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1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文译文题目（中文） ：EVA 经济增加值：从间接证据中筛选出直接解释学 院:管理学院专 业:会计学学 号:-学生姓名:-指导教师:-日 期:2012年9月1号EVA Economic Value Added：Sifting the Direct from the CircumstantialJoseph SammutSource：ttp:/EVA 经济增加值从间接证据中筛选出直接解释约瑟夫萨穆特来源：1. 介绍如果存在一个脐带链接三大支柱业务,管理,会计,经济，毫无疑问，一个可信的竞争者应该是EVA(经济增加值)。其原因在于它富于变化的根源。对于一个明确规定的财务目标，研
2、究人们的行为和如何直接操纵这种行为。在这个方向，EVA理论走了很长的路。它突出本身是一个非常规和非法定科学，在这两个人类行为和利润测量这样声称是最优的两个链接之间在寻找未来完美的商业项目。这种断言有很多的支持者和反对者，伴随着潜在的疑点，,它可以是介于目光短浅或一个空想和是最可能的情况两者之间。沿着这些方向是一些未被发现的东西。这篇简短论文可以详细分析经济增加值(EVA)的涵义即既是金融性能测量工具也是一个密探,矛头直指接下来的管理革命后的全球化时代,即绩效工资的引入。本文将解决关键的问题也是EVA联结科学管理、会计和经济学通过将直接转化为的间接证据努力深入这个问题。最后本文将成为一个通过提交
3、作者的看法提出的关键点。2. EVA的涵义最简单的形式,EVA被定义为业务操作中的货币残留的扣除资本成本。它的正式术语相当于税后净营业利润 (NOPAT)更少的股本成本。即通过考虑到的资本成本，将账目收益灵巧的转换为经济收益。表面上看起来这个概念是革命性的和新潮的。然而，其创意不过仅限于包装，这个想法至少可以追溯到一百年,到一个特定的名字阿尔弗雷德马歇尔。新的推动者, Stern Steward,只是继承了这个概念、依赖更愿意接受的和复杂的市场，并且很明智地链接到报酬革命,从而利用并发几率形成未来新公司的模型。EVA的主要推力与其说是表现措施和绩效工资之间的联系，不如说是老板员工个人利益的统一
4、。这样做,EVA试图摆脱传统的股东/员工关系的对抗的立场,利用一个非常简单但高度情绪化的口号“业绩”。冒险进入一个创新的商业文化，通过建立和实现这一传统路线已经是显而易见的,只是没有在EVA的名片。历史和会计准则被认为是EVA的推广者，不只是一个有效的工具来衡量和促进商业效益而且是更出奇的方式来粉饰财务结果。EVA因此不仅与传统会计冲突而且挑战它的道德高地。最近的背景下，会计低迷和金融崩溃,它可以而且应该侵入现代商业研究,从而在股东/管理关系中建立本身作为一种新的支柱。这个新职业科学上进,此外,声称是最接近的链接可能的市场价值。在这个行业,拥有一个杰出的捍卫者本身和突出的后卫在形式的巴鲁克列弗
5、，哈佛商学院教授已经明确了脆弱性会计数据和资本市场之间的值。列弗使EVA理论有了质的飞跃,因批评公认会计准则的质量，暗示包含股本成本应作为基本业绩测量有更好的适应市场价值。Kramer和Pushner已经测试了这个假说,EVA是高度相关的市场价值补充。他们发现,在他们所有的测试案例的MVA的水平与NOPAT和EVA积极相关。OByrne 和 Steward研究很大范围年限内的市场价值变化。他们的研究结果指向在解释市场反应方面EVA的明确的优势，而继续得出结论因为EVA与市场价值系统相关,这最终被证明是一个比其他绩效方式更好的预测市场价值的措施。这种集成的业务模型提出两个高度情感诉求的经济观念。
6、“没有利润,除非你赚到资本成本”和“凡是可以被度量的事物就可以被管理”。它把本身与传统的指控联系在一起并建立金融措施，排除股东的投资,并因此完全忽视资本成本。考虑到这些会计异常与传统的奖金的直接关系,一个可能的功能失调的行为在经理和高管蓄势待发。它可能是在传统的会计死灰复燃时爆发。EVA的涵义与一个特定的词“语言”直接相关。这个媒介不仅因其知名优越的品质著称,而且可能更为著名的是成为更为普遍首选的公分母的两边的方程塑造股东价值的标准。3. 从间接证据中筛选出直接解释对于这件事感兴趣的程度是影响它传播的关键因素,也是测量方面和大致表现对确实的经济附加值（EVA）影响的之间的区别。看起来,至少研究
7、混淆这两个属性就好像他们是暹罗不可分割的形式。这种学术的“混乱”已经推动了受到外来状态影响的力量，但就物质和价值而言,这个问题仍然在实验室状态。Riceman,Cahan和梅西监控的一个公司,雇佣了一个混合的管理团队。有些是EVA相关奖金方案及一些传统的奖金计划。虽然他们承认以管理层为基础的EVA要比以同事为基础的EAV表现的更好,但是他们的优势源自于EVA并不是一个优越的性能测量工具,而在于其是一种一致性的奖励过程。有趣的是,他们发现分歧在EVA的理解和效应与在同一公司不同区域有所不同。在市场价值方面,Visaltanachoti,罗和易发现,传统的会计绩效之间的关系,明确的息税前利润,投资
8、行业的回报高于EVA。也就是说，对于部门市场回报方面，业绩比EVA对于部门市场回报方面更重要。Visaltanachoti et al甚至试图定义和明确这个优势。 他们指出EVA的劣势在于对未来现金流动和其添加的并发症的调整的代理。弗格森,Rentzler和Yu调查是否采用EVA会导致更好的股票表现和默认情况下的更大的盈利能力。他们还没有找到足够的证据来证明这些。然而，发现有一些证据表明,EVA采用者比非EVA同行提高了盈利能力。在这个阶段它会在学术上应该很有趣，弗格森进行测试,以验证是否这个模式是稳固的的或随意的。如果没有这样的证据,EVA仍然是很有作用的。EVA被学术界进一步批判的原因是是
9、Biddel,Boswen和华莱士发现的只有边际附加信息内容超出传统的“收益”。约翰逊和Soenen降级是为其解决EVA忽视一个公司的增长潜力的问题。这两套怀疑论者是建议以一个静态的反对一个动态测量方向查看，以最作为短期业绩衡量,因此考虑到其使用范围和有效性EVA明显有缺陷。Eva一直被学术批评是关于其潜在的弱点在股东回报率之间的关系和该公司的EVA的不均衡。特伦斯,Boscaljon官员,Batala和拉奥发现最小的证据是公司采用EVA与传统的非EVA采用者的市场回报之间的差异。因此，任何形式的EVA怀疑论者绝对必须基于其性能度量函数及其适应性的直接联系作为适当的性能识别方案。用一个灵敏度分
