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1、American Economic Review美国经济评论Volume 100, Issue 4，20101. Title: Morally Motivated Self-Regulation.Authors: Baron, David P.Abstract: Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. This paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral pref
2、erences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. The focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. Social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond
3、 that with unconditional altruism. Enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than non-profit enforcement. Enforcement through social pressure imposed by NGOs also expands the scope of self-regulation.2. Title: Identifying the
4、 Elasticity of Substitution with Biased Technical Change.Authors: Len-Ledesma, Miguel A; McAdam, Peter; Willman, Alpo.Abstract: The capital-labor substitution elasticity and technical biases in production are critical parameters. The received wisdom claims their joint identification is infeasible. W
5、e challenge that interpretation. Putting the new approach of normalized production functions at the heart of a Monte Carlo analysis we identify the conditions under which identification is feasible and robust. The key result is that jointly modeling the production function and first-order conditions
6、 is superior to single-equation approaches especially when merged with normalization. Our results will have fundamental implications for production-function estimation under non-neutral technical change, for understanding the empirical relevance of normalization and variability underlying past empir
7、ical studies.3. Title: Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens.Authors: Chen, Yan; Harper, F. Maxwell; Konstan, Joseph; Li, Sherry Xin.Abstract: We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an on
8、line community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median users total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent. When given o
9、utcome information about the average users net benefit score, above-average users mainly engage in activities that help others. Our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision.4. Title: Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?Auth
10、ors: Dafny, Leemore S.Abstract: To gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. Such direct price discrimination is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings. Using a
11、 proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998-2005, I find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. Moreover, within a given firm, those sites located in concentrated insurance
12、markets experience the greatest premium increases. The findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.5. Title: Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle.Authors: Low, Hamish; Meghir, Costas; Pistaferri, Luigi.Abstract: We spec
13、ify a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions. We distinguish different sources of risk, including shocks to productivity, job arrival, and job destruction. Allowing for job mobility has a large effect on the estimate of productivity risk. I
14、ncreases in the latter impose a considerable welfare loss. Increases in employment risk have large effects on output and, primarily through this channel, affect welfare. The welfare value of programs such as Food Stamps, partially insuring productivity risk, is greater than the value of unemployment
15、 insurance which provides (partial) insurance against employment risk.6. Title: The Law of the Few.Authors: Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev.Abstract: Empirical work shows that a large majority of individuals get most of their information from a very small subset of the group, viz., the influencers;
16、 moreover, there exist only minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. We refer to these empirical findings as the Law of the Few. This paper develops a model where players personally acquire information and form connections with others to access thei
17、r information. Every (robust) equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few.7. Title: Technology Capital and the US Current Account.Authors: McGrattan, Ellen R; Prescott, Edward C.Abstract: The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that the return on investments of foreign subsidiar
18、ies of US multinational companies over the period 1982-2006 averaged 9.4 percent annually after taxes; US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals averaged only 3.2 percent. BEA returns on foreign direct investment (FDI) are distorted because most intangible investments made by multinationals are expe
19、nsed. We develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for FDI and apply the BEAs methodology to construct economic statistics for the model economy. We estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for over 60 percent of the difference in BEA returns.8. T
20、itle: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets.Authors: Broner, Fernando; Martin, Alberto; Ventura, Jaume.Abstract: Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption:
21、 that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade onl
22、y if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets.9. Title: Pavlovian Processes in Consumer Choice: The Physical Presence of a Good Increases Willingness-to-Pay.
23、Authors: Bushong, Benjamin; King, Lindsay M; Camerer, Colin F; Rangel, Antonio.Abstract: This paper describes a series of laboratory experiments studying whether the form in which items are displayed at the time of decision affects the dollar value that subjects place on them. Using a Becker-DeGroot
24、 auction under three different conditions-(i) text displays, (ii) image displays, and (iii) displays of the actual items-we find that subjects willingness-to-pay is 40-61 percent larger in the real than in the image and text displays. Furthermore, follow-up experiments suggest the presence of the re
25、al item triggers preprogrammed consummatory Pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with appetitive items whenever they are available.10. Title: Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India.Authors: Bardhan, Pranab; Mook
26、herjee, Dilip.Abstract: We investigate political determinants of land reform implementation in the Indian state of West Bengal. Using a village panel spanning 1974-1998, we do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that land reforms were positively and monotonically related to control of local
27、governments by a Left Front coalition vis-vis the right-centrist Congress party, combined with lack of commitment to policy platforms. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a quasi-Downsian theory stressing the role of opportunism (reelection concerns) and electoral competition.11. Title: Monopol
28、y Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature.Authors: Aguirre, Iaki; Cowan, Simon; Vickers, John.Abstract: This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions-involving straigh
29、tforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets-are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output.12. Title: Strategic Redistricting.Authors: Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang.Abstract: Two pa
30、rties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates
31、 more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger partys favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased tow
32、ards the preferences of the redistricting partys supporters.13. Title: A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms.Authors: Weyl, E. Glen.Abstract: I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocat
33、ion. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user hete
34、rogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers.14. Title: Consumption Taxes and Redistribution.Au
35、thors: Correia, Isabel.Abstract: This study considers replacing the current US tax system with only a flat tax consumption tax, showing, in contrast to the literature, that such a reform leads to a decline in inequality and increase in welfare for the welfare-poor. The results are obtained from a si
36、mple model that identifies the main channels through which the reform affects the economy. It is shown also that these novel results depend on the distribution of wealth and earnings, and that they hold for the relevant empirical distributions.15. Title: When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
37、Authors: Ellingsen, Tore; stling, Robert.Abstract: We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 22 games. One-way
38、communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coo
39、rdination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.16. Title: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution.Authors: Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jrgen W.Abstract: We analyze how family ties af
40、fect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degre
41、e of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how t
42、his affects economic outcomes.17. Title: Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-Economic Equilibria.Authors: Chang, Roberto.Abstract: We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral o
43、utcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidat
44、es commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed.18. Title: Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment.Authors: Anderson, Steven T; Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan.Abstract: Several impatient inves
45、tors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laborato
46、ry experiment confirms the models main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Br
47、ownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost.19. Title: Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Womens Welfare in Rural Pakistan.待添加的隐藏文字内容2Authors: Jacoby, Hanan G; Mansuri, Ghazala.Abstract: Can marriage institutions limit marital inefficiency? We study th
48、e pervasive custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. Watta satta can be seen as a mechanism for coordinating the actions of two sets of parents, each wishing to restrain their son-in-law. We find that marital discord, as
49、measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wifes mental health, is indeed significantly lower in watta satta versus conventional marriage, but only after accounting for selection bias. These benefits cannot be explained by endogamy, a marriage pattern associated with watta satta.20. Title: Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relation
