IMF-马尔代夫:金融部门评估方案关于宏观审慎政策的技术说明(英)-2024.1.docx

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1、INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDIMFCountryReportNo.24/21MA1.DIVESFINANCIA1.SECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAMJanuary2024TECHNICA1.NOTEONMACROPRUDENTIA1.PO1.ICYThispaperontheMaldiveswaspreparedbyastaffteamoftheInternationalMonetaryFundasbackgrounddocumentationfortheperiodicconsultationwiththemembercountry.Itisbasedon

2、theinformationavailableatthetimeitwascompletedonDecember18,2023.CopiesofthisreportareavailabletothepublicfromInternationalMonetaryFundPublicationServicesPOBox92780Washington,D.C.20090Telephone:(202)623-7430Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:publicationsimf.orgWeb:InternationalMonetaryFundWashington,D.C.2024Int

3、ernationalMonetaryFundINTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDMA1.DIVESFINANCIA1.SECTORASSESSMENTPROGRAMDecember18,2023TECHNICA1.NOTEMACROPRUDENTIA1.PO1.ICYPreparedByMonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartmentThisTechnicalNotewaspreparedbyIMFstaffinthecontextofajointIMF-WorIdBankFinancialSectorAssessmentProgram(FSAP)miss

4、ionintheMaldivesduringFebruary18-March2,2023.ItcontainstechnicalanalysisanddetailedinformationunderpinningtheFSAP,sfindingsandrecommendations.FurtherinformationontheFSAPcanbefoundatCONTENTSGlossary3EXECUTIVESUMMARY4INTR0DUC110N7INSTITUTIONA1.FRAMEWORK8A. WillingnesstoAct8B. AbilitytoAct9C. Effective

5、CoordinationandCooperation10D. AccountabilityandCommunication11E. Recommendations11SYSTEMICRISKMONITORING13A. ExistingIndicators13B. RecommendedAdditionalIndicators14MACROPRUDENTIA1.INSTRUMENTS18A. ExistingInstruments18B. EnvisagedInstruments19C. RecommendedAdditionalInstruments22References25BOX1. 1

6、.easeandHirePurchaseProgramsandHouseholdIndebtedness16FIGURES2. ExistingIndicators133. Credit-to-GDPGap154. DSTI1.evelandProbabilityofDefaultofMortgage1.oansinRomania21TAB1.ES1. RecommendationsonMacroprudentialPolicy62. ModelsforMacroprudentialDecision-MakingBodies93. SuggestedEarlyWarningIndicators

7、144. MacroprudentialInstruments:ComparisonwithPeerCountries185. BanksInternalPrudential1.imitsforHousehold1.oans206. RecommendedMacroprudentialInstruments24GlossaryBCBSBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionCARCapitalAdequacyRatioCCyBCountercyclicalCapitalBufferQBCreditInformationBureauCMDACapitalMarketD

8、evelopmentAuthorityCRECommercialRealEstateCYCurrencyD-SIBDomesticallySystemicallyImportantBankd-SRIDomesticSystemicRiskIndicatorDSTIDebtServicetoIncomeRatioFCForeignCurrencyFCAFinancialConductAuthorityFXForeignExchangeFSAPFinancialSectorAssessmentProgramHDCHousingDevelopmentCorporationHDFCHousingDev

9、elopmentFinanceCorporationHPHodrick-PrescottHQ1.AHigh-Quality1.iquidAssets1.C1.ocalCurrency1.CR1.iquidityCoverageRatio1.TD1.oan-to-DepositRatio1.TI1.oan-to-IncomeRatio1.TV1.oan-to-ValueRatioMF1.CMaldivesFinanceand1.easingCompanyMMAMaldivesMonetaryAuthorityMoFMinistryofFinanceMoUMemorandumofUnderstan

10、dingMVRMaldivianRufiyaaNBFINon-BankFinancialInstitutionsNBSNationalBureauofStatisticsNOPNetOpenPositionNP1.Non-Performing1.oanNSFRNetStableFundingRatioPDProbabilityofDefaultRBIReserveBankofIndiaRRReserveRequirementsRWARisk-WeightedAssetsSDFCSMEDevelopmentFinanceCorporationSOEState-OwnedEnterpriseSyR

11、BSystemicRiskBufferEXECUTIVESUMMARY】TheMaldivesMonetaryAuthority(MMA)istheentityresponsibleformaintainingfinancialstability.TheBoardofthemonetaryauthorityhasdecision-makingpowersoverMMA,sthreemandates(inorderofpriority):maintainpricestability,maintainfinancialstability,provideassistancetothegovernme

