity, since it has a prior claim to equity. Issuing new equity is the last choice of ?r
23、ms raising capital. In this pecking order theory, as Myers calls it, observed debt ratios will re?ect the cumulative requirement for external ?nancing which is inversely related to the cumulative pro?tability Myers, 1984. Short-term debt is less sensitive to mispricing than long-term debt. Therefore
24、 short-term debt should be exhausted before the ?rm issues long-term debt. It should be noted, however, that Jensens 1986 free cash ?ow theory, which is based on con?icts of interest between management and stockholders, predicts the opposite, i.e. a positive relation between pro?tability and debt ra
25、tio. Free cash ?ow can be de?ned as cash ?ow in excess of the funds required to ?nance positive net present value projects. When pro?t levels are high, management may be enticed to use the free cash ?ow on perquisites or negative net present value investments. An increase in the level of debt forces
26、 the managers to pay out cash and thus reduces the free cash ?ow. Firms with risky debt and large future growth opportunities are espe cially prone to incur the agency costs that can arise from con?icts of interest between di?erent stakeholders. In these ?rms, shareholders have an incentive to choos
27、e investment strategies that are suboptimal for the ?rm as a whole. These strategies, characterized as asset substitution Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and underinvestment Myers, 1977, are bene?cial to the shareholders because they transfer wealth from the bondholders to the shareholders or prevent a tr
28、ansfer in the opposite direction. Rational bondholders will anticipate these strategies and protect themselves by adjusting their terms. The resulting decrease in ?rm value is an agency cost of debt. More debt increases agency costs. Furthermore, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 1980 showed that issuing sh
29、ort-term debt mitigates these costs, since short-term debt reduces managerial ?exibility by o?ering frequent renegotiation possibilities. Myers 1977 reasons that by matching the maturities of debt and assets, debt repayments are scheduled to correspond with the decline in value of assets currently i
30、n place. This matching reduces the agency costs of debt. Stohs andMauer 1996 contend that a debt maturity shorter than the assets life will increase the risk of default, since not enough cash may be available when the debt is due. When the maturity of debt is longer than the life of the assets, the
31、?rm may encounter problems ?nding new assets to support the debt. An extensive survey of the theories concerning capital structure can be found in Harris and Raviv 1991, and for debt maturity structure and their empirical tests in Ravid 1996. Empirical studies Few studies have analyzed the ?nancing
32、decisions of small, non-listed ?rms. Scherr and Hulburt found strong support for the maturity matching principle, weak support for the e?ects of taxes and information asymmetry, while they rejected the e?ects of agency theory and size. To compare the results of this study with the literature, which
33、is dominated by listed ?rms in large countries as the United States, we also provide an overview of those empirical studies in Table 1. Demirg?-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999 and Ozkan 2002 give results for non-American data, but also use listed ?rms. As will be evident from Table 1, only the maturity mat
34、ching principle is supported in all studies. There is no univocal support for or rejection of any of the theories and the size e?ect. Newberry and Novack 1999, which speci?cally tests the tax theory, supports this theory. Otherwise, the tax e?ect is usually rejected or weakly supported for the capit
35、al structure and debt maturity structure. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999 found the pecking order theory to provide an adequate description of the capital structure of ?rms. However, Chirinko and Singha 2000 argue that there are serious di?culties with Shyam-Sunder and Myers models. They conclude that a
36、lternative tests are needed to identify the determinants of capital structure. Ghosh and Cai 1999 ?nd evidence for both the trade-o? theory and the pecking order theory and suggest both models can coexist. The empirical support for agency e?ects, asymmetric information/signaling e?ects, and size e?e
37、cts is also mixed. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this paper is to supplement the existing literature with an analysis of the factors determining the ?nancial structure of non-listed ?rms. The database used covers all limited liability ?rms in Norway.The analyses give rise to the following conclusions.
38、First, taxes and the maturity matching principle appear to be the most important determinants of the ?nancing decision for non-listed ?rms in Norway. In two random samples, leverage and debt maturity are seen to increase with the size of non-debt tax shields and with the maturity of the ?rms assets.
