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1、美国社会保障的改革外文翻译 原文二: The social security reform of American Jobs lost during the recent recession caused a deluge of applications to the Social Security Disability Insurance program ? more than 6 million each year in 2009 and 2010 ? and threw into relief the fact that the SSDI program is structurally
2、unsound. The current applications surge will accelerate the exhaustion of SSDIs trust fund and will force Congress to have to choose among two unpalatable options ? increase SSDI payroll taxes or reduce benefit allowance rates. But that is not enough. If the particularly vulnerable population the SS
3、DI is designed to serve is to be protected, while preserving incentives to work, the program has to be radically restructured. Why Get A Job? Even in normal economic times, those with marginally physical or mental impairments apply in the hope of acquiring disabled status under SSDI. Among those alr
4、eady receiving SSDI benefits, the incentive to return to the work force is very poor. Revealing ones ability to work, especially if its in a low-paid occupation, could cause permanent loss of SSDI benefits. Strong work disincentives under SSDI result from its eligibility standard that guides benefit
5、 awards: an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for 12 months or more. Professors David Autor of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Mark Duggan of the University of Maryland recently proposed reforming SSDI to solve its twin problems of impending fiscal shortfalls and poor emp
6、loyment incentives. They propose a new front-end universal program of private disability insurance PDI paid for out of a new payroll tax to be shared by employers and employees. PDI would provide employment supports to disabled workers with a view of keeping them on the job. It would also provide ne
7、w subsidies to employers to retain disabled workers on the job. Under their reform, applications to SSDI by those with disabilities but who could continue working with assistive technologies would be statutorily delayed by 22 months, during which time they would continue to receive PDIs employment s
8、upports. Applications for SSDI benefits by workers with serious disabilities ? who obviously cannot continue to work ? would be permitted as before. Indeed, in all likelihood, the seriously disabled would begin receiving benefits quickly through SSDIs Compassionate Allowances program. For others, cu
9、rrent SSDI would become the back end of a three-part system of disability insurance. Autor and Duggan estimate the annual cost of implementing PDI at $150 and $250 per year per worker. They expect PDI to reduce the number of SSDI applications. The more volatile job-market process for the disabled ?
10、because of their lower productivity, they tend to be laid-off first and hired last over the course of business cycles ? implies volatility in applications to SSDI. Potentially filtering out frivolous applications under a PDI program would reduce volatility of SSDI applications during recessions and
11、reduce the programs denial rate. In addition, a smaller caseload would reduce waiting times for adjudicating legitimate claims and reduce the programs overall costs. Indeed, Autor and Duggan suggest that a substantial amount of the cost of implementing PDI would be recovered through SSDI cost saving
12、s. Costs In Time And Money Nevertheless, workers and disability advocates are unlikely to support the Autor-Duggan proposal. It involves, they would argue, larger upfront costs and much longer delays in qualifying for SSDI benefits. Apart from discouraging frivolous applications, mandatory delays ma
13、y also discourage deserving candidates from applying, and decisions about initial employment supports would be made by private, profit-driven insurance firms, potentially, resulting in unfair benefit denials. In addition, although the authors estimate the cost of PDI to be small relative to annual S
14、SDI payroll taxes for a lifetime median wage-earner, they do not include the taxpayer cost of employer incentives to retain disabled workers. Those subsidies may work during normal economic times, but not during recessions when the compensation of disabled workers net of the subsidies considerably e
15、xceeds their productivity. Flood Of Applicants On the other hand, PDI might attract so many new applicants ? including from among those currently employed ? that sizable cost savings to SSDI may never materialize. In that case, PDI would just become another new pay-go financed entitlement program of
16、 employment supports without any commensurate gains in employment or productivity. If, indeed, this approach could save SSDI costs by as much as the PDI proponents contend, an application delay with employment supports for appropriate candidates ? conditional on labor-force attachment and demonstrat