10、析来证明，即两个不仅直接相关,而且本质上通过一个名为“性能”的共同纽带相互依赖。如果它的致命弱点在于所谓脆弱性之间的连接测量和性能的话,那么EVA的Heraclean力量在于其声称同化的两极。据说EVA已经发现了诠释方式,以这个公式来体现集成性能测量与实际性能。对共同利益的担忧是最影响该公司的利益相关者的。他们可能会抨击EVA的学术先端，坚持认为最有价值的管理已经不会支持会计收益,因为他们将改变对不可预测性的非经营性目的。这种“全权委托“会计不仅转移目标职位，当业绩奖励发挥作用时，更危险地提供完美的方法。因此未来的模型是将EVA和绩效工资措施进行融合。EVA会成为相互沟通的机会的性能目标和策略
11、,产生一个稳健的的智能集成测量和奖励系统。它是沿着这条线索,发现EVA最狂热的推动者。毫无疑问,未来的商业模式是部分受到可变工资推动支持的形式。这一创新的方式会调整工资和薪金与公司的市场相联系的表现。Zall列出三个假设渗透这个公式。首先,金钱激励人们努力工作。其次,增加动力提高性能。第三,公平测量性能的是可能的。EVA声称会提供最完美的“鸡尾酒”即内部和周围的这些相关参数。根本问题在于分析方法的效率和公平补偿人对这些生产力按照他们的相对输入。Bellavary和艾伦认为公司意识到,为了成功他们必须鼓励他们的员工建立合伙关系。他们认为“支付”是一个组织和员工之间的强而有力的沟通者。只有自然看待
12、“支付” 作为在一个组织和一个需要认真的定义作为最有效的语言。支付绝对是一个强大的动力,但它可能不是最强大的。弗雷德赫兹伯格坚称这是工作本身是首要因素在于员工。即使在有意识的条款方面,该链接看起来也不紧凑。在2006年，一个相关代表调查凯利服务职业介绍所表明,只有四分之一的员工没有在任何性能相关的支付说他们应当表现得更好。薪酬是首要动力,但很显然,只对少数人群。凯利还发现,平均比例的员工与性能相关的比例在欧盟为21%，是最高的,可以理解的是,金融服务是28%，最低的在教育5%。这是由于相对轻松地照亮与金融服务行业可以测量其结果对相对歧义和难以测量教育机构的性能。性能相关的支付(prp)成为受欢
13、迎的年代末年代和年代早期,尤其是在美国。到1991年,51%的美国公司操作的某种形式的prp。在英国,prp还在1998年的40%。这不仅证实了其更高的声望和使用在美国但默认情况下也,潜在的风险和间接影响的预期那里。这只是一个时间问题,公司高管,股票期权和股票上运行性能计划,开始寻找自己的方式进入系统。其余的是现代金融的历史。然而,只能最终得到因为报告标准促进形式为代价的,因为这些物质或受托监护人聪明过了头。因此以这个历史的角度来看,EVA的动量。竞选中个人主义和其自然孪生与违反新闻道德行为对强势复兴的逐渐减弱的管理工具提供了完美的背景。作为长和只要让会计专业不要与其行为沉重地走在一起,通过实
14、施严厉措施,EVA的支持者将继续利用了致命的性能之间的联系和法定利润回报报告以现在的形式和条件。4. 作者在关键点上的最终意见它确实是讽刺,虽然不是不自然的或不切实际的,EVA的宿敌模式对会计标准应该是直接向性能的-先锋报告轴。毫无疑问,大多数会计行为不当源自某处的脆弱和剥削其报告机制。它有滥用的倾向,反过来,创建了一个非常活跃的和阴暗的市场。性能相关的工资和奖励从未打算禁用报告要求和标准。事实上,他们是截然不同的两个理论和实践。前者是一个激励因素,后者,一个计算器。事实上,计算器,在某些情况下,被操纵并不意味着所有这些计算器是被动的。它也不意味着任何性能相关方案提供了这样的可能性会被计算。E
15、VA的强调这种“性能报告“异常回避评估它在它的总体,从而限制自己质疑二元性的第二部分。这个弱点似乎源于一个事实,理论家们已经接受了“性能”和“性能相关的支付”在即将到来的商业革命作为其中的一种催化剂。EVA的支持者,获得了一个方面,因此集中他们的努力在其他方向。的确,态度支付标准正在改变。对齐的企业、劳动力和市场目标是更全面的系统的输入和奖励制定进度的走向。然而,基本标准客观公正的测量性能尚未解决。无论是否有个人主义的影响。因此据说前一种已经被保护是一个严重的夸张。EVA提出改变报告技巧。不管它是一个根本性的改变但并不取决于业主资本也被考虑进去,但它的能力无法检测和也阻止不了不道德的行为。原因
16、很明显,EVA的捍卫者还没有发出任何形式的担保或赔偿。这并不意味着EVA是会计的领域一个不必要的入侵者,。没有相互排他性的融资。补充可能是最好的金融工具。评估情况提供了足够的洞察力的多边达到一个更高的程度的结论。鉴于这个现实,EVA应当有一个非常强大的流行和激烈的支持。EVA不应被视为一个竞争者或替代财务报告的事物。它的优势在于其性能部分的二元性。因此,它是一个结合业主和雇员的利益支柱。它的狡猾的特质提供最终的安慰。1. IntroductionIf ever there should have been an umbilical cord between the three pillars
17、of business, that is, management, accountancy and economics, without doubt a credible contender should have been EVA (Economic Value Added). Its apogee lies in its Machiavellian roots. The investigation of how people behave and the outright manipulation of this behaviour for a clearly set financial
18、objective. EVA travels a long way in this direction. It protrudes itself to be a non-conventional and non-statutory science in both human behaviour and profit measurement and in so doing claims to be the optimal linkage between the two in the quest for the futuristic perfect business project. This a
19、ssertion comes along with a full assembly of both defenders and sceptics and with the underlying suspicion that it can be either a myopia or an utopia or as is the most possible case scenario somewhere in between. Along which coordinate is something yet to be discovered. This brief Paper shall analy