12、ntinattainingeconomicdevelopmentandstability.Tomaintainfinancialstability,MMAregulatesandsupervisesthefinancialinstitutionsandoverseesthepaymentsandsettlementssystem.ItalsohousesaCreditInformationBureau(CIB),akeyelementforbothmicroandmacroprudentialsupervision.Thesecuritiesmarket,outsideofthescopeof

13、MMA,isregulatedbytheCapitalMarketDevelopmentAuthority(CMDA).MMAdoesnothaveamacroprudentialframework.MMA,slowcapacityandsentimentthatthefinancialsystemisisolated,simple,andlowriskhasresultedinaminimalistapproachtoitssupervision.Thereisnomacroprudentialcommitteeandnomacroprudentialmandatewithclearobje

14、ctives.ThebulkoftheworkonmacroprudentialpolicywouldneedtobedonebyafinancialstabilityunitatMMA1separatefromthe,banksandOFIdivision,zasthelatterlacksclearcorrespondingobjectivesandresourcestosafeguardfinancialstability.Inaddition,coordinationwithbothCMDAandthemainstakeholdersofthefinancialsystemappear

15、stobelimited.Communicationtothepublicisalsosparse,withnopublicationofafinancialstabilityreport.1.ast,MMAsuffersfromasignificantlackofdatainfrastructure.DespitetheexistenceoftheCIB,dataqualityappearstobeinsufficientwithmanygaps,andaccesstothedatabaseistoolimitedinpractice.Systemicriskmonitoringisvery

16、limitedandonlyafewmacroprudentialinstrumentsareimplemented.MMAdoesnotmonitoranyindicatorofsystemicrisk,butonlyafewmacroeconomicseriesthatarekeytothetourismsector(e.g.,touristarrivals,numberofbed-nights).Indicatorsofcreditcycle,realestate,corporateperformance,andhouseholdindebtednessarenotmonitored.I

17、naddition,MMAusesasinglemacroprudentialinstrument(leverageratio),althoughitiscontemplatingintroducingotherselectedtools(e.g.,1.oan-to-Value(1.TV)andDebt-Service-to-Income(DSTI)limits).Tostrengthenthewillingnessandabilitytoact,theFSAPteamrecommendsestablishingacomprehensivemacroprudentialframework.Th

18、ecreationofamacroprudentialcommitteewithaclearmandateanddecision-makingpowersisrecommended.Thiscommitteewouldrelyonawell-resourcedfinancialstabilityunit,actingasasecretariatandprovidingdata-drivenrecommendations.TheunitsmandateandlegitimacywouldbeenhancedbyprovidingalegaldefinitionOffinancialstabili

19、tywithclearintermediateobjectives.Increasingcoordinationwiththemainstakeholdersandcommunicationtothepublicwouldstrengthentransparencyandaccountability.Tothataim,regular1ThistechnicalnotewaspreparedbyEtienneVaccaro-Grange(MCM).TheanalysisbenefitedfromdiscussionswiththestaffoftheMMAandreviewersattheIM

20、F.meetingswiththemainactorsofthefinancialsystemshouldbeorganizedandanannualfinancialstabilityreportshouldbepublished.MMAshouldconsidercreatingasetofearlywarningindicatorsandfurtherdevelopitsmacroprudentialtoolkit.Acomprehensivedashboardofbothbroad-basedandsectoralindicatorswouldhelpmonitorsystemicri

21、sks.Indicatorsofcredit,realestatedevelopment,corporateperformance,andhouseholdindebtednessshouldbeconsideredforimplementation.Inaddition,theintroductionofseveralkeymacroprudentialinstrumentswouldhelppreventtheemergenceofsystemicrisk.MMAshouldfollowthroughonitsplantointroducetwohousehold-relatedinstr

22、uments(limitsto1.TVandDSTIratios).TheFSAPteamrecommendsthedevelopmentofadditionalinstrumentstosafeguardbankliquidityandreducethecurrencymismatchofbanks(1.iquidityCoverageRatio(1.CR),NetStableFundingRatio(NSFR)and1.oan-to-Deposit(1.TD)inbothlocalandforeigncurrency)aswellasotherinstrumentsrecommendedb

23、ytheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervision(e.g.zBaselI11capitalbuffers,SystemicRiskBuffer(SyRB),BaselPillar1/2capitalsurcharge).Table1summarizesthemainrecommendationswiththeassociatedtimehorizonsofimplementation.Table1.Maldives:RecommendationsonMacroprudentialPolicyRecommendationsTiming1InstitutionalFra

24、meworkCreateaMacroprudentialCommitteehousedinMMA.(T20) Givemacroprudentialmandateanddecision-makingpowers. CoordinatewithMoFandCMDA,andotherstakeholdersasneeded.STEstablishaMacroprudentialMandate.(1121)Definefinancialstabilityinthelawwithclearmacroprudentialobjectives.STCreateafinancialstabilityunit