17、ion that employment supports are essential ? could be integrated into the current SSDI program itself ? an employment-conditioned disability front-end. This way, any cost savings would accrue immediately and directly to SSDI. The available policy options are: ? Increase payroll taxes to pay for SSDI
18、s unfunded costs. ? Create a new PDI entitlement with continuation of the current poorly structured SSDI program. ? Or reform SSDI directly to improve work incentives and potentially make the program financially more secure. Introducing a mandatory application delay with employment supports where ap
19、propriate within SSDI would avoid many of the Autor-Duggan proposals shortcomings and help to increase independence and self-sufficiency among many of tomorrows persons with disabilities. Todays narrow ruling in Virginia on the constitutionality of a provision of the Affordable Care Act is just one
20、of many recent rulings on similar cases that have come down in recent months. Since the law passed, opponents of reform have filed more than 20 different legal challenges. Judges have already granted the Administrations motion to dismiss 12 of these cases. And in two cases, federal judges looked at
21、the merits of the opponents arguments, determined that the Affordable Care Act is constitutional and upheld the law. We disagree with the ruling issued today in Virginia and the Department of Justice is considering its appeal options. We are pleased that Judge Hudson agrees that implementation of th
22、e law will continue uninterrupted. In the nine months since the health reform law was passed, weve made tremendous progress to strengthen our health care system, including lowering costs and implementing a new patients bill of rights to end some of the worst insurance company abuses. That work conti
23、nues. And were confident that when its all said and done, the courts will find the Affordable Care Act constitutional. History and the facts are on our side. Similar legal challenges to major new laws - including the Social Security Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the Voting Rights Act - were all fil
24、ed and all failed. Contrary to what opponents argue the new law falls well within Congresss power to regulate economic activity under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the General Welfare Clause. Opponents of reform claim that the individual responsibility requirement - the r
25、equirement that all Americans carry a minimum level insurance by 72014 -exceeds Congress power to regulate interstate commerce because it penalizes economic inactivity. Make no mistake - individuals who choose to go without health insurance are actively engaged in economic decision making - the deci
26、sion to pay for health care out-of-pocket or to seek uncompensated care. Every year millions of those who have chosen to go without health insurance actively seek medical care, which is evident in the billions of dollars spent on uncompensated care every year. The Affordable Care Act came into being
27、 precisely because of the interconnectedness of our health care costs. People who make an economic decision to forego health insurance do not opt out of the health care market, but instead shift their costs to others when they become ill or are involved in an accident and cannot pay. Those costs - $
28、43 billion in 2008 alone - are borne by doctors, hospitals, insured individuals, taxpayers and small businesses throughout the nation. This cost-shift added on average $1,000 to family premiums in 2009 and roughly $410 to an individual premium. This concept is clearly seen in other areas of commerce
29、. For example, in most states, drivers are required to carry a minimum level of auto insurance. Accidents happen and when they do, they need to be paid for quickly and responsibly. Requiring drivers to carry auto insurance accomplishes this goal. Similarly, the Affordable Care Act, through the indiv
30、idual responsibility requirement, will require everyone to carry some form of health insurance since everyone at some point in time participates in the health care system, and incur costs that must be paid for. Its no surprise then, that President Reagans Solicitor General Charles Fried recently wro
31、te, the health care laws enemies have no ally in the Constitution. Two federal judges that recently ruled on the challenge to the constitutionality of the reform law in Michigan and Virginia agreed. These lawsuits were dismissed, with the federal judge in Virginia concluding how and when to pay for
32、health care are activities.in the aggregate.substantially affects the interstate health care market. Two federal judges have agreed with this argument. In an earlier ruling in the Western District of Virginia, a federal judge wrote: I hold that there is a rational basis for Congress to conclude that