20、se in some detail the attributes of Economic Value Added (EVA) both as a financial performance measurement tool as well as an agent provocateur to spearhead the next management revolution in the post globalisation era, that is, performance related pay. The Paper shall address key issues with which E
21、VA interlocks the sciences of management, accountancy and economics and shall strive to penetrate into the issue by separating the circumstantial from the direct evidence. Eventually this Paper shall come to a close through the submission of the authors views on the critical points raised. 2. Attrib
22、utes of EVAIn its simplest form, EVA is defined as the monetary residue from business operations after allowing for the cost of capital. Its formal technical equivalent is Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) less Equity Cost. A neat conversion of accounting profit into economic profit through the
23、 factoring-in of the cost of capital. At face value the concept looks both revolutionary and new. Its originality however is limited to the wrapping as the idea dates back at least a hundred years and to a specific name Alfred Marshall. The new promoters, Stern Steward, have simply re-invented the c
24、oncept, banking on a more receptive and sophisticated market and smartly linking it to a remuneration revolution, thus leveraging the odds concurrently as the new futuristic firm model takes shape. EVAs main thrust is not so much its linkage between performance measurement and performance related pa
25、y but can best be captured in the alignment of both owners and employees interests along a common frequency. In so doing, EVA attempts to depart from the confrontational standpoints that have traditionally characterised shareholders/employees relationships and venture into an innovative business cul
26、ture by capitalizing on a very simple but highly emotional catchword performance. Achieving this through already established and conventional routes is plain and simply not on EVAs cards. Historical and statutory accounting is considered by EVAs promoters as not only an ineffective tool to gauge and
27、 promote business performance but more sensationally as means to airbrush and whitewash financial results. EVA thus not only conflicts with traditional accounting but challenges its moral high ground. Against the backdrop of recent accounting malaise and financial meltdown, it can and should make in
28、roads into modern business studies and thus establish itself as a new pillar in shareholder/management relationship. This new pro-scientific aspirant, furthermore, claims to be the closest link possible to market values. In this sector it exults itself in having an eminent and prominent defender in
29、the form of Baruch Lev. The Harvard Business School professor had already made his position clear as regards the fragility between accounting data and capital markets value. Lev made EVAs leap forward in quality by criticising GAAPs treatment of equity and thus hinting towards the inclusion of equit