25、atMMA.(1122) Directcommunicationchanneltothemacroprudentialcommittee(actassecretariat). Giveclearobjectives,includinganalysisofsystemicrisks,preparationoffinancialstabilityreport. Increasehumanresources(headcounts,budgetallocation).STPublishaFinancialStabilityReport.(H23) Backwardandforward-lookinga

26、ssessmentofriskstofinancialstability. Tobepublishedinbetweenannualreportstoprovideupdateoffinancialsectordevelopments. Presenttokeystakeholders(e.g.,MoFandtheParliament).MTImprovedatainfrastructure.(1124) GrantaccesstoCIBtorelevantMMAdivisions(banksandOFIdivision,futurefinancialstabilityunit). Addre

27、ssvariousdatagapsatCIB. BuildadatabaseofcorporatefinancialdatathroughMMAon-siteinspections. Constructapropertypriceindex,leveragingexistinginformation(e.g.,atHDFC).ISystemicRiskMonitoringDevelopsystemicriskindicators.(I26-H33)Developindicatorsformeasurementandmonitoringofsystemicrisk.MTMacroprudentl

28、alInstrumentsCalibratecontemplatedandothermacroprudentialinstruments.(I35-1I39)Introduceregulatorylimitsto1.TV,1.T1.1.CR,NSFR,1.TDratios.MTDevelopotherinstrumentsrecommendedbytheBCBS.(H40-U45)IntroduceBaselIIIcapitalbuffers.MT11:Immediately;ST:Shortterm(lessthan1year);MT:MediumTerm(1-5years)INTRODUC

29、TION1. TheassessmentofmacroprudentialpolicywasconductedduringthefirstmissionoftheFSAPinFebruary-March2023.FollowingaWorldBankDevelopmentModulein2016,thisisthefirstjointIMF-WorIdBankFSAPwiththeMaldives.ThisTechnicalNoteprovidesaroadmapforestablishingaframeworkformacroprudentialpolicyaswellasdevelopin

30、gsystemicriskindicatorsandmacroprudentialpolicytools.2. TheCOVID-19pandemichastakenaseveretollontheMaldivestourism-dependenteconomy.Tourismactivitycollapsedascontainmentmeasures,notablytemporaryborderclosures,wereputinplacetocontainthespreadofthevirus.Asaresult,realGDPcontractedbyanunprecedented32.9

31、percentin2020.Althoughtheeconomyreboundedwitha37.7percentincreaseineconomicactivityin2021,astouristinfluxresumed,thepandemichasexacerbatedpre-existingvulnerabilities.Apersistentlyhighfiscaldeficitandawideningcurrentaccountdeficitcoupledwithrisinggovernmentdebtandadepletionofinternationalreserveshave

32、puttheMaldivesinadifficultpositiondespitenear-recordlevelsoftouristarrivalsinrecentmonths.3. TheFSAPteamidentifiedseveralmacro-financialsourcesofsystemicrisk.PersistentFXshortages,astrongsovereign-banknexus,andhighloanconcentrationposethreatstofinancialstability.Inaddition,MMA,slowcapacityandsentime

33、ntthatthefinancialsystemisisolated,simple,andlowriskhasresultedinaminimalistapproachtoitssupervision.Forinstance,MMAhasnomacroprudentialframework,nodashboardofearlywarningindicatorsofsystemicrisk,andonlyasinglemacroprudentialinstrument.4. Despiterecordlevelsoftouristarrivals,thereisapersistentshorta

34、geofFXinthebankingsystem.Duetohighcurrentaccountdeficitsstemmingfromlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojectsandrisingSOEandcentralgovernmentexternaldebtservice,DebtserviceinpercentofdomesticGNFSexportsgrewfrom7.5percentin2018,to12.9percentin2019,and37.4percentin2020,beforedecliningthereafter.ExternalPPGdeb

35、tgrewfrom40.3percentin2019to74.9percentin2020,beforereversingthetrendinthefollowingyears.MMA,sgrossinternationalreservesdeclinedfromUSD985millionin2020toUSD806millionin2021beforereboundingtoUSD832millionin2022.TheseexternalimbalanceshaveledtoinsufficientFXsupplyfromMMAtobanksandapersistentparallelma

36、rketwithapremiumofabout15percent.Asaresult,theremaybeunmetcreditdemandinFXintheeconomyandnaturallyhedgedFXborrowersmayencounterliquidityshocksifthereisastopintourismandFXinflows.Goingforward,highlevelsofexternaldebtservicefromthepublicsector,alongwithtighterglobalfinancialconditions,mayputadditional

