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1、International Politics:Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation,Objectives of the class,Two goals:,First:give students an overview of basic concepts and themes that are used in the political analysis of International relations and of their recent theoretical developments.Among those concepts:actor,sub-a
2、ctor and system in International relations,decision-making bargaining,escalation and crisis,deterrence and stability.The course also intends to cover issues in International cooperation such as alliances and coalitions,collective goods,and international institutions.,International Systems,Second,the
3、 course wants to provide epistemological and methodological foundations for the use of these concepts in a rigorous way.In order to that the course will insist on the closeness of economic and political approaches in the use of rational choice analysis and game theory particularly in their dynamic a
4、nd evolutionary aspects.The importance of productive processes and of basic demographic and resource bases for the understanding of international politics will also be emphasized.,Fundamental questions,The political analysis of international relations can be subsumed in two basic questions:Why the p
5、resent international power structureHow will it evolve?The course will try to answer by emphasizingFundamentals:Resources,Demographics,Ecological Conditions,Technology,Health Factors:The Diamond perspectiveStrategic aspects of political systems and behavior of political agents,Institutions,Example:T
6、he Mongol Empire,World Configuration,Epistemology and Methodology,Epistemological and Methodological ConsiderationsFundamental question:What is politics?Different epistemological and methodological approaches will give different answers.I will use here a scientific(Popperian)epistemology characteriz
7、ed by what is called methodological individualism and the rational choice perspectiveThis perspective gives a unique answer here:namely Politics is the solution to collective action problems(Taylor)This approach has two advantages:,Dynamics of conflict and cooperation,It gives rigorous and unambiguo
8、us definitions of concepts whereas a lot of concepts used by social scientists are fuzzy It clearly links politics with economics and other scientific disciplines such as biology,anthropology,archeology,and evolutionary psychology.Politics under different evolutionary settings which links up with a
9、tradition started in the 19th century,Dynamics of conflict and cooperation,What is the scientific method?It is according to Popper A Hypothetico-Deductive Method which includes at least 4 steps,Definition of a paradigm(units of analysis)Definition of basic assumptions and hypotheses Logical conclusi
10、ons from these assumptions Empirical testing of these conclusions through rigorous methods independent from the assumptions,Dynamics of conflict and cooperation,Basic explanatory mechanisms in the social sciences,Purely causal approaches Normative approaches:Assume the existence of norms Approaches
11、based on the motivations of actors or agents:they imply actors act strategically or instrumentally and not for other reasons!Rational choice approaches:do not exclude norms!Cognitive approaches,Rational choice approaches:Decomposition of preferences and decisions:present,future,uncertainty,Rationali
12、ty means transitivity if AB and BC then AC.Rationality is also represented by the standard expected utility model:Suppose a transitive preference or utility order,this order can be represented by a function U(x,y,z,.).This function can then be associated with a gamble.Here U(x)takes only the values
13、W(win),ST(Status quo)and L(lose).We have the order here of WSTL.The gamble or risk aspect is associated with a probability scheme for different events.,gamble,sure,-,thing act,probability,lose,L,ST,p,win,W,ST,1,-,p,Gamble preferred to sure thing if EU(gble)U(ST),EU(gble)=U(W)(1-p)+U(L)p,Dynamic Aspe
14、cts and Risk Preference,The sure thing realization U(C(x)is always preferred to the(chancy)prospect U(C(x)=U(B(x)p(x)+U(A(x)(1-p(x)The interval T C(x)is the amount of gain in terms of x an individual is prepared to forgo for not taking the risk linked to the chancy prospect,U(C(x)=U(B(x)p(x)+U(A(x)(
15、1-p(x)is always preferred to the sure thing value C,Dynamic aspects can be included via a discount rate:pure time preference,Dynamic aspects,Cognitive approaches:Example of a scheme,EVENT,SEARCH FOR SIMILAR EVENT IN PAST,Use matches to past to decide course of actions,TAKE ACTION,Did action yield de
16、sired outcome,NO,YES,PAST EVENTS,Modify event base to avoid future match,Reinforce matched event,Now such approaches have evolved into agent based modeling or morphed with rational choice approaches,Agent Based Modeling,Symmetric indirectly ruled state with a hierarchy depth of n,Symmetric directly
17、ruled state with no depth,Rational Choice Shows The Problematic Aspect of Solving Collective Action Problems and Social Choice and thus of the Linkage Domestic Foreign Policy,Two theoretical approaches especially in view of information problemsCondorcet-Arrow paradox and theoremThe Theory of collect