30、y cost as fundamental for performance measurement and better alignment to market values. Kramer and Pushner have tested the hypothesis that EVA is highly correlated with Market Value Added. They found that in all their tested cases the level of MVA positively relates to both NOPAT and EVA. OByrne an
31、d Steward studied market value variations in multiple year formats. Their findings point towards a clear superiority of EVA explaining market reactions and go on to conclude that because EVA is systematically linked to market value, it proves to be a better predictor of market value than other perfo
32、rmance measures. This integrated business model knocks on the doors of two highly emotional economic notions. “There is no profit unless you earn the cost of capital” and “what gets measured gets managed”. It allies itself with the accusation that traditional and established financial measures exclu
33、de shareholders investments and thus completely ignore the cost of capital. Considering these accounting anomalies direct relationship with traditional incentive compensation, a possible dysfunctional behaviour among managers and executives does not remain long on paper. It is probably in this regio
34、n that traditional accounting has recovered its worst “corpses”. EVAs attributes are directly correlated to one specific word: language. The medium that is not only recognisable by its superior measuring qualities but probably more strongly by being the preferred common denominator of those on both
35、sides of the equation shaping shareholder value. 3. Circumstantial and Direct EvidenceProblematic in the appreciation of this question, and probably also a key to its diffusion, is the separation between the measurement aspect and the alleged performance impact effect of EVA. It seems, at least opti
36、cally, that studies confound the two attributes as if they are of Siamese inseparable form. This academic “confusion” has propelled the subject to exotic status but insofar as substance and value are concerned, the issue is still in laboratory condition. 待添加的隐藏文字内容3Riceman, Cahan and Massey monitore
37、d a firm that employs a mixed management team. Some are on EVA related bonus schemes and others on traditional bonus plans. Whilst they acknowledge that EVA based managers perform better that their colleagues, yet their superiority does not emanate from EVA being a superior performance measurement t
38、ool but in its consistency as a reward process. Interestingly, they found out divergences in EVA understanding and effect related to different areas within the same firm. On the market value front, Visaltanachoti, Luo and Yi found that the association between traditional accounting performance measu