33、 individuals decisions about how and when to pay for health care are activities that in the aggregate substantially affect the interstate health care market.Nearly everyone will require health care services at some point in their lifetimes, and it is not always possible to predict when one will be a
34、fflicted by illness or injury and require care.Far from inactivity, by choosing to forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of insurance. As Congress found, the total incidence of th
35、ese economic decisions has a substantial impact on the national market for health care by collectively shifting billions of dollars on to other market participants and driving up the prices of insurance policies. The Affordable Care Act also bans insurance companies from discriminating against peopl
36、e with preexisting conditions. However, unless every American is required to have insurance, it would be cost prohibitive to cover people with preexisting conditions. Heres why: If insurance companies can no longer deny coverage to anyone who applies for insurance - especially those who have health
37、problems and are potentially more expensive to cover - then there is nothing stopping someone from waiting until theyre sick or injured to apply for coverage since insurance companies cant say no. That would lead to double digit premiums increases - up to 20% - for everyone with insurance, and would
38、 significantly increase the cost health care spending nationwide. We dont let people wait until after theyve been in a car accident to apply for auto insurance and get reimbursed, and we dont want to do that with healthcare. If were going to outlaw discrimination based on pre-existing conditions, th
39、e only way to keep people from gaming the system and raising costs on everyone else is to ensure that everyone takes responsibility for their own health insurance. There have been many rulings on court cases regarding health reform and we know there will be many more. In the end, the Affordable Care
40、 Act will prevail and the American people will enjoy the benefits of reform. Background: The plaintiff, Shawna P. Dombert, brings this action pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, denying the plaintiffs application for
41、 Supplemental Security Income. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the commissioners decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The SSA commissioner contends that there is substantial evidence in the record to support his decision to deny the plaintiff SSI benefits. Both p
42、arties have now moved for judgment. In 2008, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and SSI alleging disability due to back pain, arthritis, depression, anxiety, high blood pressure and a foot deformity. The Administrative Law Judge found that the plaintiff did not have
43、 an impairment listed in the regulations and that, although she did not have past relevant work experience, plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. Further, plaintiff is a 46-year-old woman with a high school education who has worked as a short order cook, an assist
44、ant to a disabled veteran, an assistant to a disabled woman, a cashier, a housekeeper and a seamstress. Ruling: The court finds that there is substantial medical evidence in the record for the ALJ to conclude that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and that
45、 the plaintiff could perform sedentary work. Sedentary work is defined as work that involves sitting, with occasional standing or walking, lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time, and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers. The ALJ properly weighed the various medical
46、opinions. The court finds that the ALJ properly determined that the plaintiffs subjective complaints were not credible as they were not supported by the record. Among the evidence, the March 2009 report from the plaintiffs treating physicians stated that she was able to stand and sit for an hour at
47、a time and lift 10 pounds. The plaintiff reported that she was able to take care of her eight-year-old son, do limited cleaning and shopping, drive and take public transportation. The plaintiffs complaint is therefore dismissed.译文: 美国社会保障的改革 最近山洪暴发般的经济衰退造成了大量应用与社会保障伤残保险的程序?每年超过 6万,在2009年至 2010 年松了一口
48、气 ? ?事实程序结构的合理性,SSDI是站不住脚的。当前应用程序潮将促进用尽 SSDI 的信托基金,并将强制国会在两个难吃选项中进行选择 ? ? SSDI 工资税的增加或减少福利津贴。但这是不足够的。如果要同时保留奖励工作,SSDI 为了服务,特别是弱势群体的程序已经被彻底调整了。为什么就业?甚至在经济比平时有轻微的身体或精神障碍中也适用,希望能获得 SSDI 下的禁用的状态。已接收 SSDI 好处的,回到工作中激励是很差。透露工作的能力,尤其如果是在一份低报酬的工作时,才可能导致SSDI 好处永久丢失。根据SSDI的强有力的工作抑制,因其资格标准指南受益奖项:不能从事实质效益可观活动,12
49、个月或者更多。麻省理工学院的教授 David Autor 和马里兰大学的教授Duggan 最近提出改革:两个问题,旨在解决其SSDI迫近的财政不足以及可怜的就业的奖励。他们提出了一个新前端通用程序的私人残疾保险 PDI ,由雇主和雇员共同支付的一种新的工资税。PDI 将为残疾工人服务,以期保持他们对这项工作的工人提供就业支持。它还会保留对这项工作的残疾的人士的雇主,提供新的补贴。根据他们的改革,谁能继续与辅助技术的 SSDI 应用程序会法定延迟22个月,在这段时间他们将继续接收 PDI 的就业支持,。严重残疾工人 SSDI 福利申请的人显然不能继续工作 ? ?他们将获准和以前一样。事实上,在所有的可能性中,严重残疾人士会为他人开始接收快速通过 SSDI 的体恤津贴计划的好处。当前 SSDI 将成为残疾保险的三个部分系统后端。Autor 和Duggan