18、ive goodsInternational dynamics are linked to such questions,Social Choice:Condorcet Arrow,Social Choice and Arrows Theorem:3 Voters:x y z 3 Issues:A B C,The Condorcet Arrow Paradox,Preferences:x:A B C y:C A B z:B C AMajority Vote:A B,B C,but C A,Arrow Paradox continued:Single peakedness,A B C,A,C,B
19、,Preference,A,B,C,A,B,C,A,B,C,Collective Good Theory,Collective goods as opposed to private goods are problematic with respect to exclusion and rivalryThey are nevertheless essential for the working of societyThey originate with productive processes and population concentrations that are higher:Prod
20、uction security dilemma,Property rights solution,Collective good theory continued,Tax solution,Collective good theory leads to a theory of interest groups,Free Rider Problem and Selective incentives Asymmetry of interest is important Collective goods are usually supplied by small groups Collective g
21、oods lead to the principal agent problem,Politics,Conflict and Cooperation,What is politics?If politics consist in solving collective action problems,(for a collective good)then they consist in organizing cooperation but also for conflictPolitics start to emerge when traditional methods of conflict
22、resolution fail:avoidance,skirmishes,raidsThey require a tax base which can only be realized through a surplus,Theories,Classical:Hume,Kant,CobdenWhereas classical approaches are focusing on the origins and nature of structures the newer theories take structure for granted:This is not so see the wor
23、ks of Peter Sahlins and,Graham Robb More recent:Neo-realism,Neo-liberal institutionalism,Information based conceptions such as epistemic communities.Constructivism,Theories of international relations,The evolution of theories is closely linked to the structural aspect of state systemsHistorically we
24、 notice a succession of decentralized state systems followed by the creation of empiresThis evolution was broken in Western Europe around the year 1000 and despite attempts an empire cold not be recreatedElsewhere the standard evolution continued(China,the Ottoman Empire,.)By the 18th Century the Eu
25、ropean specificity became clear to analysts By the 19th Century European states became consolidated,Politics and internal structures,What can be said historically?Given types of political systems appear:Chiefs organizers of redistribution-providers of higher goods,lords,kings,emperors,self-governmen
26、tFrom taxation to property rights:Egypt,IncasThese have international connotations:The Konrad Skaperdas perspective:size of coalition to create collective goodEvolutionary aspects:from Chiefs to self-governmentFundamental question:what conditions these evolutions,Size of Polities(Johnson+Earle),Camp
27、 or Hamlet:25 30Local group:150 500 some warfare over resources and people(Yanomamo:women)Big man collectivity:350 1800 more warfareChiefdom:1000-max 100 000 more regular warfareState:several 100 000 to several millions systematic organized warfare:Inka state 14 MImportance of warfare for state orga
28、nization,The Konrad-Skaperdas Model,The Konrad-Skaperdas Theory:Based on Hirshleifer individual based utility functions of different groups in society:peasants,bandits,soldiers,lords.Basic Assumptions:Diminishing Returns in Production,Trade-offs between private and collective defense and between def
29、ense and productive activities.4 Nash equilibria from Konrad Skaperdas:Anarchy,Self governance,Leviathan,Competing Lords,All these considerations lead to different ways of considering theories,What is primary are relations among individuals or households and how they solve subsistence and security q
30、uestions and the resulting collective action problemsThese will lead to big or small coalitions and centralized or decentralized political systemsWhat will determine those are cost,technology and taxation possibilitiesThis suggests a different look at theories,The International Actor and its Bargain
31、ing Power,Even though we know that the international actor is not unitary,it is convenient to represent it like that sometimesSometimes the unitary actor is even justifiedThere is however no relation between unitary actor and rationality:More complex representations are possibleIt is in particular d
32、esirable to represent the actor like this in terms of bargaining and bargaining powerWhat is bargaining power:A heightened ability to impose a solution on the other side,this greater“probability”results from being able to walk away from negotiations,Possible conflict dynamics,The Basic Bargaining Mo
33、del,Type I,Type II,ST,Accepts,Gives up,Insists,q,q,1-q,Or prefer or not a bargain to conflict u(x)(1-p)W-c(conflict)where x is an offer by the challenger,Characteristics of the Basic Bargaining Model,The basic bargaining model emphasizes the importance of:Sequence and thus time preferences and disco