39、 The latter, i.e. support for the maturity matching principle, is in line with practically all empirical studies of debt maturity. The former, i.e. support for a tax e?ect, is much less common in the existing literature. Perhaps using data for the non-listed ?rms contributes to this result. Second,
40、size and information asymmetry are found to be additional determinants of the ?nancial structure for non-listed ?rms. For these ?rms, debt maturity increases with size and decreases with cross investments in daughter companies that make ?rms less transparent. The results are robust as the same concl
41、usions are reached for a second random sample of unlisted ?rms. Third, the hypotheses that were formulated on the basis of the pecking order theory and agency theory are rejected for the non-listed ?rms. Profitability appears to be positively, rather than negatively, related to debt. Similarly, sale
42、s growth is not found to be associated with a shorter debt maturity, as agency theory predicts, but with a longer maturity. On a more general level, the clear support for the tax e?ect sets this study apart from most of the literature. The support for the maturity matching principle is a common elem
43、ent with the empirical literature. Support for the other hypotheses is mixed and, as such, not essentially di?erent from that in most of the literature. Finally, and in line with the arguments of Mikkelson 1984, we can conclude that the analysis of corporate capital structure can be strengthened by
44、incorporating more characteristics of ?rms claims structures, such as debt maturity structure. A similar conclusion is presented in Bevan and Danbolt 2002 who state that an analysis of capital structure is incomplete without a detailed examination of all forms of corporate debt. Determinants may hav
45、e di?erent e?ects on di?erent debt categories and if this occurs, the e?ects will be diminished or obscured if the analysis is restricted to total debt. This is clearly the case in this paper: more often than not, the empirical proxy variables have opposite e?ects on the two debt categories distingu
46、ished here.译文 非上市公司的融资结构 资料来源:谷歌作者:苏珊?霍尔和尼科?范?德?威杰斯特 介绍 只有很少一部分的欧洲公司在证券交易所上市。在挪威,举个例子,在超过100000家有限责任公司里有200-250家(在2006年7月6日有231家)在奥斯陆证券交易所上市。尽管它们在数量上占了多数,但未上市的公司在金融结构的实证研究中很少受到注意。对非上市的出版要求通常很少或者没有要求,相关的数据可以部分的解释这种注意的缺乏。然而在挪威,法律要求所有的有限责任公司把他们的年度财务报表存放在一个对查阅者开放的登记中心。这些都促进了商业团体和资本结构理论的多样性,能够清晰地分析公司财政支持
47、的手段受益于大型数据库的使用覆盖了整个地区的人口。 本文在使用这个数据库的基础上研究非上市公司的金融结构。由于美国上市公司环境中融资决策的实证研究虽然多但趋于单一,所以这项研究会是对这类文献的一个很重要的补缺。测试不同金融环境中非上市公司的资本结构理论的实证意义有助于实证研究,还可能会拓宽对资本结构的选择。对欧洲公司资本结构研究的文献出版的很少(e.g. Carlsen and Nilsen, 1993; Demirg?-Kunt and Maksimovic,1999; Ozkan, 2002),对非上市公司相关方面研究的出版文献就更少(e.g. Scherr and Hul-burt, 2
48、001)。 本文研究的动机是非上市公司实证研究的缺乏。更确切的说,这篇文章的目的是对挪威非上市公司的因素决定金融结构进行分析以补充现有的文献。这是根据资本结构的实证测试理论和非金融企业债务期限使用的面板数据而做的。一个包括了挪威1995-2000年所有的非上市公司的数据集都被使用。Scherr and Hulburt 2001他们也分析了美国1987-1993年这个小时间段里的未上市公司。据我们所知,之前对非上市公司融资决策没有过如此大规模的分析。 融资结构和实证研究 资本结构和债务期限理论 最初的资本结构理论起源于毫不相干的著名MM定理之后的最优资本结构模型的发展。这些模型后来成为了为人所知
49、的静态平衡理论(see e.g. Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963, Baxter 1967, Gor-don 1971, Kraus and Litzenberger 1973, Scott 1976, 1977, Kim 1978,Vinso 1979, and Scott 1981)。在这个理论中,由于交易税收优势对抗可能的成本的产生,和成本(与破产和代理关系相联系)以及债务税收优势相关的组合杠杆产生了一个低于100%债务融资的最优资本结构。这个理论结果现在在专业领域内已被广泛的接受。 在很大程度上,债务期限理论是基于最优资本结构理论中的同一市场不完善性。尽管不同债务种类的资本结构模型的延伸看起来明显,公司债券在1980年之前始终吸引不到很多的学术兴趣。从那时起制定了几种不同的债务期限选择理论。这些理论通常模拟了债务期限中金融环境的影响和为什么金融环境表现在现金流量特征和上述提