39、res, specifically EBIT, and sector returns is higher than that with EVA. That is to say Earnings is superior to EVA in explaining sector market returns. Visaltanachoti et al even attempted to define and locate this superiority. They point towards EVAs inferiority in proxying for future cash flows an
40、d its added complication of book-keeping adjustments. Ferguson, Rentzler and Yu investigated whether adopting EVA leads to better stock performance and by default greater profitability. They did not find sufficient evidence to prove this albeit having found out that there is some evidence suggesting
41、 that EVA adopters experience increased profitability in relation to their non-EVA peers after adoption. At this stage it would have been academically interesting should Ferguson et al carried out tests to verify whether this pattern is entrenched or casual. In the absence of such evidence, EVA rema
42、ins an elixir. Further criticism is levied on the information qualities of EVA. Biddel, Boswen and Wallace found only marginal additional information content beyond traditional “earnings”. Johnson and Soenen downgrade EVA for its neglect in addressing the growth potential of a firm. Both sets of sce
43、ptics suggest a static against a dynamic measurement tool looking at the most as a short term performance measure, thus considering its range of use and effectiveness as significantly handicapped. EVA has been academically criticised for the underlying weakness in the relationship between shareholde
44、r returns and the firms EVA quantum. Terrance, Jalbert, Boscaljon, Batala and Rao found minimal evidence of discrepancies between the market returns of firms adopting EVA with traditional non-EVA adopters. Thus any form of defence against the circumstantial discourse of the EVA sceptics definitely h
45、as to be based on the direct correlation between its performance measurement function and its adaptability as the appropriate performance recognition scheme. A sensitivity analysis has to prove that the two are not only directly related but more essentially mutually dependent through a common bond n
46、amed “performance”. If its Achilles Heel lies in the perceived vulnerability of the linkage between measurement and performance, EVAs Heraclean strength lies in the language that purports to assimilate the two poles. EVA asserts to have discovered the language and thus the formula to integrate perfo
47、rmance measurement with actual performance. This common denominator allays the interests of the firms most influential stakeholders and by default, its market valuation. Ochsner probably hit EVAs academic apex by insisting that most valuable managers have grown to distrust accounting earnings because they change unpredictably for non-operational purposes. This “carte blanche” accounting does not only shift the goal posts but far more dangerously provide the perfect potion when performance rewarding comes into play. Marrying EVA to pay-for-performance measures is thus the s