34、untingUncertainty and thus attitudes toward uncertainty and risk,Basics of Bargaining Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken,Row,Column,(3,3)Nash Equilibrium,(4,1),(2,2)Nash Equilibrium,C,C,C,C,Prisoner=s Dilemma,(1,4),(2,2),Row,C,C,Row,Column,(3,3),(4,2)Nash Equilibrium(Subgame Perfect),(1,1),C,C,C,C,Chicke
35、n,Bargaining Power:A General Conception,International Actors,like Domestic Ones interact by using their Bargaining Power:Probability to defect in a bargaining situation This Power is determined by:Domestic Constraints leading to the Metaphor and then Models of Two-Level GamesBy the Symmetry or Asymm
36、etry of Preferences or(expected)Utilities(As already noticed for Collective Goods).This characteristic was emphasized by John Nash in his theory of bargaining.,Bargaining Power(continued),This Power is also Determined by International Actors Propensity toward Risk,by the Patience or Impatience of Ac
37、tors with Respect to a Bargaining Outcome and thus by their Discount Rate(Rubinstein Theory of Bargaining)Incomplete information about the nature of an other actor or about propensity toward risk will also play a role,particularly in evaluating threats,What role for risk preference?Example,Conflict
38、Escalation,The analysis of negotiation among actors indicates an irrationality of conflict escalation This irrationality can be explained through the notion of incomplete information or poor risk preference:Fearon model The dollar auction game is a good metaphor for conflict escalation and the costs
39、 associated to it.,Deterrence and Stability,Deterrence can be explained via the analysis of compellent or deterrent threats.If credible threats are absent deterrence or compellence may not work If deterrent power is well spread stability is maintained.,The Evolution of Warfare and Combat and Arms Ra
40、ces,The evolution of military technology influences international relations because it modifies the costs of using armed forces.There are often complementarities between military force and production and exchange systems.Phoenician and Athenian fleets protected trade and commerce,Roman armies were g
41、uarding the empire but also conducting raids for slaves,Viking ships could both be used for piracy and trade.,Some Analyst agree:The Evolution of Combat,Combat is characterized by two parameters,concentration and dispersion These two notions were studied by the British engineer Lanchester during Wor
42、ld War I in terms of dynamic equations,one for frontal attacks,one for blanketing an area(such as naval battles or artillery fire)For concentration:dx1/dt=-ax2 a quadratic law obtains to explain success:x12/x22 a/bP For dispersion,a linear law obtains:dx1/dt=-Ax1x2 x1/x2 A/B,How does technological e
43、volution work out?,Combat Strategies,Good strategists like Hannibal have always been able to use a combination of concentration and dispersion.In the battle of Cannae Hannibal was able to destroy through clever use of concentration and dispersion a numerically superior Roman army Lets look at this e
44、xample,The Roman Empire at 100 BC,Changes effected by Second Punic War:Conquest of Syracuse,complete control of Sicily-211 BCConquest of Carthaginian Spain-206 BC Creation of Hispania Citerior(Nearer Spain)-197 BCCreation of Hispania Ulterior(Further Spain)-197 BCConquest of Macedonia-148 BC Conques
45、t of Greece,incorporated into Macedonia-146 BCConquest of Carthage,creation of province of Africa-146 BCInheritance of the kingdom of Pergamum(Province of Asia)-133 BC(129 BC)Conquest of Illyricum(possibly incorporated into Macedonia at first)-129 BCConquest of Balearic Islands,incorporated into His
46、pania Citerior-123 BCConquest of Gallia Transalpina(Narbonensis)-121 BCConquest of Cilicia-102 BC,HannibalBattle of Cannae 216 BC,Roman generals:Lucius Aemilius Paullus 6 000 cavalry,Carthaginian general:Hannibal Forces:35 000 infantry;10 000 cavalry,urs/source340.html,http:/,Historical Evolution of
47、 Combat and Military technology,Historically combat tends to disperse more and more(cf.The analysis made by T.Dupuy)These evolutions influence military preparedness and produce arms racesThe dynamics of arms races are important in themselves,Arms Race Dynamics,Arms races tend to follow an adaptive l
48、ogic:Evolution of ArmsA=F(ArmsB)-ArmsA where F(ArmsB)is a desired level of armaments for A and ArmsA its existing stockEach decision maker will try to adapt desired level to actual level,Arms Races:Desired Level Reaction Functions,More Recent Developments,Deitschmann(1962)proposed an asymmetric Lanc
49、hester model applied to guerrilla warfareGovernment or occupying forces would have to fight in a dispersed way Guerrilla forces would fight in a concentrated way through ambushes which makes them relatively effectiveA natural extension of the Deitchmann perspective would be to pay attention to a pop
50、ulation from which guerrilla forces recruit and to try what influences its sizeGovernment and occupation forces are also determined to shrink the size of this population,The example of Rwanda,The Rwanda situation can be described as a typical Deitchman model where Tutsi rebels are dispersed but figh