37、strainontheexchangeratepegandcouldleadtoadevaluationifthecountryalsoweretoexperienceasevereeconomicshock.5. Astrongsovereign-banknexusposesriskstothebankingsector.Theshareofbanks,holdingsofgovernmentdebtamountedto135percentofregulatorycapitalatend-2022,aidedbyzeroriskweightsandnoregulatorylimitsonsu

38、chholdings.Inaddition,somelargeSOEshaveunsustainablefinancialpositions(e.g.,HDC),whichincreasestheneedforgovernmentsupportandthecontingentliabilities.Iffiscalspaceweretotightenfurther,thegovernmentmaynolongerbeabletoprovidesupporttotheSOEs.Thismayeventuallyspillovertothefinancialsector.6. Ahighloanc

39、oncentrationexposesbankstoasignificantcreditrisk.Onebankisclosetothesupervisorysinglelargeexposurelimitasthecorporatesectorischaracterizedbyafewlargefirms.Duetoweaknessesinthedataqualityandcoverageofthecreditinformationbureau(CIB),totalhouseholddebt(service)isunderestimated.Inparticular,theexclusion

40、ofnon-regulatedIease-and-hirefpurchasefirmsisanimportantdatagapthatpreventsapropermonitoringofhouseholdindebtedness.7. MMAdoesnothaveamacroprudentialframework.MMAhasaminimalistapproachtoitsmacroprudentialpolicy.Thereisnoinstitutionalframeworkinplace(nomacroprudentialmandate,nocoordinationcommitteeto

41、discussfinancialstabilityissues).MMAhasnodefinitionofsystemicrisk,doesnotconductanyregularanalysisoffinancialstability,anddoesnotpublishanyfinancialstabilityreport.Ithasnorelevantdataatitsdisposal,apartforafewmacroeconomicseriesthatarekeytothetourismsector(e.g.,touristarrivals,numberofbed-nights).In

42、addition,onlyasinglemacroprudentialinstrumentisinplace(aleverageratio),althoughMMAhasbeencontemplatingintroducingselectedtools(e.g.,1.TV,DSTIlimits,liquidityinstruments).8. Againstthisbackdrop,theFSAPteamsrecommendstheintroductionofamacroprudentialframeworktohelpMMAmaintainfinancialstability.Acompre

43、hensivemacroprudentialframework,including:(i)stronginstitutionalarrangementstoensurethewillingnessandabilitytoactofthemacroprudentialauthority,(ii)thedevelopmentofbroad-basedandsectoralearlywarningindicators,and(iii)theuseofrelevantmacroprudentialinstruments,constitutethebasisforasoundmacroprudentia

44、lpolicyworkingtowardsmaintainingfinancialstability.INSTITUTIONA1.FRAMEWORKA.WillingnesstoAct9. Astronginstitutionalframeworkisessentialtoensurethatmacroprudentialpolicycanworkeffectively.Theframeworkneedstoassurewillingnesstoactandcounterbiasesforinactionorinsufficientlytimelyactionthatcanarisefromd

45、ifficultiesinquantifyingthebenefitsofmacroprudentialaction.Aclearmandatecancounterthesebiasesandunderpinthelegitimacyofpolicyactionwhensurveillancepointstoelevatedsystemicrisks.Equallyimportant,theframeworkneedstofostertheabilitytoactinthefaceofevolvingsystemicthreats,byassuringaccesstoinformationan

46、daneffectivesurveillancecapacity,andbyassigninganappropriaterangeandreachofmacroprudentialinstrumentstothemacroprudentialauthority.Itneedsfinallytopromoteeffectivecooperationinriskassessmentsandmitigation,inamannerthatpreservestheautonomyofseparatepolicyfunctions.Thissectionevaluatesthecurrentinstit

47、utionalarrangementsintheMaldivesagainstthesethreekeyprinciples,whicharesetoutintheIMFStaffGUidanCeNoteOnMaCrOPnJdentialPoliCy(IMF2014a).10. MMAisthedesignatedauthorityinchargeoffinancialstabilityintheMaldives.Althoughitdoesnothaveapropermacroprudentialmandateorframework,MMAistheentityinchargeofmaint

48、ainingfinancialstabilitywithoutprejudicetomaintainingpricestabilityconducivetotheSustainabIegrowthoftheeconomy,asperitsmandate(MMAAct,2020amendmentsection4).MMAisresponsibleforregulatingandsupervisingthefinancialsectorotherthanthesecuritiesmarket,whichisregulatedbyCMDA.MMAalsoregulatesthepaymentsystemandhousestheCIB,bothofwhichareanimportantpartofthefinancialmarketinfrastructure.11. MMAdoesnothavealegaldefinitionoffinancialstabilitybutonlyanoperationalone.MMAstatesonitsweb

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